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The goal of my dissertation is to describe the history of the South Korean1 space program 
and to use it to offer some insights on reframing space history from a global point of view. South 
Korea is a new player among the space faring nations. While some of the necessary 
infrastructure was put in place in the 30 years after the launch of Sputnik, the country only really 
made a commitment space in the 1990s, developing rapidly to become a significant presence 
today. The launch of KITsat-1 (Uribyul-1, the first Korean satellite) in 1992 marks its first major 
achievement, after which it built up its technological capabilities in the space sector in a 
relatively short period. South Korea now has twelve satellites and operates several space projects, 
and successfully developed its first space launch vehicle, KSLV-1, also known as Naro, in 2013. 
Although KSLV-1 is derived from the first stage of the Russian Angara rocket, combined with a 
solid-fueled second stage built by South Korea, its successful launch was the crucial step for the 
development of the country’s civilian space program. South Korea aims to develop the first 
wholly Korean-made launch rocket, KSLV-2 by 2020, which will additionally be used to launch 
a moon orbiter later that year. 
Korea’s recent aspiration to space exploration can be seen as part of global narrative in 
which the conquest of space is not dominated by a few superpowers. Our understanding of the 
past half-century of space development is, however, still firmly rooted in the framework of the 
old Cold-War-centered approach to space history. Until recently, only large and powerful nations 
have been able to mobilize the resources necessary for access to space, so the early years of 
space exploration produced a simple narrative: a fierce space competition between the Soviet 
xii 
 
Union and the U. S., with a few countries following behind in a struggle to increase their 
presence in space. Yet emerging powers’ stories of space development were barely noticed in 
comparison with the abundant literature on the space history of the super-powers and the 
increasing literature on middle-range space powers. In order to situate the South Korean space 
program in this evolving global context, this dissertation attempts to answer the following critical 
questions: What is the origin of Korean space development? Why is South Korea a late-comer in 
space, and why is it becoming more active today? How have its motivations and rationales 
evolved in defining relationships with other countries including the U.S., Russia, France, China, 
Japan, and even North Korea? Why does it continue to emphasize the need for “Korean” 
technology in space? In essence, what is Korean about the Korean space program? 
I seek answers to these questions by examining the relationship between a “space 
program” and “the construction of national identity” in a political, social, and transnational 
context. Through historical analysis, I will show that South Korea’s space program has been 
primarily driven by nationalistic rationales implicit in the argument that space development 
served “modernization,” “self-defense,”, “economic security”, and “national prestige.” By 
tracing the multiple links between technological prowess and national imagination, I connect 
these four rationales using to periodization; 1950s~1960s, 1970~1984, 1985~1997, and 
1998~2013. A close examination of the history of the development of space exploration in South 
Korea offers a fertile ground for exploring the question how the rationales of space development 




CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
 
The goal of my dissertation is to describe the history of the South Korean1 space 
program and to use it to offer some insights on reframing space history from a global point of 
view. South Korea is a new player among the space faring nations. While some of the 
necessary infrastructure was put in place in the 30 years after the launch of Sputnik, the 
country only really made a commitment space in the 1990s, developing rapidly to become a 
significant presence today. The launch of KITsat-1 (Uribyul-1, the first Korean satellite) in 
1992 marks its first major achievement, after which it built up its technological capabilities in 
the space sector in a relatively short period. South Korea now has twelve satellites and 
operates several space projects, and successfully developed its first space launch vehicle, 
KSLV-1, also known as Naro, in 2013. Although KSLV-1 is derived from the first stage of 
the Russian Angara rocket, combined with a solid-fueled second stage built by South Korea, 
its successful launch was the crucial step for the development of the country’s civilian space 
program. South Korea aims to develop the first wholly Korean-made launch rocket, KSLV-2 
by 2020, which will additionally be used to launch a moon orbiter later that year.  
Korea’s recent aspiration to space exploration can be seen as part of global narrative 
in which the conquest of space is not dominated by a few superpowers. Although rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union framed the early historiography of space 
exploration, going into space always engaged more nations. By the mid-1960s, other 
                                       




countries had already begun to develop the capability to send satellites into orbit using their 
own launch vehicles. In 1965, France became the third nation to achieve access to space with 
an indigenously built launcher, later sharing technologies with other European countries to 
develop the Ariane launcher family.2 Japan and China launched their first satellites in 1970, 
followed by India in 1980, and Israel in 1988. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, a 
growing number of states and corporations have begun to seek their own place in space 
exploration. Looking back over the space age, Brian Harvey et al. divide the “space powers” 
into three categories: the original space “super-powers” such as the U. S. and Russia/Soviet 
Union; a larger group of “middle-range space powers” who launched their satellites between 
1960 and 1980 such as France, Japan, China, and India; and the new “emerging powers” that 
followed thereafter, such as Israel, Brazil, North Korea, Iran and South Korea.3  
Our understanding of the past half-century of space development is, however, still 
firmly rooted in the framework of the old Cold-War-centered approach to space history. Until 
recently, only large and powerful nations have been able to mobilize the resources necessary 
for access to space, so the early years of space exploration produced a simple narrative: a 
fierce space competition between the Soviet Union and the U. S., with a few countries 
                                       
2 France provided a spaceport for ESA (European Space Agency) space launchers in French Guyana, 
transferring between 1975 and 1980 its capability to ESA as a founding member. ESA signatories at 
the time of first launch were Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, France and Ireland. These countries became shareholders in the 
commercial company Arianespace dealing with production, operation, and marketing except Ireland 
and United Kingdom. For a detailed history of European space program see John Krige, Fifty Years of 
European Cooperation in Space: Building on its Past, ESA Shapes the Future (Beauchesne, 2014).  
3 Israel became the eighth nation to have space launch capability in 1988, followed by Iran in 2009, 
North Korea in 2012. Brazil has yet to launch a satellite into orbit independently and its space 
program suffered three satellite launch failures in the early 2000s. Brian Harvey, Emerging Space 
Powers the New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East and South America (London; Chichester: 
Springer; Praxis, 2009), p. 543. 
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following behind in a struggle to increase their presence in space. Yet emerging powers’ 
stories of space development were barely noticed in comparison with the abundant literature 
on the space history of the super-powers and the increasing literature on middle-range space 
powers. For this reason, space historian Asif Siddiqi suggests that “other national space 
programs will require us to approach space history with new lenses as more and more new 
narratives join the old cold-war-centered approach to space history.”4 
In order to situate the South Korean space program in this evolving global context, 
this dissertation attempts to answer the following critical questions: What is the origin of 
Korean space development? Why is South Korea a late-comer in space, and why is it 
becoming more active today? How have its motivations and rationales evolved in defining 
relationships with other countries including the U.S., Russia, France, China, Japan, and even 
North Korea? Why does it continue to emphasize the need for “Korean” technology in space? 
In essence, what is Korean about the Korean space program? 
I seek answers to these questions by examining the relationship between a “space 
program” and “the construction of national identity” in a political, social, and transnational 
context. Through historical analysis, I will show that South Korea’s space program has been 
primarily driven by nationalistic rationales implicit in the argument that space development 
served “modernization”, “self-defense”, “economic security”, and “national prestige.” By 
tracing the multiple links between technological prowess and national imagination, I connect 
these four rationales using to periodization; 1950s~1960s, 1970~1984, 1985~1997, and 
1998~2013. A close examination of the history of the development of space exploration in 
                                       
4 Asif Siddiqi, “Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a 
Global History of Space Exploration,” Technology and Culture 51, no. 2 (2010): 425–443. 
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South Korea offers a fertile ground for exploring the question how the rationales of space 
development have evolved as the Korean state worked on nation-building in a global context. 
  
Historiographical Context 
Compared to China, India, and Japan which have received the bulk of recent attention 
for their space programs in Asia’s space race,5 there has been very little research on the 
origin of the Korean space program and its development; there is still no comprehensive 
monograph. However, since the mid-2000s, several scholars have begun paying attention to 
the emergence of South Korea as a new player which has been remarkably dynamic over the 
past decade. Many scholars have attempted to explain its dynamics mainly through economic 
perspectives. For example, Lee Joosung and Chung Seungmi argue that Korea’s space 
development has been focused on “technology catch-up,” where the growth of industrial 
competitiveness is an important rationale.6 Kim Jongbum shows that the Korean space 
program has been directed under the “banner of pragmatism,” through an analysis of 
presidential speeches from 1993 to 2005.7 Similarly, Hwang Chin Young argues that the 
space industry is a symbolic industry through which South Korea can prove its national 
                                       
5 For a detailed history of Asian countries’ space programs see Brian Harvey, China's Space Program 
- From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (Springer, 2004); Yasushi Sato, “A contested Gift of 
Power: American Assistance to Japan’s Space Launch Vehicle Technology, 1965-1975,” Historia 
Scientarum 11, no. 2 (November, 2001); Gopal Raj, Reach for the Star: The Evolution of India’s 
Rocket Programme (New Delhi: Viking, 2000); Ashok Maharaj, Space for Development: US –India 
Space Relations, 1955 – 1976 (Doctoral Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2011). 
6 Joosung J. Lee and Seungmi Chung, “Space Policy for Late Comer Countries: A Case Study of 
South Korea,” Space Policy 27, no. 4 (November, 2011): 227–233. 
7 Jong Bum Kim, “Rationales of Korean Space Development,” Technology Trend of Aerospace 
Industry 4, no. 2 (2006): 3–9. (in Korean) 
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technological capability as well as its national power.8 Following Hwang’s argument, Juan 
Felipe Lopez-Aymes defines the “emblematic character” of the Korean space industry as 
“economic nationalism” - the interaction of economic process and national identity that 
includes a political use of that identity for developmental purposes.9 
Other scholars focus on the evolution of South Korea’s capability in space as it relates 
to its national security. Daniel Pinkston argues that South Korea has developed rocket 
technology for military and civilian applications dominantly in response to the actions of 
North Korea.10 Kim Kyung-Min also argues that the notion of a space program still sounds 
“exotic and adventurous” to South Koreans; it merely wishes to build its own capability to 
gather information aimed at identifying the existence of any security threats across the 
border.11 Stressing the influence of a U.S. ban on developing long-range missiles, James 
Mortz argues that Korea’s swift progress is due to “the desire to be recognized as an 
independent, modern, and technologically advanced society.”12 
                                       
8 Chin Young Hwang, “Space Activities in Korea—History, Current Programs and Future Plans,” 
Space Policy 22, no. 3 (August 2006): 194–199. 
9 Juan Felipe Lopez-Aymes, “Automobile, Information and Communication Technology and Space 
Industries as Icons of South Korean Economic Nationalism,” Pacific Focus 25, no. 2 (July 26, 2010): 
289–312. 
10 Daniel Pinkston, “North and South Korean Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and 
Conflict,” Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics and Policy 4, no. 2 (August 1, 
2006): 207–227. 
11 Kyung-Min Kim, “South Korean Capabilities for Space Security,” in John Logsdon and James 
Moltz (eds.), Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (George Washington University; the 
Space Policy Institute, 2008): 67–74. 
12 James Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International 
Risks, (Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 138. 
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Previous research on South Korean space development has certain limitations. First, 
most of the previous studies are descriptive reports of the current conditions of Korea’s space 
development and a catalogue of events since the 1990s (with the exception of a few which 
start in the 1970s), rather than providing the full story since the 1950s within the framework 
of relevant social, political, and economic contexts. Thus, these studies and reports are 
largely disconnected, failing to provide a comprehensive and historical overview of South 
Korean space development. Second, they are dominated by the political and diplomatic 
context in which political leaders have constructed a “master narrative” of the history of 
space exploration and made major decisions regarding national space policy. So they did not 
include much of the public discourse describing space exploration which rhetorically and 
symbolically communicates persistent ideas about space exploration.13 These histories 
instead serve as “a filter for the public understanding of spaceflight and consequently 
contribute to the public enthusiasm for space exploration and national space policy.” Third, 
the most critical and common problem is that by heavily focusing on the national narratives 
of professional engineering identities, they pay scant attention to the connected histories of 
developed space-faring countries and their international collaborations in a global context. 
Indeed, the Korean space program has been at the intersection of multiple flows of 
knowledge from a variety of sources across borders in complicated diplomatic and political 
contexts.  
 
                                       
13 This point was made by Glen Asner, “Space History from the Bottom Up: Using Social History to 
Interpret the Societal Impact of Spaceflight,” in Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (eds.), Societal 
Impact of Spaceflight (Washington, DC: NASA, 2007): 387–406. 
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A Transnational Perspective on the Korean Program 
With these limitations of the existing literature in mind, I here reframe the history of 
South Korean space development by focusing on the complex relationship between “nation-
building” and “space development” within a changing global context. Throughout the 20th 
century, and with particular emphasis after WWII, governments came to see science and 
technology as levers of industrial development, economic growth and military strength. As 
instruments of modernization they promised both to improve the lives of citizens in both 
developed and developing countries, and to project the power of the nation-state abroad.14 
For example, in her book, the Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after 
World War II, Gabrielle Hecht shows that France’s nuclear program after World War II 
offered “technological prowess” as a solution to restore its glorious past after WWII, 
epitomizing the link between French radiance and technological achievement.15 
“Technologists,” including engineers as well as top administrators of industrial state 
enterprises, justified the investment in a large-scale technological system by placing it in 
direct historical lineage with past national achievements: nuclear reactors were the modern 
heirs of the Eiffel Tower, twentieth-century symbol of technological progress. Suzanne 
Moon’s research on Indonesian industrialization is another good example.16 She explores the 
connections between technology and the postcolonial project of national identity formation in 
                                       
14 Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990). 
15 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity After World War 
II, (Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press, 2009). 
16 Suzanne Moon, “Justice, Geography, and Steel: Technology and National Identity in Indonesian 
Industrialization,” Osiris 24 (2009): 253-277. 
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Indonesia in the early period of industrialization, from 1950-75. The process of defining a 
national identity for Indonesia was particularly challenging due to its geographic and social 
fragmentation; it is an archipelago consisting of more than 13,000 islands where there are 
hundreds of different languages and sizable minorities who are Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, 
and animist. In this context, political elites worked assiduously to use a variety of 
technologies to unite the people around a cohesive national project: technologies such as 
newspapers, the radio, television, the airplane, and satellites were enlisted to overcome both 
cultural difference and physical distance. To unite the people of the islands, create patriotic 
loyalty to the new state, and to define Indonesia’s place in the world geographically and 
politically, technology and national identity were made to play mutually reinforcing roles in 
the narratives. 
Space programs are perceived as an important sign of technological prowess in the 
construction of a national identity, because only nations and alliances of states have had the 
resources to develop reliable and effective space transportation systems.17 The history of the 
past 50-years of spaceflight shows that the connection between nation-building and space 
development has endured both in reality and in perception. The American and Russian space 
programs have reinforced the notion that space exploration is a powerful vehicle for 
expressing a nation’s broader aspirations. The emerging powers, including China and Japan, 
have also strengthened the link between nationalism and competence in space activities 
recently. South Korea is not an exception. In an interview with the BBC in November 2007, 
the president of KARI, Paik Hong-Yul, insisted that “our space program is about courage and 
                                       
17 Asif Siddiqi, “Spaceflight in the National Imagination,” in Steven J. Dick (ed.), Remembering The 
Space Age: Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary Conference (Washington, DC: NASA, 2008): 17-35. 
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dreams. This is above money; it’s about developing as a nation and that’s why we do it.”18 
Nevertheless, all nations do not share the same rationale for space exploration. Rather, each 
defines its space accomplishments according to its own cultural and social values, rooted in 
the framework of the national imagination.  
I draw attention to the concept of “imagination,” which plays a significant role via 
artificial mediators in the making of the collective consciousness whether it crosses the 
borders of a nation-state or not. The concept of “imagination” has been used frequently by 
historians for explaining how the “nation” is constructed as a mental image of affinity within 
its citizens’ minds. Benedict Anderson defined a nation as “an imagined community…[that is] 
both inherently limited and sovereign.”19 Indeed, the advent of print technology in more 
wealthy nations allowed people to “imagine” large linked communities that had previously 
enjoyed no special form of togetherness. In the eighteenth century, newspapers and novels 
created a vernacular readership whose limits often helped to “define the nation”. These forms 
provided the technical means of ‘representing’ the kind of imagined community that is a 
nation.  Meanwhile, Arjun Appadurai has argued that the contemporary world has 
manipulated the imagination via the media and made it public, thereby emphasizing the role 
of the imagination as an essential component of the new global order.20 
The role of the imagination in national space exploration has tended to center around 
the projects of the two main space superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. For 
                                       
18 “South Korea Buys into Space Dream,” BBC News (November 12, 2007). 
19 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Rev. ed. (London; New York: Verso, 2006). 
20 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity Al Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis; 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
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example, in his book, Space and the American Imagination, Howard McCurdy offered 
largely cultural explanations for the changing American attitudes toward space exploration in 
the twentieth century and the subsequent changes in public policies. He defines the 
imagination as “mental images of events or processes that are not actually present,” and the 
mental images produced by the imagination may also be called “vision”. McCurdy argues 
that the vision of the space program has provided a strong boost promoting the American 
space programs since the early 1940s, borrowing U.S. historian Walter McDougall’s 
expression, “Once these forces [a rich economy, the appropriate technology, and imagination] 
started pushing in the same direction, a large government-supported space program was 
automatic.”21 According to him, the vision of space as “the New World” and “the final 
frontier” inspired the “American” space program since the early 1940s. In their attempts to 
justify the modern space program, advocates worked hard to sustain the image of discovery 
fostered by previous explorers, such as Lewis and Clark pressing across the uncharted 
continent, Admirals Peary and Byrd’s exploration of the icy waters of the poles, and 
Lindberg’s non-stop, solo, trans-Atlantic flight22. Indeed, the preexisting American cultural 
ideals of the endless frontier, of the heroic explorer, and of progress through technology made 
selling the space program to policy makers and the general public much easier.  
 Similarly, in his recent book entitled The Red Rockets’ Glare: Spaceflight and the 
Soviet Imagination 1857-1957, Asif Siddiqi attempts to reframe the birth of the Soviet space 
program by linking the ideology for building a communist nation to engineering. The Russian 
                                       
21 Howard McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination (Washington: Smithsonian Inst Press, 
1999), p. 34. 
22 Ibid. p. 143. 
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imagination of the cosmos in the late nineteenth century intersected with the practical 
realities of rocket engineering, in other words “technological utopianism.” According to him, 
the network of space activists, including science fiction writers and philosophers, in the 
1920s through the 1950s promoted a technological utopian view of space exploration. Before 
the Revolution of 1917, for example, Russian utopian philosophers, such as Lev Trotskii, 
incorporated both Marxist notions and twentieth-century modernist ideals of science and 
technology23. Their dream of space flight represented “liberation from Earth” and “fantasy 
beyond reality,” which could represent total liberation from social injustice and imperfections 
in the past through a combination of technology.24 In this way imagined futures influenced 
the thinking of Soviet citizens, creating the notion that space exploration was both inevitable 
and necessary.  
McCurdy and Siddiqi’s works are crucial not simply because they show how national 
imagination has had a significant role in moving a space program forward, but because they 
provide major insights into the nature of the relationship between nation-building and space 
exploration. The imagineries that facilitated nations’ space programs have not been one-
dimensional; rather they were heterogeneous as well as historically contextual. For example, 
McCurdy points out that even though the imagination of the ‘final frontier’ boosted American 
space projects and seems to reflect the American spirit, the notion of “frontier opportunity” 
was also criticized as simplistic by many Americans. African Americans and Indians did not 
view the New World as a land of opportunity and invention, and frontier women did not 
                                       
23 Asif Siddiqi, The Red Rockets’ Glare : Spaceflight and the Soviet Imagination, 1857-1957 
(Cambridge UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 76. 
24 Ibid, p. 78. 
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enjoy the same freedoms as frontier men. Indeed, one of the most important images in the 
post-Apollo era was that space travel would become routine and available to ordinary citizens, 
rather than that space exploration would exemplify national prowess. Siddiqi also points out 
that the major Russian imagination, “technological utopianism,” showed that the Soviet 
Union’s space program was not the outcome of forces that were consistent with the aims and 
ideologies of the state. Rather, it was only possible under the fantasy and fascination with 
twentieth-century modernist ideals of science and technology, which were significantly 
influenced by “foreign factors”. 
Articles claiming to offer a transnational perspective on history have proliferated for 
the past two decades. However, discussions on the pros and cons of this concept are still 
ongoing in some fields, and the opportunity for historians of technology to engage with a 
transnational perspective has emerged only recently. Chris Bayly’s AHR (American 
Historical Review) group suggests that transnational history is “an approach to history that 
focuses on a whole range of connections that transcend politically bounded territories and 
connect various parts of the world to one another. Networks, institutions, ideas, and processes 
constitute these connections, and though rulers, empires, and states are important in 
structuring them, they transcend politically bounded territories.”25 Notice, they use the term 
“politically bounded territories” instead of national borders. Essential to the notion of the 
transnational history is to “transcend and de-isolate” the nation-state as a unit of analysis. 
                                       
25 Chris Bayly et al., “AHR Conversation: on Transnational History,” American Historical Review 
111: 5 (2006): 1441-1464, p. 1446. 
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Meanwhile, Erik van der Vleuten’s recent study gives three guidelines for a 
transnational history of technology.26 First, transnational history often refers to the study of 
cross-border flows. This focuses on the circulation of flows of people, ideas and objects 
across national boundaries, with the structures that support these flows and with the different 
scales across which structures and flows operate. Second, “transnational” is frequently 
employed to refer to the study of the historical role of international nongovernmental 
organizations such as IBM, Unilever, international trade unions, and in science and 
technology history, transnational networks of scientists and technologists. Third, 
transnational history is often taken to mean “de-centering the nation-state from its position as 
the principal organizing category for scholarly inquiry.” A major difficulty in this view is that 
de-centering the nation-state would lead to abandoning the national as a category of analysis 
altogether. However, the true meaning of the guideline is to place the nation-state in its 
proper historical context. The nation-state remains “a key analytical category that should be 
contextualized, not abandoned.”27  
In this dissertation, I use van der Vleuten’s three guidelines for a transnational history 
of technology to explain how a transnational study of the Korean space program is possible. I 
attempt to rupture the South Korean national frame and to situate scientific and technological 
practices in a transnational framework by tracing their technological trajectory back to 1958 
when the rocket team established in the National Defense Scientific Research Institute 
(NDSRI) launched its first modern rocket. By tracking the history of Korean space 
                                       
26 Erik van der Vleuten, “Towards a Transnational History of Technology: Meanings, Promises, and 
Pitfalls.” Technology and Culture 49: 4 (2008): 974-994. 
27 Ibid. p. 984. 
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development from its first step towards an autonomous rocket technology before the 1970s (a 
period dominated by ballistic missile development for national security), to the first Korean 
space launch vehicle (Naro) project in 2000s - which aspired to attain an indigenous 
capability for space development enabling South Korea to join the top 10 countries in the 
space industry - I will show how its political dynamics are closely intertwined with the global 
environment in which Korean space policy has evolved over time. The alignment entails 
complex and social interactions that served to encode collective imaginations of the good 
society. A transnational study of the Korean program will not only overcome the limitations 
of a national history of the Korean space program, but also contribute to re-framing the 
history of space exploration to reflect a global context. 
A key argument of this dissertation is that the path of nation-building which enables a 
country’s space program is deeply connected to constructing the collective imaginary of a 
desired social order, which entails complex international interactions in a constantly changing 
global context. This dissertation will also take up Siddiqi’s challenge that a significant step 
toward reframing the history of space exploration to reflect a global context must include an 
examination of the space-faring histories of non-superpowers. Considering these points, I 
suggest a transnational study of the Korean space program provides a fertile ground to better 
define the way in which the relationship between nation-building and space exploration has 
affected our discipline’s approach to the history of spaceflight. There is a link between 
national imagination and space exploration which connects the narrow perspective of national 
identity to a larger, global vision. Therefore, the center of this analysis of the Korean space 
program is located in the Korean national imagination for space exploration – which itself is 




The argument is developed in four central chapters based on a periodization of the 
dominant rationales driving space development. These rationales were a “rocket for 
modernity” (1950s~1969), “self-defense” (1970~1984), “economic security” (1985~1997), 
and “national prestige” (1998~2013). 
In the first chapter, I take a closer look at the early history of South Korea’s first step 
towards a space presence in 1950s and 1960s. During this period, the country had made an 
effort to redefine its national identity to secure national pride through science and technology, 
while struggling to deal with humiliation over past failures such as Korea’s colonization and 
then war and division. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 directly affected the space aspirations 
of the people in one of the world’s poorest countries at that time. It provided not only 
motivation for political leaders to develop guided weapons for national security but also 
inspiration for ordinary people to emerge from backwardness to embrace the excitement of 
cutting-edge technology. A rocket development team was established in the National Defense 
Scientific Research Institute (NDSRI) in 1956; it launched its first modern rocket 
successfully in 1958. Also as public interest in space science increased, several amateur 
rocket clubs and scholarly associations fostered a boom in space science by promoting the 
idea that “we can do it.” These measures were blunted by Park Chung Hee, who seized power 
through a military coup in 1961. He dismissed NDSRI in order to secure the U.S.’s approval 
and continued assistance as required by President John F. Kennedy’s changing foreign policy 
toward South Korea; the U.S. would provide for consumable military items rather than 
investing in up-to-date equipment. Consequently, national missile development was put on 
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hold, and the public’s high nationalistic aspirations did not become a massive social 
movement or drive national space policy for a decade.  
The security situation around South Korea before and after 1970 dramatically 
changed Park’s view on Korea’s military capability. His perception of a waning of the U.S. 
commitment to defend South Korea at a time of heightened vulnerability to North Korean 
political and military offensives led Park to seek ways of becoming more independent of the 
American military. In the mid-1970s, the Park Chung Hee government often conflicted with 
the Carter administration, because Park wanted to develop nuclear weapons and guided 
missiles, in anticipation of Carter’s withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. Seeking to 
stabilize the always tense Korean peninsula, the United States put pressure on the Koreans to 
end their work. In 1975, the South Koreans agreed to American demands, ended their nuclear 
weapon program and signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Park continued to develop 
guided missiles in the name of “self-defense.” Despite pressure from the U.S. for fear of 
proliferation, engineers from the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) successfully 
developed the surface-to-surface missile NHK-1, also known as Paekkom (White Bear), in 
1978. Although South Korea had to sign the bilateral agreement, known as the ‘Missile 
Guideline,’ which allowed only for the development of missiles with the shorter range of 
180km in exchange for technological assistance from U.S. in 1979, the country established a 
strong infrastructure for future space programs. The second chapter traces how and why 
South Korea succeeded in developing the NHK-1 missile but suspended efforts in developing 
nuclear weapons in the 1970s. It will focus on U.S. policy toward South Korea and Korean 
efforts to diversify its sources of supplies of technology and materials and to acquire its own 
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defense plants and production capabilities for the missile. It will also discuss Korea’s 
acquisition of the most advanced weapons available in the international market.  
The third chapter deals with the period from 1985 to 1997 when South Korea began to 
outline an economic rationale for moving the country into the field of space technology, 
based on technological advances through the defense industry in the 1970s. The Korean 
economy—which had once been characterized by an emphasis on low-cost labor and 
assembly-type operations in the 1970s—was now in the midst of a significant transformation 
reflecting a new commitment to skill and knowledge-intensive industries. Also, due to the 
increasing international technology protectionism of the 1980s, South Koreans perceived the 
failure to escape from underdevelopment and to catch up with the advanced industrial nations 
as one of the most serious risks facing their country. In this atmosphere, South Koreans began 
to view space as a realm with frontier technologies that they must master to join the ranks of 
the advanced countries. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) initiated a 15-year 
space development plan in 1985. Its long-term objectives were to acquire the independent 
technological capabilities for space development, and to join the top 10 countries in the 
global space industrial market by launching a domestically-configured communication 
satellite with the help of overseas expertise by 2001. With the first Korean research institute 
to specialize in space development, the Institute of Space Science & Astronomy (ISSA), 
established in 1986, the Aerospace Industry Development and Promotion Act, which 
included the first significant funding for space projects, was enacted in 1987. Subsequently, 
the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology (KAIST), and Korea Telecommunication (KT) emerged as new actors in the 
civilian space program. Initially relying on the import of technology from foreign countries, 
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they soon aspired to attaining an autonomous and indigenous launch capability for space 
development. In 1996, South Korea announced its first Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term 
National Space Development, of which the main objective was to launch the first Korean 
space launch vehicle, KSLV-1 (also known as Naro) with a satellite developed independently 
at a local launch site in 2010 and to join the top 10 countries in the space industry.  
National security concerns soon intervened to renew South Korea’s emphasis on the 
development of space capabilities. The so-called “Taepodong Shock” viz., North Korea’s 
attempt to launch a Taepodong-1 space vehicle with a satellite in 1998, directly affected the 
direction and independent development of KSLV-1. The South Korean government brought 
its independent launch of KSLV-1 forward by five years, from 2010 to 2005, and demanded 
that the U.S. revise the 1979 missile guideline to allow South Korea entry into the 
international Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR). This political drive led South 
Korea to turn to international cooperation with Russia rather than overcome technical 
difficulties in developing an indigenous liquid-fueled rocket for KSLV-1. The final chapter 
aims to offer an historical overview of the emergence of South Korea as a new space-faring 
nation by launching KSLV-1 in 2013, focusing on how the KSLV-1 project has evolved in 
the complicated contexts of national motivations and international politics. Even though 
South Korea changed the plan to purchase technologies from Russia for KSLV-1, its 
nationalistic vision for space, represented by the slogan “Launching our own satellite with 
our own rocket from our own country,” has persisted throughout the period. KARI conducted 
landmark projects for the exposure of space development to the public, including an initiative 
to restore Singijeon, a 15th-century South Korean rocket system, and embarking on the first 
Korean Astronaut Program. After all, the KSLV-1 project was about “developing a nation” so 
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that South Korea could prove its national technological capability as well as its national 
power. 
 
A Note on Archives  
To tell the full story of Korea’s rocket/space program, I relied on a variety of sources 
collected in South Korea during my one-year stay in 2014 and occasional visits. My sources 
are mostly from archives in the form of official documents. The National Archives of Korea 
and The Presidential Archive of Korea located at Seongnam provided not only government 
documents, correspondence and briefs between agencies, and official letters by key personnel, 
but also some background material about political leaders’ crucial decisions on space policy 
through all the periods that I covered in this project. The National Assembly Library of the 
Republic of Korea, the Archive of Seoul National University in Seoul, and the Archive of 
Inha University in Incheon were consulted to trace the efforts of Korean scientists and 
engineers in the early years of Korean rocket program during 1950s and 1960s. The Satellite 
Technology Research Center (SaTReC) in KAIST and the Korea Aerospace Research 
Institute (KARI), the main actors in the civilian space program since 1990s, have not 
established formal archival facilities to date. Although the scattered documents have not been 
well-organized yet, I have consulted with Library of KARI and Library of SaTReC to collect 
relevant materials. To fill the gaps, I consulted with a few scientists, engineers and 
government officials who were involved in the space projects, and conducted interviews with 
key actors who were concerned with the projects. Thankfully, they shared their personal 
collections and much useful source material. To offer some preliminary thoughts on the 
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nationalistic idea that characterizes the public rhetoric surrounding the Korean space program, 
I examined the discourse generated by governmental agencies, journalists, and public 
commentators etc. Newspapers, magazines and personal memoirs were also useful for this 
purpose. 
Apart from these Korean sources, documents have been also collected in the United 
States. To understand the diplomatic and political relationship between the U.S. and South 
Korea and its influence on the Korean rocket program during the 1960s and 1070s, I used 
declassified State Department documents from the National Archives, the CIA, the Ford 
Presidential Library, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Their 
digitized archival collections were extremely helpful, saving time and money in my search 
for valuable primary source materials. I also benefited from three volumes on the topic of 
Korea between 1964-1976 in FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) published by the 
U.S. Department of State, CIA documents in “South Korea: Nuclear Developments and 
Strategic Decisionmaking,” issued in June 1978 and released in 2005, and the “Investigation 
of Korean-American Relations: Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations 
of the Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives” which deals with 
the plans by the Korean National Intelligence Service to manipulate American institutions to 
the advantage of South Korean government policies in the 1970s.28  
  
                                       
28 “Investigation of Korean-American Relations: Report of the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives,” October 
31, 1978 (Washíngton D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1978), p. 173. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
Early History – The Sputnik Shock and Korea’s Rocket Fever  
1958-1969 
 
South Korea’s first attempt to establish a presence in space can be traced back to 
ballistic missile development that began in the late 1950s. The first challenge faced by the 
South Korean government was to establish the building blocks for the country’s scientific-
technological base for developing ballistic missiles. The nation’s political leader, Rhee 
Syngman, set up the team that developed the missile in the National Defense Scientific 
Research Institute (NDSRI) in 1956. Its first modern rocket was launched in 1958. However, 
NDSRI was disbanded in the political turmoil of the 1960 April Revolution that was followed 
by a military coup in 1961. In the political and technological setting of Korean missile 
development, security was the dominant aspect of relations between the U.S. and South 
Korea. This chapter deals with the U.S.’ perception of South Korea in the geopolitical context 
of the sixties, and describes its influence on the Korean rocket program. 
During this period, South Korea also made an effort to redefine its national identity 
and to boost its national pride, while struggling with humiliation over past failures such as 
Korea’s colonization followed by war and division.29 The historical episodes of the 
developed countries’ space exploration in the Cold War represented by Sputnik in 1957 and 
                                       
29 Gilbert Rozman, “Comparisons of National Identities in East Asia,” Harvard Asia Pacific Review 
11, no. 1 (May 6, 2010): 3-6. 
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Apollo’s landing on the Moon in 1969 influenced the Korean people, in relation to 
“aspirations for a Western modernity.” In this chapter, I also illustrate social responses to 
some amateur rocketeers’ efforts to launch their self-made rudimentary rockets, and the role 
played by civilian organizations in promoting space science after Sputnik.  
 
Rockets, Satellites, and Modernity 
South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world at the end of World War II. 
The Japanese colonial period left the country with very few industries in the modern sense 
and no technical personnel pool,30 and little progress had been made in the economy by 1950. 
The Korean War (1950-1953) devastated even this weak foundation; the nation’s gross 
national product (GNP) in 1953 was $67 per capita.31 Although the Korean government 
made some efforts for science and technology as part of post-war reconstruction, space 
science and technology related to sounding rockets and satellites was a luxury. South Korea 
had neither the time, the personnel, nor the funds to purse S&T initiatives in this period. It did 
not even participate in the global geophysical activities with 67 other countries during the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY, July 1957-December 1958) for lack of funding.32 
                                       
30 Before the liberation, South Korea had only around 400 scientists and engineers with academic 
degree all over the country. Kim Keunbae and Song Sungsoo, “Incomplete Reconstruction of Science 
and Technology,” in the National History Compilation Committee (ed.), Modern Science and 
Technology and the Change of Life (Seoul: Doosan-Donga, 2005): 90-106, p. 90. (in Korean) 
31 Jong Won Lee, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Korean Economy,” International Journal of 
Korean Studies 5, 1 (Spring/Summer 2001): 97-118. 
32 Jung Changhee, “On International Geophysical Year,” Dong-a Daily (March 24, 1961). (in 
Korean); Werner Buedeler, “The International Geophysical Year” (UNESCO, 1957) 
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The domestic newspapers at the time published articles deploring the pauperism of the 
scientific community and the political apathy to the news on space development in advanced 
nations. A newspaper criticized the politicians’ disinterestedness in IGY; “it is an unusual 
physical phenomena where the politicians are busy observing only the weather of 
Gyeongmudae (the presidential house) rather than perplexing problems like cosmic rays, 
solar spots, or the Earth core’s heat.” 33 According to a scientist’s reminiscence, South 
Korean Foreign Ministry officials were upset only after seeing an illustration of the Earth 
decked with the flags of all the nations that had participated in the IGY in Life Magazine.34 It 
included a North Korean flag but not the South Korean one.35 North Korea played its role in 
the IGY community when it built the first astronomical observatory installed on a telescope 
made in Germany on Mt. Daesung near Pyongyang in March 1957.36 
When the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik I on October 4, 1957 during 
the IGY, the satellite caught the world's attention as a technical achievement; South Korea 
was naturally one of them. While the Sputnik marked the start of the space age and the U.S.-
U.S.S.R space race, the dominant image of space science and technology for Korean people 
was that it represented the aspiration to Western modernity and democracy. The Kyounghang 
Daily on October 8, 1957 delivered its top news story about the Soviet Union’s successful 
launch of Sputnik I, and urged in the editorial that “we have to reflect on our parsimony on 
                                       
33 “Excursus,” Kyunghyang Daily (July 13, 1957). (in Korean) 
34 Kwon Youngdae, “A Troubled Participation in the International Conference,” Kyunghyang Daily 
(October 10, 1973). (in Korean) 
35 “The New Portrait of Our Planet,” Life 49, no. 19 (November 7, 1960), p. 74. 
36 “Red Koreans Join IGY,” Missiles and Rockets 3, no. 1 (January 1958): 60; Marcel Nicolet, “The 
International Geophysical Year 1957/58,” World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Bulletin 31 
(1982): 222-231.   
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rebuilding science and technology for overcoming the economic backwardness without 
sparing efforts for securing and maintaining power.”37 
The cartoons in newspapers used the image of an artificial satellite as an illustration of 
Western modernity to lampoon the social and political backwardness of the country in those 
days. A cartoon in Dong-a Daily on December 21, 1957 shows a man who presses a button to 
launch a rocket and another man who operates a strange box with many hands. Its caption 
states, “Victory of the National Security Law: Foreign countries have artificial satellites, 
while Korea has the ‘Keosuki’ (rubber-stamp machine).”38 This cartoon was a biting satire 
on the political corruption with which the ruling Liberal Party rushed through a revised bill 
for the National Security Law. As protests mounted in South Korea against President Rhee’s 
dictatorial regime in the mid-1950s, government leaders denounced the protesters for 
weakening South Korea’s national security and forcibly put down the protests. They further 
restricted freedom of speech in 1958 by amending the National Security Law to provide death 
sentences or long prison terms for such crimes.39 By comparing space rockets and satellite 
with a strange looking machine, the cartoon was meant to criticize the ruling party’s political 
corruption. The rocket and satellites in the cartoon thus symbolized the democracy that Korea 
had not fully achieved.  
 
                                       
37 “Editorial,” Kyunghyang Daily (October 8, 1958). (in Korean) 
38 “Conquer of the National Security Law: Foreign countries have artificial satellites, while Korea has 
the ‘Keosuki’” Dong-a Daily (December 21, 1958). (in Korean) 
39 Norman Levin and Yong-Sup Han, Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate over Policies 





Another cartoon in Donga Daily on 17 January 1959 uses a U.S. satellite as a symbol 
of Western modernity. The cartoon, which states “Scientific Competition: The U.S. has 
artificial satellites, yet we have a ‘talking tree,’” depicts a tall western man with a round-
shaped satellite and a short man wearing a shirt printed R.O.K with a tree that has a human 
face.40 The talking tree stands for a cult leader, Park Taesun, who linked himself to the return 
of Christ as one of the two witnesses of olive trees in the Bible. Although the Olive Tree 
movement, named by the followers, was the largest and fastest growing of the new, syncretic 
Korean religions after the Korean War41, Park was accused of injuring and defrauding his 
                                       
40 “Scientific Competition: The U.S. has artificial satellites, yet we have a ‘talking tree,’” Dong-a 
Daily, (January 17, 1959). (in Korean) 
41 James Huntley Grayson, Korea: A Religious History (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p. 208. 
Figure 1: “Victory of the National Security Law: Foreign countries have artificial satellites, while 
Korea has the ‘Keosuki’” (Left); “Scientific Competition: The U.S. has artificial satellites, yet we have 
a ‘talking tree’” (Right). (Source: Dong-a Daily) 
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followers, and he was sentenced to two and a half years in jail in 1959. By comparing the 
U.S.’s satellite and the ‘talking tree’ under the name of ‘scientific competition,’ the cartoon 
deplores the reality of Korean society that could not go forward as a modern society while it 
was captured by a religious cult. 
 
The Korean Amateur Rocketeers  
The fascination and astonishment with the launch of Sputnik did not only remind 
people of the social and political backwardness of the country. The “beep-beep” sound that 
emanated from a simple transmitter aboard the Soviet satellite inspired amateur rocketeers 
around the world, and rocket fever in South Korea rapidly increased after the Sputnik. The 
stories of some amateur rocketeers and the social reaction to their achievements illustrate the 
notion of exploring space, which links to the idea of a nation’s prowess in science and 
technology. 
Among the amateur rocketeers who appeared since Sputnik, nineteen-year-old Kim 
Kiyong’s story is noticeable.42  Fascinated by the news about Sputnik, Kim dedicated his 
whole high school education to rocketry. After graduating from high school, he spent an 
entire university tuition fee to develop his own rocket. Despite becoming the laughingstock of 
the people in his village, Kim launched a self-built rocket successfully on March 16, 1958. 
The rocket was 107cm in height, 20cm in diameter and 65kg in weight, and reportedly rose 
2km, during a 12-second burn time. On June 12, 1958, President Rhee invited Kim to the 
                                       
42 “Launching Korean Rockets,” Dong-a Daily (August 27, 1958). (in Korean) 
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Blue House to talk about its military implications. Encouraged by the first successful launch, 
he now attempted to launch the rocket publicly on August 23, 1958, but it ended in failure 








Another twenty-five-year-old amateur rocketeer, Cho Joongsuk, was a poor shoe-
repair man’s son.43 He abandoned going to high school due to the economic hardship, and 
worked for a steel plant and body shop for years. Meanwhile, he became interested in 
rocketry after the news about Sputnik, and taught himself how to make a rocket. Finally, he 
succeeded in launching a four stage rocket, 37.5 cm in height, 2.25 kg in weight on August 
20, 1958. According to the village folks who gathered to watch the rocket launch, the rocket 
soared up into the air with a tremendous explosive sound so high that they could not see the 
multiple-stage rockets disengage with the naked eye. Moon Wonsuk, Lieutenant colonel in 
the Department of Development of the Army Military Headquarters, visited Cho to see if the 
rocket could be useful for military purposes.44 
Even though the two rockets were rudimentary and without a strictly scientific base, 
the social response to the first Korean modern rockets was very enthusiastic. All those 
involved said that they taught themselves rocket science for several months motivated by 
Sputnik, and the newspapers assessed the two amateur rocketeers’ achievement as “the 
triumph of Korean science,” and saw in it hope for the “restoration of scientific creativity as 
in the past,” (that was represented by several scientific instruments such as Chukuki, the 
world’s first rain gauge of Choseon dynasty in 16th century).45 One newspaper article, 
entitled “The Spirit of Korean Youth is Still Alive,” covered their stories with news that Lee 
                                       
43 “Increasing Rocket Fever,” Kyunghyang Daily (August 13, 1958). (in Korean) 
44 Ibid 
45 “Launching Korean Rockets,” Dong-a Daily (August 27, 1958). (in Korean) 
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Changhoon had won the gold medal in a marathon in the Third Asian Games on May 29, 
1958.46 The marathon had been a competition of national pride to Koreans ever since Sohn 
Ki-Jeong won the gold medal in the marathon at the 1936 Berlin Olympics as a member of 
the Japanese delegation and removed the Japanese flag from his running tunic at the medal 
ceremony. Dealing with the two stories together, the newspapers devoted long columns to the 
events and used the occasion to boost the pride and praise the superiority of the Korean 
people.  
The popular enthusiasm for rockets stimulated nationalism enabling an amateur 
rocketeer to raise funds for research abroad — by fabricating documents! Dong-a Daily, a 
daily newspaper on June 11, 1961 tells the story of a twenty-year-old amateur rocket 
enthusiast Oh Sukeun, in an article entitled “A Korean Young Scientist to the World.”47 He 
had taught himself to design a five-stage rocket over two years and launched a self-made 
two-stage rocket which was 2.1m in height, 32.5cm in diameter, and 225kg in weight. He 
sent 3000 pages of papers and blue prints, the result of his research, to Wernher Von Braun, 
who had develop the V-2 missile in Germany in WWII and became the first director of 
NASA’s new Marshall Space Flight Center. According to the newspaper article, Oh received 
an invitation letter to a Missile School in NASA with the highest commendation for his new 
discoveries in rocket science from Von Braun.  
The newspapers scrambled to report Oh’s story praising him as “a pride of Korean 
science” and for proof that while “our country was well known for geniuses for a long time, 
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we have still a good number of the nameless geniuses.” 48 However, three months later, it 
was discovered by the Bureau of Public Information that Oh had faked all the documents, 
including the invitation letter and Von Braun’s signature and pictures on it, though he raised 
2 million Hwan (roughly 1 million dollars today) by donations from corporate sponsors.49 
Although his story turned out to be a hoax, it indicates that the popular interest in space 
science was very high, and effective enough to perpetrate a swindle by misusing Dr. von 
Braun’s name.  
 
The Societies for Space Science 
As public interest in space science increased, some amateur rocket clubs and scholarly 
associations, such as the Korean Astronautical Society (KAS) and the Korean Student Space 
Science Society (KSSSS), were established in 1958 and 1959 respectively.50 The president 
of the KAS was Jung Nakeun, of the National Defense Scientific Research Institute (NDSRI), 
and the vice president was Kim Heechul, a professor at Seoul National University. The 
association, which was constituted of elites such as professors and researchers as well as 
ordinary people such as carpenters, teachers and students, evolved into a big organization 
with four-hundred members in about one year. They managed to keep rocket research, 
experiments, and public lectures going with their own funds. The KAS also published the 
first edition of the Journal of the Korean Astronautical Society in October 1958. Its role and 
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objectives can be seen in the preface of the second number of the Journal published in May 
1960. It attempted to boost the public interest in space science by promoting the idea that “we 




The developed countries have been achieving progress in space science thanks to their 
governments’ massive support, yet it seems to be very hard for us to catch up with their 
research level immediately. Nevertheless, we have to go forward step by step with the hope 
to be among them in the future by looking into fundamental and comprehensive issues of 




The KSSSS grew into a big organization with one–hundred members, most of whom 
were university students in the Seoul area by 1960. Under the advice of Prof. Wi Sangkyu 
and Prof. Han Mansub of Seoul National University, they published a monthly magazine, the 
Bulletin of the Space Science Association, and held public lectures, symposiums, and 
exhibitions on space science to live up to public expectations. The KSSSS also encouraged 
the members to join research and development activities according to their interests and 
specialties under the seven departments; metallography, chemistry, propulsion, electric 
devices, ballistics, hydrodynamics, and astronomy. Informed by the research activity, they 
pursued a scheme to develop and launch a two-stage rocket named 4s-7. The symposium for 
                                       




making their research public was greeted with a packed house of experts such as professors 
of universities in Seoul as well as rocket enthusiasts.52    
The success of various public activities prompted the KAS and the KSSSS to hold a 
national rocket competition for university students in 1960. However, they had only one 
application for the competition from the rocket team at the Inha Institute of Technology (IIT), 
which had already finished manufacturing and testing several rockets. Thus, the KAS and the 
KSSSS decided to hold a public demonstration launching the IIT rocket team’s rockets 
instead of delaying the competition to recruit more participants. On November 19, 1960, the 
launching site of IIT’s rockets in Incheon was packed with thousands of spectators including 
Seo Minho, the vice chairman of the House of Representatives, and Lee Hongjong, the 
director of NDSRI. Under the guidance of Prof. Son Myoungwhan of the ordnance 
engineering department of the IIT, the rocket team made two single-stage rockets; IITO-1A 
(2.2m in length, 12.5cm in diameter, and 120kg in weight) and IITO-2A (1.7m in length, 
12.5cm in diameter, and 70kg in weight).53 Both rockets used JPN (Jet Propellant Navy) for 
solid propulsion — a colloidal double-based propellant used in U.S. rockets during World 
War II. The IITO-2A, a flight test model without payload, failed when the rocket exploded in 
the air.  Happily the IITO-1A which had a parachute recovery system for a communication 
device inside of a nose cone succeeded in the planned flight. However, its recovery of the 
communication device ended in failure since the parachute did not separate from the body of 
the rocket.  
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“If possible, we have to do it at all costs, even by selling land” 
While public interest was concentrated on the modernity of space science with which 
they had to catch up someday, the political leaders were interested in rockets for the 
modernization of the military in the geopolitical context of the bipolar Cold War. In the late 
1950s, after the Korean War, the protection of the Korean nation against communism was at 
the core of the state’s priority for national development. In his anti-communist rhetoric Rhee 
Syngman, the first president of South Korea, constantly requested U.S. military and material 
support to defeat North Korea and reunify Korea. 
 The Armistice Agreement of the Korean War of July 7, 1953 was signed in 
anticipation of guaranteeing a peaceful resolution to the Korean issue, through discussions 
about “withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea and a peaceful resolution to the Korean 
issue.”54 However, Rhee Syngman was very critical of the U.S. withdrawal following the 
agreement, being anxious about the asymmetry in warfighting ability between the South and 
North. Rhee claimed that the U.S. had complied with the provisions of the ceasefire 
agreement, while the North Koreans had modernized conventional weapons and equipped the 
military with missiles and atomic weapons. He was worried that the situation in Korea would 
be “another Pearl Harbor.”55  
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Based on his conviction that South Korea's military was “a relic of World War II,”56 
Rhee asked for U.S. atomic weapons and guided missiles to offset the North's military might. 
“Our intention is,” he said to the media after the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell 
D Taylor's visit to Seoul on April 1, 1957, “not to acquire any special weapons, but to ensure 
safety in the overall military capability as much as possible to prevent Communists from 
making aggression. Guided missiles are one of the ways to achieve security.” Finally, on 
January 17, 1958, Honest John rockets and 280mm artillery pieces were deployed by the U.S. 
on Korean soil on condition that two divisions of the Korean armed forces were removed.57 
On January 22, 1958, Rhee sent a telegram to express his appreciation to a Democratic 
Congressman, Daniel J. Plaid, who urged a provision of modern arms for South Korea, at the 
House of Representatives Appropriations Committee Hearings.58 
President Rhee’s interest in the autonomous development of the rocket is thought to 
have started at this time. Jung Nakun, the director of the National Defense Scientific 
Research Institute (NDSRI), put a plan into practice. He is the very person who created a 
rocket boom in both military and civilian domains in the late 1950s. Born in 1918 in South 
Korea, Jung moved to Japan to major in mechanical engineering at Kumamoto University 
and electric engineering at Tokyo University, and worked as a technical officer in Japanese 
Military Forces at the end of World War II. After decolonization in 1945, he returned to his 
home country to be the manager of the second arsenal of Korean army. And he became the 
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director of the Defense Science and Technology Research Institute (DSTRI), which was 
newly established in Seoul for promotion of Korea’s military capabilities on June 15, 1950.59 
At this time there were few research institutes of science and technology in South 
Korea, so that expectations were high for the DSTRI, which retained most of the highly-
educated domestic manpower in the field.  However, on June 25, 1950, only ten days after 
the institute was established, the Korean War broke out. The DSTRI could not conduct 
research properly because it had to take refuge frequently during the war. Only when they 
returned to Seoul at the end of the war in September 1953, could they start their jobs in 
earnest. Finally, on July 14, 1954, DSTRI incorporated the army arsenal and was reborn as a 
national institute, NDSRI by a presidential decree.60 NDSRI recruited 120 highly-educated 
people holding a university degree in science or engineering from 1955 to 1959; it emerged 
as the best science and technology institute in reality as well as in name despite the poor 
domestic environment.   
Although the mission of NDSRI was to report the results of investigations, research, 
and tests regarding defense issues to the army, the assignments from military demand were 
rarely required because the urgently-needed arms and ammunitions were procured via U.S. 
military assistance.61 The selection of research topics was relatively free; they covered the 
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research range from conventional weapons, military food and clothing to nuclear and rocket 
studies. Most research products were confidential. They also began issuing the Bulletin of the 
Scientific Research Institute that reported on their successful researches from 1956.62   
NDSRI’s concerted efforts in the development of the rocket began with establishing a 
rocket development team in November 1956. At this time, the institution consisted of three 
research groups and nine sub-laboratories, a mechanics workshop and a military food 
workshop, and the administration office. The director Jung appointed Lee Seungwon who 
doubled as the manager of the research group 1 and as a professor at Seoul National 
University, as the general manager for rocket development, and allocated responsibility 
according to research purposes; Group 1 to rocket design and manufacture, Group 2 to 
multistage rocket separation, Group 3 to a guidance system, and a newly established Lab 13, 
also called the powder lab, to rocket fuel and safety management. He also recruited Prof. Seo 
Jaejin and Prof. Han Mansub of Seoul National University as part-time employees for rocket 
engine development and vehicle design.63 They were almost the only persons in South Korea 
who held degrees in aerospace engineering from a developed country, so their research 
experience was a great addition to NDSRI’s rocket team. For example, Prof. Han held a 
master’s degree from University of Minnesota64, where he studied rockets and satellites with 
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Prof. Rudolf Hermann who had participated in developing the V-2 rocket with Wernher Von 




Figure 3: Designing a Rocket in NDSRI (Source: Hong Jaehank private collection) 
 
                                                                                                                       
National Higher Education in the Republic of Korea: Supplementary Memorandum of Explanation, 
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They designed a two-stage rocket and a three-stage rocket not to meet any specific 
range requirement, nor to launch a particular payload for scientific research. Instead, they 
wanted to see its performance with available resources. The rocket team realized that it was 
almost impossible to manufacture rocket propellant by themselves, so they decided to utilize 
an integral solid propellant used by the 5-inch HVAR (high-velocity aircraft rocket) retired 
from the Korean Air Force.66 At this time, the Korean Air Force had trouble disposing of the 
old HVARs transferred from U.S. Air Force after the Korean War. With the permission of the 
U.S. Air Force, the Korean Air Force transferred 2,000 HVARs to the NDSRI. The rocket 
team rearranged two or three of the rocket propellants to form a tube inside the single-stage 
rocket they designed and manufactured.67  
When Sputnik was launched in October 1957, the rocket team had advanced to the 
step of manufacturing a two-stage rocket and a three-stage rocket after several successful 
tests of the single-stage rocket. They were highly motivated by the news about Sputnik; 
however repeated failures in the separation of multistage rockets left them completely 
dejected. Prof. Seo attempted to apply the separation method that he had learned when he was 
in Minnesota University; the first stage rocket would be disengaged by the air friction as its 
propulsion power was exhausted. However, this method was proved to be unsuccessful by 
repeated failures, so they changed approach and adopted Lab 13’s proposal. It would separate 
the first-stage using the explosive power of the powder, which Lab 13 produced by mixing 
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various kinds of oxidizers and metal powders like antimony.68 They succeeded in several 
tests for the new method, after which their rocket project gathered steam. Group 2 developed 
a telemetry device to receive a flight signal and a guidance system to direct the rocket 
trajectory by controlling four delta fins.  
Finally, on October 10, 1958, they successfully launched the first experimental 
rockets in a test firing near Inchon, some twenty miles west of Seoul. The launch was 
conducted behind closed doors, and six of seven rocket launches reportedly succeeded.69 A 
weekly U.S. rocket magazine, Missile and Rocket on March 9, 1959, introduced NDSRI’s 
first rocket test as an example of the “interest that rocketry and space technology has given 
rise to, with considerable activity in many other nations of the world.”70 On July 27, 1959, 
the NDSRI rocket team also made a public display of five rockets in Incheon. President Rhee, 
as well as Carter B. Magruder UN commander, and Defense Minister Kim Jeongryum 
attended with more than 20,000 citizens in Incheon.71 The rocket team successfully launched 
three single-stage rockets, 005-ho, 006-ho, and 007-ho followed by a two-stage and three-
stage rocket. The two-stage rocket named 67-ho (4.65m in length, 22.9cm in radius) flew 
over 26km, rising to a maximum altitude of 9.5km, and the three-stage rocket named 556-ho 
(3.17m in length, 16.7cm in radius) flew over 81km, rising to a maximum altitude of 4.2km. 
Reportedly, stage-separation of multistage rockets presented a grand sight as it could be seen 
by the naked eye, and made a deep impression on the government officials and citizens. 
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Encouraged by the successful rocket launch, President Rhee praised the rocket team adding 




Figure 4: the President Rhee Syngman and the Guidance System of the 67-ho two-stage Rocket 
(Source: National Archive of Korea) 
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Table 1: Data of Rockets Launched by NDSRI in 1959 (Source: Photograph Album from Hong 
Jaehak private collection) 
Missile Designation 005 006 007 067 566 
Performance 
Range 4.7km 7.5km 8.2km 26km 81km 
Altitude 2.2km 3.3km 3.6km 9.5km 42km 
Velocity ? 1,200km/h 1,310km/h 1,820km/h 3,620km/h 
Stability Aerodynamic Stabilizing Fin 
Frame 
Length 0.78m 1.75m 3.01m 4.65m 3.71m 
Diameter 5.6cm 16.7cm 16.7cm 22.9cm 16.7cm 
Span ? 49.1cm 76.7cm 160.6cm 76.7cm 
Weight ? 78kg 139.9kg 213kg 141kg 
Material Steel Steel, Duraluminum 
Stage 1 2 3 
Power Plant 
Propellant Solid 






















After the public display, NDSRI set up a new research project to develop a guided 
rocket using domestically produced propellant. The government’s support for the rocket 
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team of NDSRI seemed to increase as the procurement of material and equipment went 
ahead without delay.73 In the late 1959, they began research on a liquid-propellant rocket 
and presented their paper in the second International Symposium of Rocket and Aeronautics 
held in Tokyo, Japan in May 1960.74  
 
NDSRI and the Diplomatic Relation with the U.S  
The rocket fever in South Korea in the late 1950s, began to decrease rapidly with the 
political turmoil of the April Revolution in 1960, a popular uprising to overthrow President 
Rhee’s autocratic state, followed by a military-led coup d'état in May 1961. Having been in 
office since 1948, President Rhee struggled to prolong his stay in power despite increasing 
domestic discontent with limited economic and social development and pervasive political 
corruption. Rhee had pushed through several constitutional amendments which made the 
presidency a life-long position and he became increasingly repressive as he amended the 
National Security Law to tighten government control over all levels of administration 
including the local units. On April 19, 1960, protests by students and citizens against the 
irregularities of the election on March 15, 1960 burst out in city of Masan and spread 
nationwide. Subsequent protests in the Seoul streets finally led Rhee to step down from 
power on April 26, which is called the April Revolution. As South Korea adopted a 
parliamentary system to remove power from the office of the president, the prime minister, 
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Chang Myon, and his cabinet was sworn into office on August 23, 1960. However, the new 
government’s efforts to implement effective reforms did not last long. Major General Park 
Chung Hee, who was then the Director General of Korea Army Operations, formed the 
Military Revolutionary Committee, and led a military coup on May 16, 1961.75 
It was hardly possible for NDSRI to perform its mission properly in such political 
turmoil. The director of NDSRI, Jung Nakeun left and Brigadier General Lee Hongjong was 
appointed as his successor. After the resignation of President Rhee, all the research at NDSRI 
made slow progress without his ongoing support. When Park Chung Hee seized power 
rumors spread that NDSRI might be closed down having lost its reliable supporter. 76 To 
cope with the rumors, Lee Hongjong tried every possible means to promulgate and justify the 
existence of NDSRI; he distributed information booklets and launched a monthly popular 
journal, Science and Technology, to deliver the latest trends in science and technology in June 
1961. 
Notwithstanding many efforts to save the institution, the Minister of National Defense 
of the military government, Song Yochan, announced his plan to close down the NDSRI “in 
order to achieve budget reductions” on June 29, 1961.77 Finally the institution which had 
been founded by presidential order was abolished by Cabinet order No. 47 of July 10, 1961. 
The abolition of the institution meant getting rid of everything that the institution had 
accomplished to date including administrative documents, manpower, and even research 
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products. The direct reason why Park’s government dismissed NDSRI remains unclear, 
because the abolition of the institution could not be fully justified simply on financial grounds. 
According to Han Mansub’s reminiscence, there was a rumor that Jung Nakeun, the director 
of NDSRI, incurred the wrath of Song Yochan, the Army chief of Staff at that time, by 
making frequent visits to the President without Song’s permission. Song then used his 
influence to close the NDSRI.78 However, the rumor could not be corroborated; a more 
important reason seems to be related to the diplomatic relations between Park’s government 
and the United States. 
The primary purpose of Park’s revolt was to “replace the corrupt and incapable Chang 
Myon government” which was sworn into office after the April Revolution. The principles of 
Military Revolutionary Council set forth were the following: 79 
 
 
1. The new regime would take a strong anti-Communist position in the 
operation of the country. 
2. The new government would create stronger ties with the free world and the 
United States and would adhere to the peace-keeping efforts of the United 
Nations.  
3. Steps would be taken to eliminate corruption and to establish new moral 
standards throughout the country. 
4. Efforts would be made to eliminate starvation in the country and to create a 
new, self-reliant, national economy.  
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5. The people’s goals of Korean unification would be pursued by the regime 
under the banner of Korean nationalism. 
6. The revolutionary government would be turned over to duly elected 




Park’s national development program focused on reconstruction and the creation of an 
industrial base, in an environment characterized by external political threats from the North, 
as well as repression of dissent at home. He saw economic development and national security 
as inseparably linked, yet building a strong military required a strong industrial economy first. 
The South Korean economy was too small, too poor and too vulnerable to security threats to 
attract foreign capital, while the North had already surpassed its southern rival. Increasing 
anxiety even more, the North-South gap continued to widen throughout the 1960s, with Kim 
Il Sung’s successful completion of the Three-year Recovery Plan (1954-1956) and the first 
Five-Year Plan (1957-1961). To catch up with the North, in both economic and military 
capabilities, the Park government reorganized the state apparatus and began a series of five-
year national economic plans in 1962 to jumpstart the economy.80 Park visited Washington 
from 14 to 17 November, 1961 to enhance his prestige at home and assure continued large-
scale American aid for the national economic plan.  
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At the beginning of the Kennedy administration, the U.S. made noteworthy changes 
in its foreign policy toward South Korea.81 American interest in Korea’s economic condition 
had been based on a belief that a stable, militarily strong, and pro-American government in 
Korea was essential to U.S. strategic interests. This change was characterized by the 
replacement of military-support grants with economic-development loans. The key points of 
the new proposals were to reduce military grants, to reduce the size of the South Korean army, 
and to increase economic development aid.82 For military assistance, the U.S. sought to 
maintain Korea’s reliance on the U.S. for armaments and for a major part of the Korean 
defense budget. Military assistance was provided primarily through the military assistance 
program (MAP), administered by the Department of Defense.  
The MAP program consisted of grants which Korea could use to obtain military 
equipment and supplies services from the U.S. The Korean Government used MAP dollars to 
purchase “operations and maintenance” items, rather than investing in up-to-date 
equipment.83 For example, in late 1965 Park invited Paul Benke of Colt Industries to suggest 
that the Korean Government would purchase a certain number of rifles from Colt if Colt, in 
return, would help build a rifle plant in Korea. However, Benke replied that Colt would be 
willing to sell the rifles but would not build the plant because Colt could supply the rifles 
                                       
81 Park Tae-Gyun, “Change in U.S. Policy toward South Korea in the Early 1960s,” Korean Studies 
23, (1999): 94-120. 
82 “Presidential Task Force on Korea-Report to the National Security Council,” (June 5, 1961): 
Papers of John F. Kennedy Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Countries, Korea: Security, 
1961-1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-121-004.aspx (accessed on October 18, 2015) 
83 “Investigation of Korean-American Relations: Report of the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives,” October 
31, 1978 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1978), p. 173.  
47 
 
from its own facilities in Hartford, Conn. Benke explained to the subcommittee that Colt’s 
position had been supported by the Departments of State and of Defense.84  
Supposedly, this policy also applied to NASA’s international cooperation programs 
during the early 1960s.  NASA was meant “to be an arm of American diplomacy.” Since the 
Space Act of 1958, NASA played a major role in kick-starting and orienting incipient space 
programs in many friendly countries through the UN Committee on Space Research 
(COSPAR).85 For example, NASA negotiated Memoranda of Understanding and initiated 
cooperative sounding rocket programs with 13 foreign countries. The foreign country 
supplied the launch crew and launch services, the site, and the experiment, and NASA 
supplied the rocket, knowhow, some instrumentation and so on.86 Some of the countries just 
wanted to “do something in space” without sufficient background and preparation, such as 
India, New Zealand, and Pakistan. However, South Korea was never considered for 
cooperation, even though it had demonstrated its capability and interest in developing a 
rocket. 
In this diplomatic context with the U.S., one can see that the political leaders of the 
military government could fear that NDSRI, which had done research on up-to-date weapons 
like guided rockets, would provide the U.S. government with a pretext for early suspension of 
military assistance to Korea. Also, the U.S. was concerned that the South Korean 
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Government would use an expanded military production capability to attack North Korea. 
Moreover, NDSRI was established and operated without consulting the Military Advisory 
Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG), a United States military unit which had helped 
train and provide logistic support for the South Korea Army since the Korean War.87 Thus, 
the Park government, which clearly wanted and needed the U.S.’s approval for the military 
government as well as its assistance, did not have a rationale to run an institute for research of 
up-to-date weapons such as NDSRI. They were determined to comply with the U.S. policy 
that would provide for consumable military items but not to build up basic levels of 
armaments or Korean defense industries. 
Meanwhile, the economic development plan designed and carried out in 1962 was 
carried out successfully, with focused state investment and industrial discipline, and with the 
U.S. providing security and training to the South Korean military and police forces. In the 
early 1960s, economic assistance programs provided much of the support-96 percent for the 
Korean defense budget, 64 percent in 1966, and about 14 percent in 1971. When the First 
Five-Year Plan was completed in 1966, many goals had been exceeded. The annual GNP 
growth rate, which had been projected at 7.1 percent, was actually over 8 percent. Annual per 
capita income had risen from $96 to $131.88 
 
The Rocket Team at the Inha Institute of Technology 
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The national rocket development project that had been pursued by NDSRI since the 
mid-1950s stopped with the abolition of the institute in 1961.  Civilian interest and efforts in 
rocket development were seriously influenced by the abolition of NDSRI. The KAS and 
KSSS, which had led the popular rocket boom with NDSRI’s huge support, canceled all the 
planned events including public lectures, symposiums, journals and magazines, and rocket 
development and demonstrations. These organizations finally fizzled out by 1962. Although 
newspapers and magazines carried news stories about space development focused on the 
space race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they no longer covered stories about 
amateur rocketeers through 1960s. It was the Inha Institute of Technology (IIT) that 
maintained its interest in rockets for the 1960s in South Korea. 
IIT was almost the only civilian organization that had made an effort to develop 
rockets and launch them since the late 1950s. IIT had more interest in rockets than any other 
university probably because the founder of the institute was President Rhee. Since 
decolonization in 1945, the Ministry of Education had proceeded with relatively consistent 
educational policies for science and technology. In 1952, in the midst of the Korean War, 
Rhee proposed the foundation of an educational institute that would provide expertise and 
hope to a lagging industrial sector. The driving force behind the proposal was the will and 
determination of a group of Koreans who had immigrated to Hawaii in 1902.89 Financial 
resources for the foundation came from a government subsidy ($1 million), the proceeds of 
the sale of the Korea Christian Institute, an organization founded and managed by Rhee for 
the purpose of educating the children of the original emigrants, and donations from Korean 
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emigrants in Hawaii ($150,000). In April 1954, built in Incheon where the first immigrant 
had left, the Inha Institute of Technology took its name from the first two letters of ‘Incheon’ 
and ‘Hawaii.’90 
IIT started with six departments including mechanical, marine, electric, chemical, 
metallurgical, and mineral engineering, and four years later, in 1958, it established two new 
departments, nuclear and ordnance engineering. The decision was made by President Rhee91 
to reflect the increasing international interests in atomic energy and rockets in the late 
1950s.92 In “a statement of opinion on establishment of departments,” Baek Sunyub, the 
Army Chief of Staff at that time, mentioned “Now that the achievements of modern science 
let us see artificial satellites orbiting, IIT’s establishment of the nuclear and ordnance 
departments is an epoch-making event [that will help us] emerge from backwardness and 
contribute to national security and social development.”93  
Although the IIT’s rocket team was a students’ sub-organization of the ordnance 
department, they were supported and encouraged technically and financially by the university 
authorities as well as by the army. After the rocket team launched its first rockets, IITO-1A 
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and IITO-2A, successfully on November 19, 1960, IIT was expected to become the center of 
civilian rocket development in South Korea. However, it could not escape the political 
turmoil of the April Revolution in 1960, because the founder was no less a person than 
President Rhee. Furthermore IIT did not have an independent foundation to finance it, 
although it had been established as a private institution; the members of the board of directors 
were mostly government officials appointed by President Rhee. A conflict between 
professors and a student council committee over the institute president’s Choi Syngman’s 
ability to remain in office crippled the smooth functioning of the institute.94 It was not until 
the military coup in May 1961 that the conflict was settled by an administrative order for the 
resignation of the president and several professors.  
The military government tightened controls on the whole society on the pretext of 
political reform. It abolished twelve out of thirty private universities in all parts of the country 
and merged similar departments in a university.95 IIT was ordered to cancel two departments, 
ordnance and nuclear engineering, for reasons that remain obscure, by the Decree on 
Standards for the Redevelopment of Universities and Colleges on September 9, 1961.96 As 
the ordnance engineering department closed, the rocket team, a sub-organization of it, 
seemed to be disbanded. IITO-B, their follow-up project of IITO-1A and 2A for producing a 
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rocket using a self-developed asphalt propellant, was soon dropped in this troubled 
situation.97 
All the same, the student members reorganized the team as a sub-organization of the 
student council committee and renamed it the Space Science Research Association (SSRA) in 
late 1961. Even though they could not expect any financial and technical support from the 
school authorities or the army anymore, SSRA launched an ambitious project to develop a 
three-stage rocket carrying an experimental rat and a camera for ground observation at their 
own expense after several fund-raising efforts.98 They designed a new type of rocket using 
the self-developed asphalt propellant, and produced and launched several 40cm-long single 
stage rockets, IITRA-1 and 2, to test the stability of the new propellant and the flight vehicle 
by 1964. The first two-stage test rocket, IITA-3R, was launched on November 24, 1964 to 
test the parachute recovery of the second-stage carrying no payload.99 However, due to a 
malfunction of the electric ignition system, the second stage rocket engine fired first even 
before the first stage rocket had fired. The second stage rocket was recovered by the 
parachute which opened at only a few tens of meters high.100 Despite the strange record of 
“Failure in the stage rocket ignition, but success in the separation and recovery of the second 
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stage rocket” in the first test, a week later the test was a complete success as the second stage 
rocket soared up to an altitude of 18km.101   
 
 
Figure 5: IITA-7CR 3-stage Rocket Launched by IIT in 1964 (Source: Library of Inha University) 
                                       




Table 2: Rockets Produced by SSRA of IIT (Source: Inha Gongdae Shinmun) 
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Choi Sanghyuk, the leader of SSRA at that time, and who became a researcher at 
NASA Langley Center later, appealed to the government for financial support through a 
newspaper column arguing that they had a technical capability to develop a guided weapon in 
five years, and even a sounding rocket, as well as a space launch vehicle to put a small 
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satellite into low-orbit of the Earth by 1976.102 Finally, on December 19, 1964, SSRA made 
a public display of a three stage rocket, IITA-7CR, at Songdo near Incheon as part of the 
celebrations for the 10th anniversary of the IIT. IITA-7CR (2.8m in length, 17.5 cm in 
diameter, and 67.5 kg in weight) was loaded with a camera in its nosecone to take about 30 
photos of the Korean peninsula as it descended slowly by parachute from an altitude of 50km. 
In the presence of hundreds of students and citizens as well as VIPs of the school authorities, 
the rocket was successfully launched. The flight was smooth, but at touchdown the camera 
was blown far from the predicted target area due to unexpected strong winds in the upper 
atmosphere. The camera was not recovered.103 
Although the launching display was enough to show off its technical capability and 
attract public attention, it was not easy to find a strong supporter. In 1965, the school 
authorities discussed the promotion of SSRA to a research institute directly responsible to the 
government, but this soon fizzled out. All their efforts to make SSRA a “Korean rocket 
development project”104 were ignored by external supporters including the government, and 
they could not make progress in further research. In 1968, the SSRA was on the lookout for 
an opportunity to enter rocketry again and attempted to produce a new model of a rocket with 
a small amount of money that they gained from the school with some difficulty. This venture 
soon collapsed. The SSRA was disbanded after several test launches of small rockets in late 
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1968 due to lack of funding. And “their dream to make IIT like Tokyo University,”105 where 
Dr. Hideo Itokawa started his research on a pencil rocket in 1955 and became the father of 
Japanese space development, finally collapsed.106 
Space exploration in Korea had to remain an unfulfilled alternative to the ‘aspiration’ 
to Western modernity in the late 1960s. A survey conducted by a newspaper when Neil 
Armstrong landed on the moon in 1969 showed people’s delight as well as their feeling of 
alienation.107 Most newspapers articles were filled with a full description of the process of 
two astronauts landing on the moon and commentaries on humanity’s greatest achievement, 
but an article entitled “Our Aspirations are too great. Overwhelmed by reality, but we also 
someday…” expressed various ordinary people’s first impressions on the scene of humanity’s 
first moon landing. For example, Kim Sooyoung, a taxi driver in Seoul, said “I hope that I 
can drive a car developed and manufactured by our engineers in Seoul as soon as possible,” 
and Yang Jaehee, a housewife, replied to the questionnaire that “It sounds just like a 
chimerical story of a far-away land, as I am in a reality in which the water supply was cut off 
last night.” Also, the damage from a recent storm flood in the country was severe enough to 
highlight to the people the wide disparity in science and technology between rich and poor 
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countries. “We have to get a move on with modernization,” said Kang Wonho, a police 
officer, “as we are concerned about things like flood damage even in the space era.”  
 
Conclusion 
The Sputnik shock of 1957 directly affected the space aspirations of the people in one 
of the poorest counties at the time, South Korea. It provided not only motivation for political 
leaders to develop guided weapons for national security but also inspiration for ordinary 
people to emerge from backwardness by being made aware of up-to-date technology. The 
rocket development team was established in the NDSRI under the President Rhee’s strong 
support in 1956, and the team launched its first modern rocket successfully in 1958. As 
public interest in space science increased, some amateur rocket clubs and scholarly 
associations, such as the KAS and the KSSSS, encouraged a boom of interest in space 
science by promoting the idea that “we can do it.” 
However, the revolution changed everything. NDSRI entered a crisis after Rhee’s 
resignation by the April Revolution in 1960, and Park Chung Hee, who seized power through 
a military coup in 1961, dismissed NDSRI in order to secure the U.S.’s approval and 
continued assistance by resonating with Kennedy’s changed foreign policy toward South 
Korea which would provide for consumable military items rather than investing in up-to-date 
equipment. After NDSRI was shut down, no further work on national missile development 
took place for a decade in South Korea. Also, despite of some amateur rocket men’s 
enthusiasm for rockets and the public’s high nationalistic interest in their projects, their 
aspirations did not provide substantive fruition for a massive social movement or lead to a 
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national space policy. The KAS and KSSS which had led the popular rocket boom under 
NDSRI’s huge support fizzled out, and the Inha University rocket team which managed to 
keep their rocket research was also disbanded due to lack of funding after producing several 
rockets by late 1960s.  
Yet, in the late 1960s, a chain of events that created the impression that the United 
States was weak-kneed in dealing with South Korea’s security made Park doubt the reliability 
of U.S. military support to South Korea. These concerns for South Korea’s security caused 
Park to initiate a surface-to-surface missile program and to establish the Agency for Defense 
Development (ADD) to pursue modernization programs for South Korea’s armed forces. In 
the next chapter, I will describe how the ADD successfully developed the surface-to-surface 
missile, NHK-1, also known as Paekkom, in 1978 which consequently established Korea’s 
industrial and technical base for space development in the 1980s.   
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CHAPTER 3  
 
A Korean Rocket for Self-reliance 1970-1984 
 
Many researchers of the Korean space program take the early 1990s as its starting 
point when South Korea launched its first national satellite Wooribyul-1.108 However, the 
decade of the 1970s is critical to the understanding of the early history of the space program. 
It is then that South Korea established a strong infrastructure for future space programs by 
successfully developing the first surface-to-surface guided missile. The South Korean defense 
industry was accorded a “unique importance as symbol of modernization,” and it exerted a 
“dominating influence in setting overall scientific and technical priorities.”109 
In the late 1960s Park Chung Hee, president of South Korea, came to doubt the 
reliability of U.S. military support to South Korea. These concerns for the security of South 
Korea caused Park to initiate nuclear weapons and surface-to-surface missile programs and to 
establish the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) in 1970 to modernize the armed 
forces. The pursuit of nuclear weapons was suspended in the mid-1970s, though the ADD 
successfully developed the surface-to-surface guided missile, K-1 (Paekkom or Baekkom; 
white bear), a modification of the U. S.-produced Nike Hercules missile in 1978. However, in 
                                       
108 Brian Harvey, Emerging Space Powers the New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East and 
South America (London; Chichester: Springer; Praxis, 2009); Chin Young Hwang, “Space Activities 
in Korea—History, Current Programs and Future Plans.” Space Policy 22, no. 3 (August 2006): 194–
199; KARI, 2006 White Paper of Space Development (MOST, 2007) (in Korean) 
109 Janne Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (the Brookings Institution, 
1991), p. 17 
60 
 
1979 South Korea had to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. to limit the 
missile range to 180km as a precondition of purchasing U.S. missile technology. Meanwhile, 
Chun Doohwan, who seized power through a military coup in 1980 after Park’s death, curbed 
the missile programs by downsizing the ADD. These series of events weakened South 
Korea’s capability to produce ballistic missiles without outside assistance.  
A major issue in the development of Korea’s capability to support its defense in 1970s 
was Korean-American diplomatic relations. Overall, the U.S. approached the matter with 
caution, opposing the development of advanced defense weapons such as nuclear weapons 
and guided missiles. The Korean government, by contrast, was strongly committed to the 
rapid expansion of defense production independent of and sometimes in conflict with U.S. 
interests and policy. Through the efforts to develop a guided missile in the 1970s, South 
Korea created the infrastructure and trained skilled workers in the ways of modern industrial 
production, and subsequently used them as a means of promoting a space program, including 
the Korean Sounding Rocket (KSR) and the Korean Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV) Program 
from the 1990s onwards.  
This chapter traces how and why South Korea succeeded in developing the missile 
while it suspended efforts in developing nuclear weapons in the 1970s. The focus will be on 
U.S. policy towards Korean “self-reliance” and Korean efforts to diversify its sources of 
supply and to acquire its own defense plants and production capabilities for the missile.  
 
Increasing Threats from the North and the Nixon Doctrine 
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During the early 1960s, the U.S. discouraged the growth of a full range of Korean 
defense industries, urging production of consumable military items rather than up-to-date 
military hardware. Park Chung Hee, who had seized power in 1961, wanted to secure the 
U.S.’s approval and continued assistance by cooperating with the U.S.’s policy toward South 
Korea. (Chapter 1) However, in the late 1960s, the Park administration was determined to 
pursue military self-sufficiency, in some instance assessing its own needs independently of 
the U.S.  
Park’s drive to reduce military dependence on the U. S. was a combination of 
historical trends and events.110 The most potent reason for the change of Park’s view on 
Korea’s military capability was the so called “the second Korean War” i.e. the increasing 
threat from North Korea in the late 1960s.111 In 1966, North Korea determined that a 
peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula could not be attained without active guerrilla 
action in South Korea. Kim Il Sung announced the abandonment of the policy of seeking to 
unify Korea by peaceful means and the adoption of a new, more militant policy toward South 
Korea.112 The peak of North Korea’s hostility was reached on January 21, 1968, when a 
group of 31 North Korean commandos attempted a daring raid on the Blue House in Seoul to 
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assassinate Park. The team was divided into six groups, each having a specific mission within 
the Blue House. Although none of them reached the Blue House, they managed to cross the 
38th parallel, infiltrate the city, and approach within a kilometer of the destination. In the 
ensuing gunfight and subsequent search for the commandos, all but three commandos were 
killed, along with 2 American and 26 ROK soldiers. Two of the three North Koreans escaped 
and the other one was captured and interrogated. The captured commando, Kim Shin Jo, said 
at a press conference that the objective of the mission had been “to get the head of Park and 
kill important subordinates.”113 It was the first raid on Seoul since the Korean War. The raid 
came as a great shock to the Korean Government and people and seriously affected 
confidence in their security and anti-infiltration capability. The Korean Government wanted 
to respond with force, and President Park told U. S. Ambassador William Porter that “Korean 
Forces could be in Pyongyang in 2 days’ time” at a meeting immediately after the raid.114 
However, two days later, on January 23 in 1968, before the U.S. had time to decide 
exactly how to respond to the Blue House raid, the intelligence ship U.S.S. Pueblo and its 
crew were captured by North Korea. The U.S.S. Pueblo was one of America’s electronic 
intelligence ships with a nine-hundred-ton hull equipped with highly sophisticated 
instruments to collect electromagnetic intelligence information along the east coast of North 
Korea. North Korea claimed that the ship had intruded into its territorial waters, and they 
towed it into Wonsan port along with its crew of 82 men. President Park felt that resolute 
action was required to insure stability of South Korea in the face of these provocations. He 
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urged the U.S. to retaliate with preemptive air strikes against the North. However, the 
Johnson administration responded by seeking to de-escalate the crisis. The objective of U.S. 
policy was “to prevent further escalation of tension, to de-escalate if possible, and to ensure 
the ROK troops do not violate Armistice Agreement.”115  
At the beginning of the incident, Johnson tried to threaten North Korea. The U.S. 
released the vessel and crew by alerting about 1,500 air force and navy reserves and 
dispatching the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, Enterprise, to the East Sea. However, he 
finally decided to rely on a campaign of diplomacy, including using whatever influence the 
Soviet Union would bring to bear on North Korea. The U.S. negotiated directly with North 
Korea at Panmunjom, and eventually succeeded in their goals.116 Korean political leaders 
were already highly indignant that the Pueblo incident quickly overshadowed the Blue House 
raid and that the U.S. government was more concerned about the Pueblo incident than the 
raid. The U.S.’ negotiations with North Korea were viewed by the Korean Government as 
tending to isolate South Korea further in its international relations.  
Until late in 1968, North Korea’s activities had continued unabated and so did South 
Korea’s disappointment in the U.S. government. On the night of October 30, 1968, 120 men 
of Unit 124 landed on the coast between Ulchin - Samcheok in Gangwon province and moved 
inland on a 30-day mission to create guerilla bases in the Taebaek Mountains. It took several 
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weeks for U.S. and South Korea forces to capture or kill the infiltrators; 110 North Koreans 
had been killed and 7 captured, for the loss of 40 regular army, police and militia and 23 
civilians. Nevertheless, there was no further U.S. response to the North.  
Despite the change of the U.S. Government in 1969, to the South Koreans, the U.S. 
seemed to fail to respond forcefully to Communist aggression in Korea. Early in the Nixon 
administration, there was another incident between the U.S. and North Korea. On April 14, 
1969, a naval intelligence plane, an EC-121 operating out of Japan, was shot down by North 
Korea over the East Sea (Sea of Japan), and the 31 members of the crew were killed.117 The 
mission of the EC-121 was reported as being routine and was conducted far from North 
Korean territorial waters, leading the National Security Council (NSC) to seriously consider 
retaliation. However, President Nixon chose to avoid the risk of opening a second front and 
antagonizing the Soviet Union and China.  
By May 1969, the level of intensity of the conflict had been reduced substantially, yet 
Park’s anxiety over security was increased due to Nixon’s new foreign policy.118 At an 
informal press conference on Guam in July 1969, Nixon stated that “the United States would 
assist in the defense and developments of allies and friends,” but would not “undertake all the 
defense of the free nations of the world.”119 This so-called ‘Nixon doctrine’ sought to 
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rebalance U.S. policy by subordinating other concerns to the waging of the Vietnam War, 
establishing a new policy to reduce the commitment of ground troops in Asia,  and 




1. The United States would honor its treaty commitments. 
2. The United States would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened the 
freedom of certain nations. 
3. In cases of other types of aggression, the United States would furnish 
military and economic assistance when requested and appropriate, but 
nations directly threatened should assume primary responsibility for their 
own defense.  
 
 
The decision was related directly to efforts to disengage from Vietnam “without 
appearing to retreat” as the U.S. had to be able to say that the Nixon doctrine applied to all of 
Asia. The doctrine was applied to Middle Eastern regions as well as Asian countries such as 
the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and others which might be threatened by Communist 
aggression. South Korean leaders were confident that their contribution in Vietnam and the 
historical ties with the U.S. would serve to exempt their country from the new policy. 
However, Nixon was to make South Korea the principal example of implementation of the 
                                       
120 “Investigation of Korean-American Relations: Report of the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives,” p. 59. 
66 
 
Nixon doctrine. He was to apply the Nixon doctrine in South Korea by withdrawing 20,000 
troops.121 
 
Korea’s Response to the Nixon Doctrine 
President Park aggressively opposed the American drawdown, insisting that the U.S. 
reduction should be small, and that any military realignment should be accompanied by a 
sharp rise in U.S. military assistance to South Korea. The troop reduction was a significant 
issue which might weaken him at the 1971 election. In response to Park’s reaction, Nixon 
invited Park to San Francisco for a state visit, August 21-23, 1969. At the meeting with 
Nixon, Park argued; 122 
 
 
Kim [Il-sung] will provoke a war if he believes that this American policy 
toward the ROK is going to change or has changed. Kim’s objective in 
making various provocations is to have American troops stationed in the ROK 
withdraw as they have done in South Vietnam, alienate the ROK from the U.S. 
and have the U.S. not intervene when anything happens in Korea. The 
strengthening of ROK defense would check these provocations of Kim and 
have him give up the idea of invading the South by force. A way to achieve 
this objective is to strengthen the equipment and combat capability of the 
ROK forces rather than to strengthen U.S. forces in South Korea, to the extent 
that the ROK can single-handedly resist North Korean invasion, since the U.S. 
has various commitments all over the world. 
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To reassure him that the U.S. would not turn its back on Korea and would be 
responsive to its security needs, President Nixon decided to provide funding for a 5-year plan 
to modernize the ROK armed Forces in March 1970 pursuant to recommendations by the 
NSC. The administration would submit a proposal Congress for the modernization program 
including military assistance at a level of $200 million per year. This comprised either a MAP 
grant of $200 million per year or its equivalent in MAP funds at a lower level supplemented 
by equipment and other supplies in excess of U.S. needs between fiscal years 1971 and 
1975.123 
The U.S. Government expected Park to understand the terms of troop reduction and 
were reasonably pleased with the assurance of the 5-year military modernization package. 
However the Korean leader was still dissatisfied. While U.S. had decided that troop reduction 
and ROK armed Forces modernization should be initiated simultaneously, Park insisted that 
the military modernization should be prior to troop reduction. Indeed, there was no guarantee 
that the Congress would actually vote the funds needed to implement the modernization 
program in time, considering the program as being different from the normal annual security 
appropriation. On April 9, 1970, Senator Joseph Tydings criticized the Nixon administration 
for failing to apply the Nixon doctrine quickly to Korea arguing that “South Korea possesses 
the military manpower and resources to handle any invasion threat North Korea could pose in 
the foreseeable future.”124 The advocates in the Congress argued further that the South 
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Korean economy was strong enough to protect itself without any ground troop support from 
the U.S.  
When vice President Spiro Agnew went to Seoul for direct talks with Park on August 
26, 1970, he kept emphasizing that although the President made foreign policy, it was the role 
of Congress to decide on appropriations. At the meeting, planned to last about an hour, but 
that went on for almost 6 hours without breaks, Agnew told Park that “all American troops 
would be withdrawn from South Korea when that country's armed forces were fully 
modernized perhaps in five years or more.”125 Agnew emphasized that Nixon would be 
unable to guarantee the modernization program because “Congress holds the purse-strings 
and that no money can be allocated without its support or acquiescence.”126 On August 29, 
1970, immediately after Agnew’s visit, Korean newspapers reported that the Pentagon had 
announced that the U.S. had already reduced the 63,000 person-ceiling by 10,000.  
Korean concern peaked after Agnew’s visit. While the Nixon administration 
considered the military modernization program essential for the military self-sufficiency of 
South Korea, Congress viewed the program as part of the annual security assistance 
legislation. An additional problem for Korea was that they believed that the program would 
be predicated on grant assistance, but the Congress changed the nature of military assistance 
to all countries from direct grants to direct sales of military equipment, with credit 
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arrangements to be provided through Foreign Military Credit Sales (FMS) as necessary.127 
The modernization plan was presented to Congress in the fall of 1970 as a $150 million 
supplemental appropriation to the Security Assistance Act of that year. In December, the 
Congress approved a large loan for the construction of an M-16 rifle factory in Korea as the 
first step in the modernization program. 
 
Military Assistance to Korea 
On February 6 1971, the U.S. and South Korea reached the agreements and 
announced the matter of U.S. troop withdrawal and the modernization plan for the South 
Korean Armed Forces.128 The U.S. agreed to provide a package of $1.5 billion in military aid 
to South Korea over a five-year period. On 10 March, 1971 the 7th Infantry Division began to 
withdraw from South Korea. The 2nd Infantry Division gave back its 18.5 miles of 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to the South Korean Army and took responsibility for the 7th 
Infantry’s positions between Seoul and the DMZ. The South Korean Army defended the 
entire 155 mile DMZ for the first time. In return, Nixon enhanced the U.S. Air Force in South 
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Korea with an additional F-4 squadron from Japan. On March 27, 1971, the reduction of 
20,000 troops was completed.129  
Park’s fear, however, grew over the next few years as he perceived the assistance 
level to be diminishing. The military assistance decreased from $291 million in 1971 to $149 
million in 1973. (Table 3) However, as South Korea began to purchase military equipment 
under FMS programs in 1971, the U.S. began to reduce its grant in aid for operations and 
maintenance. Increasing military sales replaced the military aid program, and became the new 
trend in U.S. policy. The change from a military assistance program to military sales to South 
Korea was rapid and a large amount of arms were delivered to South Korea under FMS. 
Congressional opposition to dictatorial government in South Korea also increased 
Park’s insecurity. The Nixon administration initiated a dramatic transformation in the policy 
of containment and isolation of China; Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s assistant for national 
security affairs, secretly visited Peking. Nixon himself visited China in February 1972. South 
and North Korea expressed a willingness to have direct talks with each other, in response to 
the change in the international situation. After the first meeting between two Koreas in July 
1972, Park announced that South Korea needed a new constitution in order to strengthen its 
negotiating position. On October 17, 1972, he restructured the Government and imposed the 
Yushin Constitution, which virtually guaranteed him lifetime Presidency and restricted the 
civil rights of Korean citizens.  
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Table 3: Security Assistance for Fiscal Years 1971-1977 to the ROK (Source: “Investigation of 
Korean-American Relations: Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the 





When President Ford started his term of office after Nixon’s resignation in 1974, the 
Congress became actively concerned about U.S. involvement in the international arms trade 
and U.S. arms transfer.  Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, which linked 
the human rights issue to military assistance levels. This led to “the most serious cut in the 
Korean modernization program because of Park’s worsening record on human rights.”130 As 
a result, the Congress did not fulfill the administration’s modernization commitment until 
1977, two years after the scheduled completion date. In response to Congressional legislation, 
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the Park government attempted to persuade the U.S. government and Congress not to 
withdraw U.S. troops and at least to provide South Korea with a massive military assistance 
and security commitment through intensive lobbying, cash campaign contributions, cash pay-
offs, and trips to South Korea. This developed into a big political issue between the two 
countries, popularly known as “Koreagate.”131   
 
Military Modernization for Self-Reliance  
Although the U.S. in this instance pledged compensatory assistance to modernize 
ROK forces after troop withdrawal in the early 1970s, Park’s security concerns and 
discontent on the budget cut made by Congress led him to strengthen Korea’s own defense 
capabilities. In the early 1970s, South Korea had only one division of unguided, Honest John 
missiles, and planned to build a factory in Yangsan, South Gyeongsang Province, for 
manufacturing the M-16 rifle with the support of the U.S. Realizing the weakness of South 
Korea’s defense capability, Park began to emphasize the principle of “self-defense” and then 
“self-reliance” with an eye to reducing dependence on what, he thought, was an unreliable 
superpower ally.132 In 1970, President Park claimed in his New Year’s addresses that; 
“During the 1970s, we should actively seek to achieve reunification of our country by 
peaceful or non-peaceful means, and secure a potent defense-power superior to the North so 
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that we can defeat their sudden attacks instantly with our strength alone. This is the spirit of 
self-reliance, I always speak about.”133 
Park had already emphasized “self-reliance” as a key political slogan for economic 
modernization in the early 1960s. However, the slogan, for now, was promoted as a national 
slogan in the name of defense. This led Park down two main paths: the modernization of 
Korea’s conventional arms inventory and the preliminary consideration of nuclear weapons 
and guided missile options. Planning for force modernization began in 1970 when he ordered 
a unilateral review of the earlier plan and an accelerated timetable for defense industry 
expansion. He hoped that this revised force improvement plan, to be completed in 1980, 
would enable South Korea to meet an attack with only logistic and air support from the U.S. 
Later Park’s resolution to continue the expansion of defense budgets and aggressive 
procurement policies led to three government decrees in the mid-1970s; a 1973 Law on the 
Defense Industry, a 1974 Force Improvement Plan for the buildup of Korea’s armed forces 
(the First Yulgok Project), and the 1975 Defense Tax Law that was designed to finance the 
development of the defense industry.134  
Before he declared to launch a full scale development of heavy and chemical industry 
to support the weapons development program in January 1973, the Korean Government 
established two defense agencies to mobilize all scientific resources in the military, industry 
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and academia for weapons development in 1970; The Agency for Defense Development 
(ADD) and the Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC). The ADD was established on 
August 6, 1970 to conduct military research and the development of weapons, weapons 
systems, equipment, and material for the Korean military and assistance in the development 
of technology in the area of defense industries. The WEC was established on August 16 as an 
ad hoc governmental committee designed for the covert development of modern weapons to 
bolster South Korea’s defenses. Oh Won Chul, Second Secretary for Economic Affairs, and 
other high ranking Blue House officials were among the participants.135 
 
The Efforts for Nuclear Weapons 
Meanwhile, Park began to consider the nuclear and missile option as a deterrent as 
well as a political tool. Although the U.S. continued to deploy 600-700 tactical nuclear 
weapons in South Korea,136 Park feared that these tactical nuclear weapons might be 
removed with the troop withdrawal. In the early 1970s, he started pursuing a nuclear weapons 
capability and the development of medium range surface-to-surface missiles. According to a 
memoir of Kim Kwangmo, a chief secretary for Oh Won Chol, a newly appointed member of 
the Blue House senior staff in charge of developing defense-related heavy and chemical 
industries, Park used to say to Oh: “The security of South Korea is decreasing due to the 
troop withdrawal. I am feeling that we are so easily swayed by the U.S. They hold us so 
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cheap. Is there anything that can make a weak nation talk big?”137 He wanted to acquire the 
technology and capability to possess nuclear weapons just like Japan and European countries, 
rather than the completed nuclear weapons.138 
Park and his high-ranking staff  believed that developing nuclear weapons seemed 
feasible, because their country already began its nuclear research in 1954 with the help of the 
‘Atoms for Peace’ movement promoted by the U.S. South Korea formally initiated nuclear 
activities when it became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957.139 
The Atomic Energy Law was passed in 1958, and the Office of Atomic Energy was 
established by the government in 1959. The first nuclear reactor, TRIGA-Mark II provided 
by U.S. firms General Atomics and General Dynamics started its operation in March 1962.140 
This reactor could not be used for peaceful scientific research and creating radioisotopes for 
medical and agricultural purposes. During the 1960s, South Korea made continuous progress 
in nuclear energy, and access to this technology raised hopes for the future acquisition of 
civilian nuclear power.  
From late 1960s, nuclear energy was believed to be the most promising means to 
reduce its heavy dependence on imported energy sources, especially oil, which accounted for 
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about 60% of Korea’s energy consumption. Energy demand was likely to continue to grow 
about 10% annually in line with Korea’s rapid economic growth, resulting in some modest 
reduction in its relative dependence on imported energy supplies. This led South Korea to 
initiate one of the developing world’s most ambitious nuclear energy plans.141 In 1968, the 
government conducted the feasibility study for its first commercial nuclear power plant, Kori-
1.142 Fifteen nuclear power plants were to be constructed by 1991, providing 44% of the 
country’s electricity-generating capacity. 
The scope of South Korea’s nuclear ambitions, however, soon changed to encompass 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Park’s nuclear advisers in the WEC decided to proceed 
with the development of nuclear weapons.143 They were aware that it was a major issue to 
acquire a reprocessing plant to manufacture plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel, which 
could be produced in a civilian power plant. Although most of South Korea’s civil nuclear 
power program was based on American equipment and technology, the U.S. would put 
pressure on the Koreans to end their nuclear work for seeking to stabilize the always tense 
Korean peninsula. Thus, South Korea steered clear of the U.S. in seeking reprocessing 
equipment and technology. From 1972, it led the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute 
(KAERI) to put top priority on the acquisition of a reprocessing capability and directed the 
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ADD to acquire the technology for nuclear weapons and missile design.144 It began 
negotiations to purchase a NRX-type heavy-water research reactor from Canada, a small 
reprocessing facility from France, and a research lab for mixed-oxide nuclear fuel fabrication 
from Belgium.145 These facilities were an integral part of the institute’s long-term plan for 
nuclear power development, as well as a necessary component of a covert program within the 
military to develop a nuclear weapons capability. 
 
U.S. Pressure on the Korean Nuclear Program 
India’s nuclear test in 1974 alerted the world to the dangers of the spread of nuclear 
weapons. Moreover India, in a first for a developing nonaligned country, had diverted 
plutonium for its nuclear test from materials generated by an NRX-type reactor. Canada 
suspended its negotiations for the sale of a similar research reactor to South Korea. The U.S. 
Government began to intensify its scrutiny of South Korea. U.S. intelligence officials judged 
that some steps to develop nuclear weapons technology had been taken which appeared 
designed to pave the way for a nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s. According to a 
CIA report146, in 1974 and 1975 a much expanded, dedicated nuclear weapons program took 
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shape, combining missile design work with nuclear and chemical warhead research in a 
project designate “890.”147 The project was undertaken to acquire a missile that could 
threaten Pyongyang, while long-term nuclear fuel cycle technology was sought to keep the 
bomb option open. The report noted that “the nuclear weapons design team took clear shape 
in mid-1975, when it was divided into three substantive subgroups working on warhead 
structure, high explosives fabrication, and computer codes.”  
In February 1975, the National Security Council of the U.S. agreed with the U.S. 
embassy in Seoul that “the ROK has entered the initial stage of nuclear weapons 
development,”148 and Ambassador Richard Sneider began taking the U.S.’s objections to 
reprocessing directly to South Korean officials;  
 
If Korea begins to build a reprocessing plant, it will be widely assumed that 
it is seriously working on a nuclear weapons program. This perception would be 
potentially destabilizing in all of Northeast Asia. North Korea would certainly 
press its allies for a similar capability, and both China and the Soviet Union 
would see potential nuclear threats to their own territory. Perhaps most 
important such a development might possibly tip the balance on proliferation in 
Japan. Consequently, the Korean case would seem to warrant special bilateral 
action with the ROK, in addition to the controls we are contemplating in the 
international regulatory mechanisms.149 
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The fall of Vietnam in 1975 and the late North Korean President Kim Il Sung’s visit 
to Beijing in the same year had an extremely destabilizing effect on Korea’s security 
environment. In an interview with the Washington Post in June 1975, Park stated that if the 
U.S. were to withdraw its nuclear umbrella, South Korea would develop its own nuclear 
weapons.150  
However, under pressure from the U.S. and Canada, which used the leverage of 
pending power reactor sales and credit approvals to bolster their case, KAERI dropped its 
plans for purchasing both the reprocessing and mixed-oxide research facilities. In January 
1976, at a Senate Government Operations meeting, Myron B. Kratzer, director of the State 
Department’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, 
disclosed that “South Korea has canceled plans to purchase a French plutonium reprocessing 
plant that could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, … The cancellation 
reportedly followed heavy U.S. pressure.” This was said under questioning by members of a 
Senate Government Operations subcommittee about U.S. pressures on the Koreans.151 
 Currently KAERI oversees Korea’s bilateral cooperation with the U.S. in the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy, generally open to foreign scrutiny by keeping it out of 
sensitive fuel cycle work. In 1975, the Korean government agreed to American demands and 
ended its program and signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in April.152 Finally, in late 
December 1976, Park ordered the immediate suspension of all activities related to Project 890 
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following cabinet officials who convinced him that the weapons program was a major irritant 
in relations with the U.S. Some believe that Park continued a clandestine program that only 
ended with his assassination in 1979,153 but this is not confirmed. Consequently, the U.S. 
actively cooperated in the expanding Korean nuclear power program and agreed to sell U.S. 
commercial power reactors.  
Park suspended the effort for nuclear weapons after strong U.S. diplomatic 
intervention, but that was not the only reason. Notably, the Cabinet discussion regarding 
nuclear weapons had begun as early as 1970, before Park’s decision to initiate a weapons 
program in late 1974. The delay of the decision making implies that the Korean research 
institutes had undertaken development projects beyond their competency and means. The 
CIA pointed out that his decision “was strongly conditioned by the poor performance of the 
ADD. … and by the lack of any immediate need for nuclear weapons development,”154 
describing that the policy planning for the nuclear weapons program “was erratic, even 
haphazard.”155 According to Oh Won Chul, Park had not decided actually to produce a South 
Korean bomb, but that he was determined to acquire the technology and capability to do so, 
because “Park wished to have the [nuclear] card to deal with other governments.”156 
Testimonies of some nuclear scientists and officials who were involved in the project also 
support this view. According to them, the economic planning board was not very supportive 
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when questioned about the enormous budget plan. For this reason, some scientists have cast 
doubt on the extent of President Park’s commitment to nuclear weapons.157   
 
Park’s Path to Missile Development  
South Korea came to face outright pressure from the U.S to stop its nuclear weapons 
program.  Regarding a missile system, however, the U.S. apparently provided its technology 
to South Korea, though with some strict restrictions. It is not clear if the aim of South Korea’s 
missile development was specifically related to the use of nuclear warheads with the delivery 
system. Although the guided missile NHK-1 South Korea developed in 1978 could be used as 
a delivery system for nuclear weapons,158 U.S. intelligence judged that Park preferred 
conventional, tactical missions for surface-to-surface missiles.159 Park tended to view North 
Korea’s Soviet-supplied FROGs (free rocket over ground) and 130-mm artillery as a potent 
weapon of terror, and was obsessed with acquiring a means of threatening Pyongyang to the 
same degree that the North could threaten the South. North Korea had a weapons system 
which reached Seoul, whereas the South’s rockets and artillery could not travel the 160km to 
Pyongyang. For political reasons alone, the South’s Government was obsessed with acquiring 
a means of threatening Pyongyang to the degree that the North could threaten the South.  
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Park’s first order for a surface-to-surface guided missile was made almost 
simultaneously with the decision to pursue nuclear weapons. On December 26, 1971 he 
personally wrote down a list of specific characteristics he wanted to see in the missile 
program and handed the memo to Oh Won Chol, then a newly appointed member of the Blue 
House senior staff. He was at the center of Park’s missile initiative. Oh summoned Ku Sang-
Hoe to the Blue House, later to be known as the father of South Korean missile development, 
to hand him the memo. This memo called for the development of an independent missile 
system, with the goal of producing surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, with a range of 
200km initially, but being progressively increased in later stages.160 
The missile development started with a feasibility study group by a group of scientists 
and engineers including Park Kwiyoung and Dr. Ku Sang-hoe from the ADD, Dr. Lee 
Kyoungseo from the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), Dr. Hong Jaehak 
from Korean Air Force Academy, and several officials from the Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency (KCIA) on May 1, 1972.161 They assembled in a secret apartment, on the side of the 
Han River in Seoul, under the disguised name of “The Promotional Plan for the Aerospace 
Industry.” It developed the plan for acquiring guided missiles, calling for the successful 
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testing of mid-range surface-to-surface missiles by the end of 1974 and long-range missiles 
by the end of 1976.162 
The task, however, was almost “to create something out of nothing” for them. In fact, 
no one among them had developed a guided missile previously.163 After studying catalogues 
and textbooks from abroad, mainly Japan and the U.S., for several months,164 they got an 
unexpected message. The U.S. MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) invited Ku 
Sang-Hoe to tour the missile-related facilities in the U.S. from May 16, 1972 for two months. 
The MAAG had been working with the South Korea to develop depot-level maintenance 
capabilities for the HAWK and Nike-Hercules missile system.  
They wanted a local maintenance facility to be operated under contract “to save 
money over the life-cycle of these missiles given lower labor costs, reduced transportation 
costs, and utilization of local repair parts.”165 During the visit, Ku made every effort to 
gather information related to guided missile development. And when he visited the U.S. 
Army Missile Research Center, located in Huntsville, Alabama, for two weeks, he got over 
800 pages of documents about equipment, facilities, budget, and organization for developing 
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a guided missile, provided by Mac Daniel, the director of the center. Through the feasibility 
study based on this kind of document gathered abroad, they were barely able to build the 
Basic Plan for Developing Ballistic Missiles on September 15, 1972. 166  
 
Remodeling Nike-Hercules 
In May 1974, ADD selected the Nike-Hercules (NH) for reverse engineering to 
develop a missile design. The NH was an outdated missile system which was developed in 
the 1950s and deployed in South Korea by the U.S. in January 1961. Since it was designed 
for surface-to-air missile use, it had a lot of shortcomings and inefficiencies for surface-to-
surface use. Nevertheless the rocket team was confident that they could convert the NH to be 
fit for the surface-to-surface mode by introducing new propellant material, semiconductors, a 
computerized guidance system and a new warhead on it. 167  ADD’s rocket team intended to 
upgrade the NH to a new model with a maximum range of 180km with a 500kg payload so 
that it could reach Pyongyang and two of North Korea’s major ports, Nampo and Wonsan far 
behind the DMZ.168  
ADD chose McDonnell Douglas (MD), manufacturer of the Nike-Hercules (NH) 
missiles, as its preferred licensor. At that time MD was suffering financial difficulties in the 
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mid-1970s, and was eager to sell missile design technologies.169 Although MD requested $30 
million for technology transfer, ADD could not afford to pay this from its budget. The ADD 
proposed a joint research project just for increasing the range of NH missiles from 180km to 
240km, which would progress in three stages; a feasibility study for the first stage, design 
research for the second stage, and development for the third stage. ADD made a contract with 
MD to pay $1.8 million for the first stage. Under the agreement, ten ADD researchers were 
sent to MD in Los Angeles for six months, where they learned the relevant technology under 
strict security.170 As Dr. Lee Kyoungsuh recalls it, “coming back to the hotel, we sometimes 
hid technical documents in our underwear to copy them all through the night, and brought 
them back next morning.”171 On completion of the six-month-long feasibility study, the ADD 
acquired basic design technologies for the missiles. However, only after achieving the 
capability to design missiles, did ADD cease the joint project with MD.172  
By early 1975 the State Department concluded “Linkage of nuclear weapons 
development to an advanced missile capability would have the most serious strategic 
implications given the ROK’s geographic location.” Yet, since South Korea officially 
abandoned its nuclear weapons program by signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 
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April 1975, the U.S. began to allow technology transfer, even limited, for Korea’s missile 
program. There are two main reasons for this. First, the U.S. underestimated South Korea’s 
broad effort to acquire a surface-to-surface missile capability beyond the NH. Apparently, the 
U.S. policy was to discourage the ROK from acquiring an effective and independent surface-
to-surface guided missile capability. But the NSC judged that “A propulsion manufacturing 
capability is a necessary but non-critical component compared to the sophisticated warhead 
and guidance technology which would have to be developed by the ROK to make an 
effective missile of the kind visualized by State.”173 It determined that South Korea lacked 
the capability to design and produce an improved missile control and guidance system and 
warhead. NSC also believed that “NH is not an effective medium range surface-to-surface 
weapon because the guidance and warhead were not developed for that kind of use.”  
Second, the U.S. believed that South Korea would be able to acquire similar 
technologies from other states if the U.S. did not allow such sales and transfer. Rather, by 
limited transfer of technology, they “would gain leverage or a better opportunity to monitor 
ROK rocket development.”174 For example, another major element in ADD’s effort was to 
acquire propellant technology. ADD contacted a company producing the propellant for NH, 
because U.S. companies were legally required to secure the State Department’s prior 
approval for the sale of propellant technologies. Its initial answer was ‘no.’ 175 Thus ADD 
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concentrated its resources on missile development, and actively sought to purchase the 
necessary propellant and guiding technologies, parts and components on the international 
market.176 The ADD initially chose to contact a French company, Societe Nationale des 
Poudres et Explosifs (SNPE), for the purchase of technology, equipment, parts and 
components. However, SNPE required $20-30 million for that. In the middle of the 
negotiations with SNPE, the ADD swiftly contacted Lockheed for the purchase of some of 
the equipment at the plant, getting the news of Lockheed’s plan to close down its propellant 
plant in California due to financial difficulties. The ADD made a contract with Lockheed to 
buy its California propellant factory at the price of $2.6 million - but without the 
manufacturing technology – in December 1975.177 The manufacturing technology was 
excluded from the deal because when the State Department approved the Lockheed case it 
refused to provide further “significant” technology. NSC judged that its turning down the 
Lockheed manufacturing technology sale would be “an essential signal to the ROK regarding 
our future intentions.”178 Nevertheless, the ADD completed a separate deal with SNPE to 
acquire the manufacturing technology at a cost of $3 million.179  
Overall, there were two faces to Korean Government defense policy; a public and 
official stance in support of U.S. policy, and a private, covert strategy of pursuing its own 
goals. The U.S. appeared to follow an “ambiguous policy with respect to the Korean policy 
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for missile development.”180 Consequently, the continuing discrepancy between the two 
countries’ perceptions of the military needs of South Korea created another opportunity to 
develop South Korea’s capability for missile development. South Korea’s behavior illustrates 
the difficulty of controlling technological developments in a country for once it “can 
purchase manufacturing technology, efforts to restrict its access to weapons or critical 
components become less effective and may only delay rather than terminate programs that 
the local government values.”181 
 
Successful Launch of Paekkom 
After the construction of the Daejon Machine Tool Center and the relocation of the 
Lockheed propellant factory to Daejon, the missile development program quickly gained 
momentum. By 1975, the Daejon Machine Tool Center had grown into an autonomous center 
for research of guided rockets, with 500 scientists and engineers on its start.182 ADD’s 
missile researchers were divided among the six directorates of the agency’s Daejon Center. 
The Directorate One handled with propulsion work; Two handled aeroballistics research; and 
Three, electronics and guidance and control development. Also, there was a group 
responsible for testing and evaluation of the missile flight test at Anhung in Chungchung 
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province on the west coast of South Korea.183 They developed an NH guided missile system 
following a four-step strategy, which replaced individual components they developed in NH 
rockets and tested them.184 The first step was to test the domestic guidance and control 
system, by assembling it on an NH rocket; secondly it was the propulsion engine, third the 
rocket fuselage, and the final stage was for the rocket attaching all the components they had 
developed.  
As of May 1976 the initial design of the improved missile was near completion. Only 
its control surfaces and a portion of the hydraulic system would be replicas of the Nike 
Hercules, but the rocket motors, airframe, control system, and onboard guidance system 
would be dramatically upgraded or entirely redesigned.185 Using French assistance for both 
propellant and production technology, ADD succeeded in casting a reduced-scale motor. 
Static tests on these motors confirmed in mid-1976 Korea’s ability to cast a carboxyl 
terminated polybutadiene-type propellant.186 ADD also modified a command guidance 
system of the Nike Hercules to extend its range and accuracy.187 Also it improved the 
onboard guidance system by making extensive use of solid-state electronics rather than the 
vacuum tube technology of the standard Nike Hercules. The ADD had not produced a 
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prototype missile by December 1976, when Park suspended Project 890, of which the missile 
program was part.   
Initially the ADD planned to finish developing the missile in late 1980, but with the 
inauguration of the Carter administration, ADD adjusted the target date to October 1978. 
During his presidential campaign in 1976, Carter promised to withdraw all American ground 
troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, though on March 9, 1977, the Carter 
administration announced the delay of its withdrawal plan until 1982. Beginning its first 
flight tests in April 29, 1978, the ADD scored a success rate of 50% in eight flights by 
September 16.188 Finally, the ADD successfully tested the surface-to-surface missile, named 
NHK-1 (also known as Paekkom-1 and Baekgom-1, which means white bear in Korean), on 
the west coast of the Korean Peninsula, on September 26, 1978. About a week later, on 
October 1 it was demonstrated in the 30th national military day parade.189  
The ADD’s missile work focused on modifying the U. S. produced Nike Hercules 
surface-to-air missile as a surface-to-surface weapon with 150km range. However, of the 
original Nike Hercules, only the control surfaces and part of the hydraulic system remained. 
The CIA was able to obtain detailed technical parameters for the ADD’s research: “Although 
the performance of the missile will not differ significantly from that of the standard Nike 
Hercules, the ADD prototype is to include a new rocket motor using French propellant and 
motor technology, a modified missile airframe, and an improved, all solid-state command 
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guidance package.”190 However, to secure U.S. guidance technology and equipment, which 
were required to complete the development of guided missiles, South Korea had to sign the 
bilateral agreement, known as the Missile Guideline with the U.S. that placed highly restrictive 
conditions on its ballistic missile development capabilities. Under the terms of the agreement, 
South Korea is prohibited from developing missiles with a range greater than 180km and 
above the maximum warhead weight of 500kg.191 
After the first successful test flight of the NHK-1, the Defense Ministry announced 
that South Korea now ranked as the seventh nation that could produce its own missiles. Every 
news media used this as the lead story and allocated the first page to the story. This was out 
of all proportion to reality. The NHK-1 was described as the first “indigenous Korean” 
missile which was developed by Korean engineers’ dedicated efforts despite the pressure 
from the U.S. in fear of proliferation. Daehan (Korea) News, the government's promotional 
film, reported that “The whole process of the rocket development was implemented by our 
scientists and engineers,” and “if the guided missiles produced by our hands are to deployed 
to the front and the coast, our lands, sea, and sky will be secured as a home of peace and 
prosperity.”192  
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Figure 6: “Successful Launch of Indigenous Guided Missile” Source: Kyounghyang Daily  
 
Chun Doohwan, Downsizing the ADD 
After the successful development of the first Korean missile, ADD initiated plans for 
a more sophisticated missile equipped with an inertial navigation system (INS) as well as 
ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000km as a long term project, along with a rocket 
capability that could launch intelligence satellites.193 According to a letter from 
Congressman Anthony Beilenson to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in August 1979, “certain 
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U.S. firms in the Los Angeles area are exporting technologies to the Republic of Korea that 
might be employed by the Korean government for the purpose of developing intermediate or 
long range, ballistic missiles.” Beilenson also noted that “the Korean government now has in 
its possession the specification, engineering drawings, instructions and designs, blueprints 
and certain assembly equipment employed in the United States Atlas Centaur program.”194 
Park and ADD’s missile aspirations were, however, suddenly reined in due to the 
domestic South Korean politics after Kim Chaekyu, the director of the Korean CIA, 
assassinated Park on October 26 1979. Prime Minister Choi Kyuha was quickly elected 
president by the National Conference for Unification. However, martial law was declared 
throughout the country and politics came under the control of the military. On December 12 
1979, Major General Chun Doohwan took power through a coup against Martial Law 
Commander, General Chong Sunghwa, and was inaugurated for a regular seven-year term as 
president in 1980. Once General Chun Doo-hwan seized power, he delegated the defense 
industries to the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and 
ensured that missile development programs, inherited from the Park era, were scrapped.195  
 The missile programs were halted as the ADD was put through two major 
organizational overhauls. In August 1980, about 30 senior researchers involved with missile 
development were fired though without clear reasons. Despite losing the core researchers, 
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ADD managed to continue to develop and succeeded in test-launching the NHK-2 missile 
equipped with the INS system provided by British firm Ferranti on October 30 1982. All the 
same, two months later the newly appointed head of ADD, Kim Sung-jin laid off more than 
800 researchers.196 Most of them were engineers and technicians in Daejeon Machine Tool 
Center, a major facility for missile development among the four centers of ADD. Through the 
two sharp reductions of ADD personnel, the subsequent missile plans of NHK-2, 3 and 5 
were also halted and South Korea’s rocket research was crippled.197 
The rationale for downsizing missile projects is still not clear from official documents, 
but Chun was said to have a negative bias about the missile program as influenced by a report 
that NHK-1 was a mere fake.198 He used to mention to people close to him that “Paekkom 
was not self-reliance, but they disguised this by painting an NH missile. The ADD wasted a 
huge amount of money and deceived the president for the purpose of developing the guided 
missile that was beyond their capability.”199 At that time, there was a widespread rumor 
within the ADD that rivalry and confrontation between the old military friendly with Park 
and the new military supportive to Chun resulted in downsizing the ADD.200 Indeed, Kim 
Sung-jin who laid off more than 800 researchers in 1982 was a classmate of Chun in the 
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military academy. However, a more important reason seems to be the diplomatic relations 
between Chun’s government and U.S. President Reagan’s government; the purge of the 
missile program was the Chun regime’s effort to win recognition and secure support from the 
Reagan Administration.201 
When Chun seized power in 1980, he faced a serious problem of legitimacy. Not only 
did he wage a military coup, but also he ordered special-forces to kill hundreds of civilians in 
Kwangju city in May 1980 given his bloody path to presidential power. To overcome this 
problem, he was desperate to seek recognition from the U.S. When Reagan assumed the 
presidency, he was to issue a new security assistance policy that superseded the arms transfer 
policy of the Carter Administration. Whereas Carter emphasized arms sales restrictions, 
Reagan would evaluate arms sales requests primarily in terms of their net contribution to 
enhanced deterrence and defense.202 Inviting Chun to Washington, Reagan assured him that 
“the U.S. has no plan to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from the Korean peninsula,” 
and confirmed that it would “make available for sale to Korea appropriate weapons systems 
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and defense industry technology necessary for enhancing Korea’s capabilities to deter 
aggression.”203  
Thus, South Korea’s defense policy turned towards maintaining a friendly 
relationship with the Conservative Reagan administration which showed a solid defense 
commitment to Korea by introducing high-tech weapons for the U.S. troops in Korea. To 
cement the alliance and secure a degree of U.S. support for his dictatorship, he was ready to 
suspend missile development which had been a headache between two countries since 
1970s.204 Moreover, compared with the 1970s, the security concerns became significantly 
relieved as the economic gap between the South and North Korea was already huge. 
Consequently, the Chun Government began to trim its defense budget share of GNP from 
5.79% in 1983 to 4.5% in 1984, and cut defense spending from $4.8 billion in 1983 to $4.1 
billion in 1984.205  
However, Chun’s policy for missile development was briefly changed by the bloody 
North Korean terrorist attack to assassinate him, killing seventeen South Korean officials in 
Burma on October 9, 1983. Escaping death by minutes, Chun traveled directly from the 
airport to a meeting of the surviving members of his security team at the Blue House. At the 
meeting, Minister of Defense Yun Songmin proposed that the South Korean Air Force bomb 
the North in retaliation, but Chun rejected the proposal. Instead, Chun ordered the ADD to 
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reconstitute the missile team and develop upgraded surface-to-surface guided missiles by the 
Seoul Olympic Games in 1988.206 Since most of the core planning staff had already left the 
ADD — some had moved to universities and firms, and others even abroad —, Ku Sang-hoe, 
who had barely kept his position in the ADD, led the missile team. In November 1983, the 
Ministry of National Defense approved a program to develop an improved version of 
Paekkom, NHK-2 called Hyounmu. After a successful test launch in 1986, one battery of 
NHK-2 was deployed on the frontline on October 1987.207  
 
Conclusion 
In the 1970s, South Korea developed its own surface-to-surface guided rockets, under 
the vision of self-reliant national defense; however, the success came at the cost of tight 
military restrictions, because South Korea had accepted the U.S. demand to limit the missile 
range to 180km as a precondition of purchasing U.S. missile technology. Nevertheless, 
throughout the period South Korea created the infrastructure and human resources skilled in 
the ways of modern industrial production, subsequently for promoting space technology. 
In the early 1970s, military production in South Korea suffered from a shortage of 
skilled engineers, planners and managers. According to a briefing given Senator Glenn by 
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U.S. military personnel in 1972208, South Korea was “a long way from self-sufficiency in 
medium or heavy equipment.” The briefing pointed to two basic deficiencies in Korea’s 
defense industry: insufficient quality control procedures and weak management. It notes 
“unless both these tasks are accomplished, the goal of self-reliance will be time consuming, 
prohibitive in costs, and ultimately a failure.” Although the notion of developing independent 
arms production capabilities for South Korea was not central to U.S policy, its military 
assistance allowed South Korea’s local firms to create its capability related to missile 
technology. It began with a MAAG-supervised maintenance facility for the Hawk and Nike 
Hercules missile systems in 1972. A local firm, Gold Star Precision Industries, which took on 
the commercial maintenance facility of missiles in Korea, received personnel training from 
the Raytheon Corporation for maintenance and operation in 1975.209 
The political leader’s strong support for the firms was also critical to establishing the 
industrial infra-structure for producing the missile. For producing indigenous components of 
Paekkom, the government subsidized its civilian counterparts as it procured the updated 
equipment and tools needed for them. 210 The propellant factory which had moved from 
Lockheed for the Paekkom project was even transferred to private ownership, Korea 
Explosive Co. As a result, in the early 1980s South Korea became a country with an 
indigenous capability for missile design and production as it created major producers such as 
                                       
208 Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, U.S. troop withdrawal from the Republic of Korea: an 
Update, 1979 : a Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by Senator 
John Glenn, p. 52.  
209 Ibid, p. 53. 
210 Interview with An Dongman (November 13, 2014) 
99 
 
Dae-Dong Industrial, Korea Air Line, Gold Star, Hyundai Shipbuilding Heavy Industries for 
aeromechanics, and Korea Explosives for propellants.211 
The growth of human resources in these sectors also helped established networks for 
defense production as the production of missiles became subsequently interwoven into the 
development of sounding rockets and space launch vehicles.212 Later, a number of scientists 
and engineers involved in the Paekkom and Hyonmu project of ADD moved to the Korea 
Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) and were given the task of building the first Korean 
sounding rocket program. It was hoped that this expertise might lead towards a space-launch 
capability subsequently. For example, Dr. Ryu Jangsu and Dr. Moon Sinhaeng, who were 
responsible for the general practice of developing Hyonmu, had a pivotal role in developing 
KARI’s sounding rockets in 1990s and the KSLV rocket program in 2000s.  
After South Korea developed the Hyonmu in the mid-1980s, Korea did not actively 
pursue ballistic missiles research until the late 1990s. This was mainly because of the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed between the U.S. and South Korea in 1979. It 
retarded South Korea’s capability to produce ballistic missiles without outside assistance.213 
Instead, the government first began to express an interest in a space program for economic 
growth. In 1985, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) issued a Long-term Plan 
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for the Development of Science and Technology toward the 2000s that called for a series of 
specific space-related projects. Eventually, space’s turn had come. This will be the beginning 







Space Development for Economic Security 1985-1997 
 
The end of the Cold War led to profound changes in the space policies of both the 
major space-faring countries and the developing countries. The focus of space missions has 
slowly moved away from military objectives to civilian ones, like scientific missions, 
telecommunications, meteorology and other civil applications related to the observation of 
the Earth. South Korea did not have an adequate infrastructural network for space 
development before the 1980s. However, the nation recognized that the civilian demand for 
space services provided by satellite and space launchers would increase and South Korea 
could exploit the defense industry established for the development of the first surface-to-
surface guided missile in the 1970s.214   
Technological advances were expected to reduce entry barriers, so, in the mid-1980s, 
the government began to formulate industrial policies for the aerospace sector. In 1985, it 
announced the Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology toward the 
2000s which emphasized space development as a way to reinforce South Korean’s industrial 
competiveness. In 1987, it also adopted the Aerospace Industry Development and Promotion 
Act which included the first significant funding for a national space program. The policies 
emphasized that the Korean nation was imagined as a cohesive community of shared 
economic interests and developmental goals, and space development was justified for 
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“economic and social security” in response to the fierce international competition in 
technology. The term “security” referred to the fear of falling behind so far that there was no 
hope of ever catching up with advanced space-faring nations. 
The strategies adopted focused on the development of satellites and sounding rockets 
that would lead to space launch vehicles. Space development proceeded with a strong 
industrial policy component, resembling South Korea’s entry as a late developer into other 
sectors, such as heavy and chemical industries, shipbuilding, automobiles, electronics, and 
telecommunications.215 Initially relying on foreign technical assistance, the three main actors 
in the Korean space program, SaTReC, KT, and KARI, sequentially launched a micro-
satellite KITsat-1 (1992), a communication satellite KOREAsat-1 (1995), and multipurpose 
observation satellite KOMPsat-1 (1999). Based on the technical and industrial base 
established through the NHK-1 project in the 1970s, it also developed sounding rockets, 
KSR-1 (1993) and KSR-2 (1998) as precursors to a space launch vehicle.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the early development of the 
Korean space program between 1985 and 1998. I shall proceed in the following way. First, I 
will show how the first signs of the national vision for space development emerged and were 
promoted with the country beginning to move from military leadership to civilian control in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Focusing on the role of scientific experts in presidential 
decision-making, I will examine the ways in which the vision of space development for 
economic security provided a strong boost to various space projects. Second, this chapter 
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describes the institutionalization process in Korean space development and the characteristics 
of this process as manifested in the changing status and role of various actors. And third, I 
will illustrate how these national actors provided South Korea with a platform for an 
autonomous and indigenous space capability through international bonds and collaborative 
practices in an interconnected global network.  
 
Development of Science and Technology toward the 2000s 
During the 1980s, South Korea struggled to change its industrial strategy for 
innovation from ‘imitation’ to ‘defense.’216 The Korean economy, which was characterized 
by an emphasis on low-cost labor, assembly-type operations during the 1970s, was now in the 
midst of a significant transformation reflecting a new commitment to skill-intensive and 
knowledge-intensive industries.217 This was to counter the technology protectionism that had 
emerged internationally after the experience of two rounds of an oil crisis, along with the fact 
that South Korea’s industry was based on low-cost labor that could barely compete with 
China, who had just entered the world trade market. 
Increasing international technology protectionism led South Korean leaders to see the 
failure to escape from underdevelopment and to catch up with advanced industrial nations as 
one of the most serious risks they faced. The Chun Doohwan government promoted the 
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development of science and technology in terms of sovereignty, and shifted its policy 
direction from technology learning to the expansion of its own scientific and technological 
capacity in high-technology sectors. This required an indigenous R&D capability. The total 
R&D expenditure of South Korea continued to increase from 0.56% of GDP in 1981 to 1.65% 
in 1987 during his rule.218 
Having secured his office through a military coup, President Chun devised a slogan 
that emphasized Korea’s science and technology-driven economic development as a way of 
compensating for his lack of legitimacy.219 His administration began to outline an economic 
rationale for moving the country into the field of science and technology as the nation 
evolved from military leadership to civilian control. The Science and Technology Promotion 
Review Council (STPRC) was established to create policy coordinator and research 
administrator positions for specific technology fields. The Chun Doohwan administration 
used this council as a tool to secure a consensus for the S&T policy agenda. 
On 19 December, 1985, at the 2nd meeting of STPRC, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) presented the Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology toward the 2000s which suggested goals and directions for achieving the status 
as a developed country by the turn of the century.220 The plan was crystallized thanks to joint 
research conducted by over 523 relevant scholars during six months plus five public hearings. 
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It was published in December 1986.221 In the first part, it defined the meaning of the 2000s, 
and approached the new changes in the environment in terms of scientific and technological, 
economic and social dimensions: “we will face the economic and social transformation in a 
time of rapid change in 15 years …,” and “… science and technology is the most critical 
factor that will lead to economic and social transformation.”222  
It also predicted that the situation which it termed a “technical monopoly” would 
intensify. In this situation, the economic barriers for entering an industry or conducting 
product development were so high that it was not profitable for developing countries to make 
the attempt. In accordance with this view, it was proposed to turn South Korea into one of 
“the world’s top 10 developed countries in the implementation of technology.” Space 
development became one of the suggested large-scale R&D programs for achieving this goal 
along with ocean development and both were viewed as a way to reinforce South Korea’s 
industrial competiveness. 
 
88 Seoul Olympic Games and Satellite 
South Korea’s interest in the commercial utilization of space began in earnest when 
the International Olympic Committee, which met in Baden- Baden, voted to award the 1988 
Olympics to Seoul in September 1981. Two months later, the South Korean government set 
up a research committee to examine the feasibility of developing a communications satellite 
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for broadcasting the Olympic Games.223 The Ministry of Communication (MOC) 
subsequently confirmed the viability of the communications satellite business based on the 
results of the feasibility study made by a Canadian company, Telesat Inc., and the American 
company Teleconsult. It planned to promote a private sector-led approach to development 
whereby private companies provided significant contributions to investment.224 The five 
domestic electronics companies including Goldstar, Samsung, Daewoo, Hyundai, and 
Dongyang Precision had expressed their intention to participate in the satellite business. As 
South Korea’s interest in the space industry increased, Europe and the United States 
simultaneously led efforts to get a major presence in the South Korean satellite market. 
Arianespace, a French company founded in 1980 as the world's first commercial provider of 
space transportation, and SatCom, a communication satellite provider, offered a 
communication satellite and its launch at 20-25% cheaper than NASA.225 NASA suggested 
that it would provide a supporting loan, and additionally let a Korean scientist fly on board 
the Space Shuttle, if South Korea would launch its own satellite using the NASA shuttle in 
1988.226 
There were risks. Some experts insisted that it would be too difficult, both financially 
and technically to develop and launch satellites, or possess (purchase) independent satellites 
by 1988, having little experience in the satellite business. The feasibility studies 
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independently performed by the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute 
(ETRI) and the Korea Development Institute (KDI) raised three common problems.227 First, 
the domestic demand for satellite communications was so small that it was not economically 
viable at present. Second, the overall technological circumstances were not mature enough to 
promote the satellite business. 
Finally, the huge investment in the satellite business risked upsetting the balanced 
development of the other telecommunication sectors. The South Korean government finally 
decided to lease nine IntelSat satellites to broadcast the Seoul Olympic events, four in the 
Atlantic Ocean region, three in the Indian Ocean region, and two in the Pacific Ocean 
region.228 In February 1984, President Chun invited firms to find a way to resolve the 
problem of Korea being on the fringe as regards reception of telecom signals, by first 
installing television relay stations in the short term,” adding that “the satellite 
communications business should be approached carefully aiming for the mid-1990s.”229  
 
The First Comprehensive Feasibility Study for the National Space Program  
Although the dream of broadcasting the Seoul Olympic Games through its own 
satellite did not come true, South Korea started to recognize that an expanded ‘national space 
program’ including communication and broadcasting satellite as well as science and 
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technology satellites and sounding rockets were needed. While the MOT worked on the 
communications satellite for the Olympics, the MOST emerged as a new and engaged actor. 
In early 1985, the MOST funded the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) to 
conduct a feasibility study for possible mid-term and long-term goals, and asked it to define 
the budget needed for South Korea to develop a respectable space program.230  
Dr. Kim Doohwan of the National Astronomical Observatory (NAO) was keen to 
promote space development as a long term national project and founded a space science and 
technology center. Dr. Kim graduated from Seoul National University and received his Ph.D. 
in astronomy from University of Tokyo in Japan in 1979. After coming back home, he joined 
the NAO in 1982 and became the director of the NAO in 1985. With a very limited budget, 
and only a handful of poorly trained astronomers and scientists with a Ph.D. in astronomy, 
the NAO had not accumulated research achievements since its establishment in 1974.231 Dr. 
Kim recognized that the bureaucratized system of the NAO was a cause of the problem, and 
waited for an opportunity to reform it. As national interest in space development grew and the 
MOST created a positive atmosphere for the establishment of a national space center, he 
planned to abolish the NAO and rebuild it as a new government-funded research institute to 
direct overall national space development.232  
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As a joint researcher of the KIST’s feasibility study, he tried to inject his project to 
reform the NAO into the study.233 The study, which was the first comprehensive feasibility 
study for a national space program, concluded that the plan of MOT for the direct 
development of the satellite and the rocket to launch the communication satellite into geo-
synchronous orbit foe the Olympics was not feasible for some time in Korea.234 Rather, 
“developing space science and technology and its industrialization,” it suggested, “should be 
planned as a long term national project, and to achieve this objective more effectively, a 
supporting law for the national space program” was required. To begin with a “scientific 
satellite is essential and various experiments by sounding rockets are unavoidable, and it is 
important to recognize that this program for rockets should not be for military purposes, but 
for peaceful space exploration since the transfer of its technology from advanced country 
would be more feasible.” Also, the establishment of a “space science and technology center” 
as a nationally supported institute was suggested to carry out research and development work 
as well as planning, adjusting and coordinating at the working level.  
 
Establishment of ISSA as a National Space Center 
Based on the study, Dr. Kim persuaded the government officials to build a long-term 
national comprehensive program for space development and to reform the NAO to be the 
national space center for the purpose. Finally, in March 1986 the government decided to 
abolish the NAO and to establish the Institute of Space Science & Astronomy (ISSA) a 
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subsidiary of the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI). Dr. Kim 
was selected as the first director of the institute. The ISSA initially consisted of two main 
departments — the Astronomy Research Department and the Space Science Technology 
Department. While the Astronomy Research Department took the function of the NAO as it 
was, the Space Science Technology Department would conduct research on communication 
satellites, remote sensing, launch vehicles and guidance and control. Starting with only 17 
researchers, Dr. Kim hoped to develop the ISSA as the NASA of Korea in the near future.235 
A Study on the Korean Space Science and Technology Development Program 
published by the ISSA in May 1987 included the first Korean mid- and long-term plan for 
space development. The study was conducted to formulate a plan, which suggested sets of 
realistic measures and schemes within the capabilities of present authorities and the resources 
available to the MOST. However, the plan went beyond such constraints to identify the ISSA 
as the unique civilian R&D institute in the nation, one that would lead the national R&D 
activities of the space science and technology programs in the future. According to the plan, 
the Korean space industry would provide not only economic benefits from the operation of 
communication and observation satellites, but also “economic and social security” in 
response to the fierce international competition in technology.236 Note that it introduced the 
term “security” to emphasize the necessity of space development. This was indicative of the 
fear of falling behind so far that one could no longer hope of catching up with the advanced 
nations. 
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Figure 7: Space Development and Economic and Social Security, Source: ISSA (1987, p. 13) 
 
 
The plan predicted that the space industry would grow up to $200 billion in the year 
2000, and suggested setting the long-term national goal as being a “nation of space 
technology,” which would provide space related products to overseas markets in nations who 
were exploiting space resources. A three-step approach was recommended, along with 
intermediate goals set for the years 1991, 1996, and 2001, respectively. The first step was to 
launch a domestically developed “sounding rocket” by 1991. The second step came during 
1996: A tiny experimental spacecraft was put into earth orbit. Finally, in 2001, the third step 
consisted of the domestic configuration of a “communications satellite system” that was 
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developed and launched jointly with overseas expert organizations. Though the ISSA’s 
ambitious plan for Korea’s first national space development received considerable attention 
from interested parties, some cast doubt on how to secure the budget for the plan. In fact, the 
legal base and system for promoting space development was not properly prepared or fleshed 
out.237 
 
The Aerospace Industry Development and Promotion Act 
The Aircraft Industry Promotion Act of 1978 was the first piece of Korean legislation 
intended to assist and fund the domestic aerospace industry.238 The Act was passed by Park 
Chung Hee’s government as it began to push for the development of an indigenous defense 
industrial capacity with the decline in the credibility of the American commitment to defend 
South Korea after the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine. Since the Act focused on a 
development program of defense industrial sectors using licensed production of foreign 
systems, new legislation was asked for to support civil space development. 
It was Dr. Ryu Jangsoo of ADD who made the most substantial contribution to 
legislation for supporting space activities.239 Dr. Ryu was involved in developing the NHK-1 
guided missile during 1970s, but was sidelined when the Chun regime downsized the missile 
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project to win recognition and secure the support of the Reagan Administration.240 In August 
1985, as thinking that a change of direction in civil space development could make a 
significant breakthrough in the rebuilding of ADD, he paid a chance visit to the then-ruling 
Democratic and Justice Party.241  
Discussing the issue with Dr. Ryu, Yi Sanghee, a member of the National Assembly 
as well as the chairman of the Committee for the Long-term Plan for the Development of 
Science and Technology toward the 2000s, he was entrusted with the task of drawing up 
legislation for the promotion of space development. Working for about two years as Yi’s 
legislative adviser, Dr. Ryu gave priority to a shift of the focus on aerospace development 
from the military to science and industry. To justify space development, he referred to the 
examples of acts used in advanced countries such as the U.S.’ National Aeronautics and 
Space Act and the French Space Operation Act.  
Finally, in December 1987, South Korea’s legislature finally approved The Aerospace 
Industry Development and Promotion Act (the Act of 1987) to complement the previous act 
for the aircraft industry. The purpose of this Act was to contribute to “the sound development 
of the national economy and the improvement of national life by supporting and promoting 
rationally the aerospace industry, and researching and developing efficiently aerospace 
science and technology.”242 The Act required that an Aerospace Industry Development 
Policy Council be established and placed under the control of the Prime Minister. It would 
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define the basic plan and see to the coordination of the accompanying important policies of 
the Government and the tasks of specific ministries and agencies. It would also secure a 
robust commitment by the government to space activities, and long-term, low interest rates to 
support R and D in civilian businesses and institutes.  
 
The Presidency and Space Development 
The year of 1987 was a time of optimism when South Korea dreamed of entering the 
ranks of advanced countries through space development with legislation favoring the 
development of the aerospace sector, while also building a democratic nation through an 
amendment of the constitution to change the presidential election system to one of direct 
elections. In June 1987, President Chun, who seized power via a military coup in 1979, 
announced his choice of Roh Tae-woo as the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic 
and Justice Party.243 Roh, a member of the Hanahoe (a secret military group), gave critical 
support to a coup in December 1979 when Chun became the de facto ruler of South Korea. 
He also helped Chun to lead troops against the Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1980. 
Thus, Chun’s nomination was widely perceived as handing Roh the presidency, and triggered 
large pro-democracy rallies in Seoul and other cities in the 1987 June Democracy Movement. 
In response, on June 29, Roh made the 6.29 Declaration, officially named the Special 
Declaration of Grand National Harmony and Progress towards a Great Nation, promising a 
wide program of political reforms with his eight-point proposal that included direct 
                                       




presidential elections. With the 6.29 Declaration, Roh successfully upstaged Chun and 
thereby boosted his own image as reformer to ensure a smooth succession of political 
power.244  
Being eager to distance himself from his past military career and ties with Chun, Roh 
effectively took up the ideas in the air about future-oriented space issues. His political 
affiliation and the ruling party, the Democratic and Justice Party, developed its contribution 
to the passing of the Act of 1987 into a preemptive political agenda. In the 1987 presidential 
race shortly after the Act of 1987 was adopted, Roh differentiated himself from other 
candidates by making the electoral commitment that he would actively pursue national space 
development through promoting independent communication and broadcasting satellites and 
the relevant cutting-edge industries. The space issue appeared in a presidential election 
campaign for the first time in South Korea. The content contained in Roh’s presidential 
election commitments was as follows:245 
 
 
Step 1 (1988-1992): Building the infrastructure for possession of an 
independent satellite 
Step 2 (1993-1997): Manufacturing a satellite and constructing a ground 
network 
Step 3 (1998- ): Securing the first independent communication satellite 
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In the election, the two leading opposition figures, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-
jung (both of whom later became the President of Korea), were unable to overcome their 
differences and ran separate campaigns and split the electorate. This enabled Roh to win by a 
narrow margin and become the country's first cleanly elected president. As the president 
elected in South Korea’s first ever peaceful transition of power, Roh publicly stated three 
policy goals; further democratization, continued economic growth, and progress toward 
reunification.246 Along with these policy initiatives, Roh appointed Yi Sanghee as the first 
Minister of Science and Technology for his administration and let Yi plan and conduct space-
related activities.  
 
Young Astronauts Korea and Technolympic 
Besides pushing ahead in accordance with Roh’s campaign promise, Minister Yi 
actively planned various projects to foster a public atmosphere congenial to space 
development. For example, he established a group called the foundation of Young Astronauts 
Korea (YAK) in 1989. The formation of YAK was discussed first when Jack Anderson, a U.S. 
columnist and the chairman of the Young Astronaut Council (YAC), visited Seoul to request 
South Korea to participate in its international program in 1985.247 The YAC was established 
by the White House in 1984 in an effort to promote greater proficiency and interest in science, 
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math and technology using space as the underlying theme.248 Since then, tens of thousands of 
Young Astronaut Chapters were formed in every state and around the world. When he 
requested  participation in YAC, Anderson also proposed that the Korean government 
should select ‘space’ as a theme for the Seoul Olympic Games, using gold medals that had 
been sent into space and returned, and letting a Korean astronaut who had flown on the Space 
Shuttle lead the Olympic parade.249     
 Although the Chun’s government did not accept Anderson’s proposal, Yi Sanghee, 
then a member of National Assembly, considered the foundation of YAK seriously. Soon 
after becoming the Minister, he accelerated the preparation of the bill to support YAK and set 
it up on 23, September 1989. Its object was “to foster global human resources by encouraging 
a focus on exploring creative research, improving and supplying space scientific education 
programs, hosting various nationwide competitions, training instructors and developing 
vibrant international exchanges to advance the advent of a bright space science era.” At the 
foundation ceremony of YAK, President Roh declared that “Our government will establish 
the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) within this year to prepare the coming space 
era, and plan to have independent satellites for communication and scientific research in the 
mid-1990s.” He added that “I hope that we can make a satellite with our hands and launch it 
in our hands within this century.”250 Roh became the honorary president of YAK that same 
day.  
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Another example of Yi’s efforts to promote a space boom was the Space 
Technolympic. Drawing on the enthusiasm for the 88 Seoul Olympics, the MOST planned to 
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hold the Space Technolympic in 1993.251 Its purpose was to “acquire advanced space 
technology and make it available for domestic industries and to promote technical 
cooperation for the peaceful use for mankind.” 252 The basic concept of the Space 
Technolympic was to be an initiator in all political, economic, and social fields, including 
national defense, as well as science and technology towards the new millennium. It included 
6 main events; a space industrial exhibition, a space science symposium, a scientific satellite 
launching, a Space Jamboree, the formation of an Asian Space Agency, and launching a 
Korean scientist in the U.S. Space Shuttle. Although the plan was nipped in the bud due to 
the failure to secure the budget, various space activities that South Korea could were 
highlighted. 
 The passing of the Act of 1987 and the government’s public activities related to 
space development contributed to create a space boom. Before 1987, there had been only a 
handful of departments of aeronautics in universities and no department and major with 
“space” in its name in South Korea. By 1990, however, about twenty space-related 
departments had been newly established or some had changed their name to department of 
aerospace engineering. The department of aerospace engineering recorded the highest rank in 
qualifications needed for admission to the Seoul National University in 1991,253 which 
shows the heightened public interest in space development. A news report described 
aerospace engineering as the “flower of the future” as Korea moved towards the 2000s 
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followed by electric and automobile engineering which had led South Korea to becoming an 
industrial country.254 
 
Three Main Players in Space Development 
The Act of 1987 included the first significant funding for space projects in South 
Korea. To use the funds effectively, the Act required the government to draft an aerospace 
development plan, and a 15-member committee led by the Prime Minister was formed to 
oversee the drafting of the plan. While the Prime Minister nominally headed the committee, 
the MOST, MOC (later Ministry of Information and Communication), and the Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MCIE) drafted most of the plan’s details. The first national 
mid and long term space plan for Korea was established in 1996. Before then, the national 
space program had been driven largely by the three main players, Korea Telecom (KT), 
Satellite Technology Research Center (SaTReC) in KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science and Technology), and Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), respectively 
pursuing the development of communication satellites, scientific satellites, and sounding 
rockets.  
For the communication satellite, the MOC that had pursued the project since the early 
1980s announced the KOREAsat project in 1989. KT was chosen as the sole investor for 
purchasing a satellite from an advanced country. For the scientific satellite, KIST and KAIST 
initially stepped up to the plate. Ever since late 1980s, Dr. Na Jungwoong of KIST had 
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exchanged ideas about small sized scientific satellites with Weber State College in the U.S., 
and started a 20-inch sized cubesat project named KORsat in 1990.255 Around the same time, 
the SaTReC founded by Dr. Choi Soondal, a Professor of KAIST, cooperated with Surrey 
University in the U.K. to develop KITsat. The MOST unified the two efforts into one project 
led by SaTReC in 1990.256 Regarding sounding rockets, though KAIST surveyed the basic 
research underway,257 the ISSA soon took the lead. Along with its own plan,258 the Space 
Engineering Section of ISSA started research on developing an unguided solid-propellant 
two-staged rocket system with the assistance of the ADD. The rocket team was led by Dr. 
Ryu Jangsoo who had worked on enabling the Act of 1987 and had moved to the ISSA. 
As KARI emerged as a comprehensive aerospace institute in 1989, the early 
institutional landscape of the space program changed. Ever since the ISSA had been 
established in 1987, some of the aerospace engineering community complained that an 
astronomer (Dr. Kim Doohwan, the director of ISSA) was leading the national space 
program.259 They did all they could to encourage the idea that engineers should take up the 
initiative. These movements triggered a discussion about the establishment of a specialized 
aerospace research institution to perform space development as part of the Act of 1987. The 
17th proposition of that Act stated that “the government could establish a comprehensive or 
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specialized research institution for more efficient aerospace research.” At the Ministers’ 
meeting in November 1988, Yi Sanghee, the Minister of Science and Technology submitted a 
proposal for the foundation of KARI as a subsidiary of the Korea Institute of Machinery & 
Material (KIMM). In response, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) joined the 
conversation and sought to take active control of the new institute, arguing that the ADD with 
the highest technology for guided rocket and aviation systems was affiliated to the MND. 
While the MOST urged the foundation of an integrated institute that would 
consolidate the existing aviation section of the ADD and the other aerospace-related 
organizations of KIMM and ISSA, the MND wanted a dual alternative that maintained the 
ADD untouched.260 After a long discussion, the final decision on the establishment of the 
KARI was made leaving the ADD to stay as it was. Consequently, the development of 
military aerospace applications was confined to the ADD under the responsibility of the 
MND, while the activities for distinct civil aerospace development was entrusted to the KARI 
officially founded as a subsidiary of KIMM in October 1989. The initial foundation of the 
institute was in the aviation section of the KIMM, and in January 1990 it consolidated the 
Space Engineering Section of ISSA. The director of ISSA, Kim Doohwan, who dreamed of 
developing the ISSA into the NASA of Korea and had already seen strong opposition to this 
idea, finally resigned his job in late 1989.261 Losing its engineering part, the ISAA remained 
as a research institute for astronomy and became Korea Astronomy & Space Science Institute 
(KASI) later. From this time on, South Korea came to have separate institutional systems for 
astronomy and aerospace engineering.  
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The activities for developing civil aerospace were initiated by mainly three actors: a 
scientific research institute (KARI), a university (KAIST), and an industrial company (KT). 
Focusing on satellite development offered prospects for direct benefits, since it led to three 
separate programs; the experimental KITsat (Uribyol), the communication KOREAsat 
(Mugunghwa), and the multi-purpose Earth observation KOMPsat (Arirang). The South 
Korean space launch vehicle program also started with the KSR (Korean Sounding Rocket) 
series in early 1990s. KARI launched its first single stage sounding rocket, the KSR-1 in 
1992. Beginning in the 1990s, most development projects were proposed by these entities, 
rather than by a political leader or government decision makers. I will describe each the three 
institutions’ activity in what follows.  
 
SaTReC in KAIST -The Birthplace of the First Korean Satellite  
The Satellite Technology Research Center (SaTReC) inside KAIST was a university-
based research facility meant to promote the education and training of satellite engineers 
through research programs in satellite engineering, space science, and remote sensing. Before 
the late 1980s, the Korean Government rarely supported the research functions of universities 
for space development. With SaTReC, a university became one of the main actors for 
spacecraft technology. 
 
Establishment of SaTReC 
The founder of SaTReC was Professor Choi Soondal at KAIST, who received a Ph.D. 
in electric engineering from Stanford and worked for a satellite team at JPL for six years as of 
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1969. In 1976, he returned home to be the director of GoldStar Corporation Research Institute, 
which took charge of developing Valcan Radar in Park Chung Hee’s regime. After Chun 
Doohwan seized power in 1980, Choi, a senior at Chun’s middle school, built a distinguished 
career as the head of The Korea Electric Power Corporation, the Minister of Communication, 
the head of the Korea Science and Engineering Foundation (KOSEF), and the head of Il-hae 
Foundation, etc. When he returned to KAIST as a professor in 1989, Choi chose low-cost 
small satellites as his major research topic.262  
In 1983, a feasibility study for the communication satellite business was conducted 
for the first time in Korea, Choi the then Minister of Communications did not accept it 
because he thought that to improve the coverage of land-based telephone lines was more 
urgent than to develop a communication satellite. However, he appreciated that the time was 
now ripe, and that there was a need for a fast and reliable way to acquire the expertise for the 
communication satellite business of the MOC.263 Despite his research experience acquired at 
JPL for several years, Choi had been working in an unrelated field for over ten years and 
needed to bring himself up to speed as regards recent trends in satellite development. He went 
to the U.K. to take a short-term lecture series on small satellite engineering provided by 
University of Southampton and University of Surrey in July 1989.264   
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Beginning in 1978, Professor Sir Martin Sweeting at the University of Surrey had 
been developing the Surrey Space Center for the design, manufacture and operations of 
micro-satellites.265 Surrey’s first experimental microsatellites UoSAT-1 (1981) and 2 (1984) 
were constructed with highly innovative features in terms of cost and performance compared 
to traditional satellites thanks to the emergence of integrated circuits and elementary 
microprocessors. However, Surrey needed to establish a commercial company to attract and 
handle external funding to build satellites. Buoyed by the success of UoSAT Sweeting could 
see the commercial value in developing his satellite technology.  
Early in 1985, his team created Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL), a company 
that worked closely with academic research teams and undertook industrial contracts to 
provide satellite design, construction, integration and launch services, satellite ground station, 
and orbital operations. SSTL provided a formal mechanism to handle the transfer of small 
satellite technologies from the University’s academic research laboratories into industry in a 
professional manner via commercial contracts through the development and marketing of 
cost-effective small satellites. Since UoSat-5, all the Surrey micro satellites have been 
designed and built for individual commercial customers.266  
During his stay abroad Choi was quick to recognize the benefits of entering the space-
faring business with an affordable, low-risk ‘first step’ via an extremely inexpensive yet 
realistic micro-satellite program. On July 28, 1989, Sweeting and Choi had a meeting of 
minds to make KAIST one of the first customers of SSTL, hiring the company to train 
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engineers and students in the construction and the launch operation of the Korea Institute of 
Technology Satellite (KITsat) costing £2.3 million in August 1993.267 SSTL would design 
the satellite, which would be built by students from KAIST, working under a technology 
transfer program at the University of Surrey’s Spacecraft Engineering Research Group. The 
students were involved in the UoSat-5 mission through taking the MSc courses at Surrey.  
However, it was no simple matter for a mere professor to secure such a large amount 
of money for about four years. It happened that the KOSEF initiated a support program for 
large long-term research projects leading to the development of science and technology in the 
country. To apply to the program, Choi founded the Satellite Technology Research Center 
(SaTReC) in KAIST in August 1989. The SaTReC had the advantage of being a university 
research institute which could be devoted to basic research and education specialized in 
satellite engineering. Choi wanted SaTReC to become a research institute like the Institute of 
Space and Aeronautical Science (ISAS) at the University of Tokyo and JPL at Caltech.268 
SaTReC was selected as an Engineering Research Center (ERC) funded by KOSEF and 
began its research in March 1990.  
The government also began to show an interest in Choi’s satellite project which could 
very quickly develop and launch a satellite before KOREAsat scheduled for the mid-1990s. 
Finally, the Korean Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and the MOST 
decided to support SaTReC as a national research project in August 1990, on condition that 
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the launch schedule of 1993 should be advanced by one year so as to be before the end of 
Roh’s presidency.  
 
Comprehensive and In-depth Training in Surrey 
Surrey and SSTL’s know-how transfer and training (KHTT) program was particularly 
suitable for SeTReC team who wished to develop and establish a national expertise in space 
technology through an affordable small satellite program. The program focused on the 
education and training of scientists and engineers by providing a means for direct, hands-on 
experience of all stages and aspects of a real satellite mission from design, construction, test 
and launch through to orbital operation. The first phase typically comprises: Academic 
Education (MSc, PhD degrees); Hands-on Training (seconded to SSTL), Ground station 
(installed in country), Microsatellites (1st at SSTL, 2nd in country), Know-how transfer 
(satellite design license) Once developing space nations have mastered microsatellite 
technology, the mini satellite provides a logical next step in the development of an 
increasingly capable national space infrastructure.269 KITsat-1 was the first KHTT satellite. 
(Table 4) 
The first five graduating students of KAIST, selected by Choi, went to the University 
of Surrey in the fall semester of 1989, and four more students and two researchers of SaTReC 
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arrived in March 1990. Twenty seven students in total were sent to foreign universities for the 
training and development of satellite experts supported by SaTReC. In addition to the 
University of Surrey that hosted most of the students, the list includes University College of 
London, Imperial College, University of Tokyo, Iowa State University, and Columbia 
University.270 They were all eager to become a new, first generation of experts that could 
help inform the country’s use of space technology to address local challenges.  
 
 
Table 4: SSTL Know-how Transfer and Training Programs. (Source: Martin Sweeting, “Space at 
Surrey: Micro-Mini Satellites for Affordable Access to Space”) 
Country Dates Satellites 
Pakistan 1985-89 BADR-1 
South Africa 1989-91 UoSAT-3/4/5 
South Korea 1990-94 KITsat-1/2 
Portugal 1993-94 PoSAT-1 
Chile 1995-97 FASat-Alfa/Bravo 
Thailand 1995-98 TMSAT-1 
Singapore 1995-99 Merlion payload 
Malaysia 1996-98 TiungSAT-1 
China 1998-99 Tsinghua-1 
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The SSTL modular microsatellite did not have a traditional inflexible ‘skeleton’ 
structure, but rather used a layered module-box structure concept. This involved a series of 
identical outline machined module boxes stacked one on top of the other to form a body onto 
which solar panels and instruments could be mounted.271 Each module box housed the 
various microsatellite subsystems such as batteries, power conditioning, on-board data 
handling, communications and attitude control. Payloads were housed either in similar 
modules or on top of the platform alongside antennas and attitude sensors as appropriate. 
Electronically, the microsatellite used modern, sophisticated, but not necessarily space-
proven, electronic circuits to provide a high degree of capability. These were underpinned by 
space-proven subsystems – resulting in a layered architecture that achieved high performance 
with operational redundancy.  
This structural characteristic of the SSTL microsatellite enabled the SaTReC team to 
use alternative technologies rather than simple duplication.(Figure 9) Also it was a great 
opportunity to acquire practical knowledge on satellite design and on manufacturing a 
satellite since they were involved in the UoSat-5 project until July 1991.272 As the UoSaT-4 
failed due to an electrical fault after two days in orbit in January 1990, the SSTL started an 
unscheduled project UoSat-5 to perform the experiments of the UoSat-4 project of October 
1990. The Surrey team involved the SaTReC personnel in the UoSat-5 project, so that they 
had one more chance to manufacture a satellite before KITsat. Based on their hands-on 
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experience, the SaTReC team could take a lead in all the processes of KITsat development 
including mission determination, manufacture of engineering model and flying model, 




Figure 8: Structure of KITsat-1. Source: Development Study of a Small Satellite for Science 




Whilst KITsat-1 used the same microsatellite platform as the UoSAT-5, a number of 
improvements and modification were incorporated to support the four main missions;273 1) 
Digital Store & Forward Communication (DSFC): supports the 9600 baud FSK packet radio 
system profiling the digital store-and-forward communications operating in the Amateur 
Satellite Service. 2) Digital Signal Processing Experiment (DSPE): transmits voice messages 
containing bulletins, telemetry and spacecraft, information spoken by its Digital Signal 
Processing Experiment module in Korean, English and other languages. 3) CCD Earth 
Imaging Experiment (CEIE): carries two experimental CCD cameras to provide two different 
images of the Earth’s surface with high resolution (400m) and low resolution (4km). 4) 
Cosmic Ray Experiment (CRE): the investigation of the near Earth environment, and its 
effects on satellite systems through a Cosmic Particle Experiment and Total Dose Experiment. 
This technology for the control of two CCD cameras, the first ever mounted on a 
microsatellite, and the cosmic particle detection instrument were developed by the SaTReC 
team and transferred to the SSTL.274  
 
“Another Opening of Heaven” 
On August 11, 1992, KITsat-1, weighing 48.6kg, was successfully launched from 
Kourou, in French Guiana, by the Ariane 42P rocket as an auxiliary payload to 
TOPEX/POSEIDON, the French spacecraft designed for oceanography measurements. Choi 
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renamed KITsat-1 Uribyul-1[Our Star-1] in April 1992 in response to a newspaper reader’s 
request to give the first Korean satellite a Korean name.275 The achievements of Uribyul-1 
were feted in all the media as a source of pride for the country. On the day KITsat launched, a 
Korean runner Hwang Youngjo won the gold medal in the marathon race at the Barcelona 
Olympic Games in Spain. South Korea finished 7th from the top overall in Barcelona. 
President Roh highly praised SaTReC, making a special address on TV. “SaTReC had helped 
open a new era of space exploration and indeed demonstrated the level of Korean science and 
technology to the world,” he said, adding that “we finally have launched a dream of being 
among the top 7 countries in science and technology toward the new millennium on the day 
we ranked 7th in the Olympics.”276 As it happens 7th in the world was the object of a major 
R&D effort nationwide at the time. In 1990, President Roh proclaimed the ‘G7 project’ 
intended to catch up with advanced industrialized countries by the beginning of the 21st 
century.277 It supported dozens of research programs in key technologies including aerospace.  
The scientific mission of the first national satellite was also expected to promote 
space awareness among decision makers and stimulate public interest. On National 
Foundation Day, October 3, 1992, a congratulatory poem entitled “A Second National 
Founding” by poet Jo Byoungha278 and songs by elementary school students could be heard 
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on FM435MHZ when the satellite went over the country.279 The first satellite image of the 
Korean peninsula from Uribyul-1 was also released to the public that day. During the 
Daejeon Expo in Korea, an international exposition held between August 7 and November 7 
in 1993, the model of KITsat-1 was exhibited, and a ground station was set up and operated 
as a demonstration. The exhibition of space exploration artifacts at the 1993 Daejeon Expo, 
such as a mock-up of KITsat-1 and 2, was very popular, drawing 16,000 visitors a day on 
average.280 
KITsatl-1 was also criticized by some for being a satellite developed using the 
“technology of others.” It is not our star but someone else’s star since domestic parts account 
for only one percent of the total components of the satellite, they said. A journalist remarked 
that KITsat-1 was a co-product created by the Bureau of Public Information and the media to 
sensationalize a presidential legacy,281 referring to an interview with Yi Sanghee who led the 
legislation of the 1987 Act and the establishment of KARI. KITsat-1 was “nothing more than 
a mere a scientific satellite which foreign experts assess as an expensive toy,” he said. A 
professor at Seoul National University, Kim Seoung Jo, who became the director of KARI in 
                                                                                                                       
Wooribyeol -1 finally soared into space through the sky. 
Our country opened the heaven again, and now it is into space. 
Ah, the splendid and great power of Korea.  
Higher and wider to space, our country, for now, is opening its bright territory. 
Freely send and receive the clear, bright and broad news from the universe. 
With Uribyul-1 as our hear of dream, 
We shall attain prosperity clearly, brightly, and widely forever. 
 
279 SaTReC, We Launched a Star: Young Geniuses’ Dream and Ambition for Uribyul-1, (Mihaksa, 
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the late 2000s, worried that “such exaggerated publicity might distort the flow of funding for 
science and technology.”282  
 
Dealing with the Criticism 
In the face of such criticisms, SaTReC took on the burden of domestically producing 
complete satellite parts and developing an indigenous model as soon as possible. It started the 
next micro-satellite KITsat-2 project on 13 September, 1992 with about 40 researchers 
including 9 members from the KITsat-1 team. Although KITsat-2, also named Uribyol-2, 
weighing 47.5 kg was nearly identical to the first satellite, KITsat-1, the challenge for 
SaTReC was to develop and build its own spacecraft from start to finish, replacing the 
technology used in the KITsat-1 mission with domestic components. Choi laid down three 
ground rules for KITsat-2 as follows;283 1) definite improvement on the problems of KitSat-1 
2) use of domestic components to the utmost 3) development of indigenous satellite bus 
system. Both KITsat 1 and 2 carried simple space science experimental modules to measure 
radiation particles, but they were in such different orbits that together they could provide a 
unique opportunity to study the effects of the radiation environment as characterized by the 
orbit. KITsat 2 was launched by Ariane 4 on September 28, 1993, as an auxiliary payload to 
SPOT-3 and successfully placed into orbit. SaTReC used 827 domestic parts out of 
approximately 12,000 parts for KITsat-2, including the KAIST Satellite 32bit-computer 
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(KAScom), a digital signal processing experiment with a 200m resolution, an Infrared Sensor 
Experiment (IREX), etc.284 
Based on the achievements of the KITsat-1 and 2 missions, SaTReC began to develop 
KITsat-3 in 1994. With the KITsat-3 mission, SaTReC demonstrated its technological know-
how in the design, development and operation of microsatellites for high-quality Earth 
observations. Further, SaTReC acquired the technology for 3-axis attitude control, the 
embodiment of high-speed data transmission using the X-band, and developed an Earth 
observation camera with a ground resolution of 13m. In addition to the multichannel Earth 
observation camera, KITsat-3 had a payload that allowed for space environment monitoring 
and scientific research. After almost being cancelled (see below) KITsat-3 was launched on 
May 26, 1999, by an Indian PSLV rocket.285 
In addition to the accumulation of technical skills, the indigenous achievements of the 
KITsat program marked the beginning of commercial space activities in South Korea. In 
January 2000, the SaTReC Initiative (SaTReC-i) was established as a space technology spin-
off of KAIST, led by the team of experienced engineers who carried out the successful 
development of the first three microsatellites in South Korea. SaTReC became the 
technological backbone for the KARI space systems, with the Science and Technology 
Satellite (STsat) program in the 2000s, while the SaTReC-i became the commercial arm of 
the Korean satellite industry through its microsatellite platforms and payload development in 
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the 2000s.286 In the early 1990s, Korea was one of the first to send engineers to Surrey to 
build satellites. South Korea has since cultivated a national satellite program, and has gone on 
to train engineers from other developing countries. 
 
KT – the Groundwork for Communication Satellite 
South Korea began to advance toward new capabilities with the KOREAsat series of 
geostationary communications satellites with the intention of offering permanent satellite 
broadcasting services (DBS) as well as a variety of voice and data communication services to 
a nationwide audience. The satellite is also called Mugunghwa which means the ‘Rose of 
Sharon,’ the country’s national flower. In a gesture evocative of the national pride associated 
with development of its own satellite technology, this name for the country’s first 
communication satellite was chosen from among submissions from citizens nationwide. 
KOREAsat had to establish the groundwork for South Korea to enter the worldwide business 
of space communications and to push the country into the rank of technologically advanced 
nations in geosynchronous orbit.  
 
Buying Satellites from Foreign Companies  
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As mentioned earlier, in the early 1980s South Korea was keen to develop a 
communication satellite for broadcasting the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The project was 
dropped when it was judged that the economic conditions for satellite business in Korea were 
not yet mature. The climate changed dramatically in the late 1980s, however. The 
government proposed restructuring the broadcasting and communication industry, mainly 
through the introduction of a competitive market, launching 27 channel cable television and a 
12-channel capacity KOREAsat DBS project, and forming a global network of Korean 
television channels to promote Korean culture and cultural products world-wide. In addition, 
it was believed that DBS would play a significant role in future communications between 
North and South Korea, which currently have different and incompatible broadcasting and 
communication systems. The death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in mid-1994 
underscored what was thought to be the single greatest environmental change in Korean 
national reunification.287  
Against this background, the government officially announced the KOREAsat project 
in 1989, and KT was chosen as the sole investor for the project and owner of the satellite in 
July 1990. Created as a public enterprise wholly owned by the government in 1982, KT had 
been responsible for the operation of Korea’s telecommunications networks and various other 
activities. KT began a satellite communication service in September 1992 by leasing one 
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transponder of the INTELSAT-VA system, which enabled KT to acquire operational 
technology and created service demand in the future for KOREAsat.288  
The plans for KOREAsat crystallized when KT asked satellite suppliers to supply a 
turnkey satellite communications system operating in Ku-band frequencies for a total 
investment of $260 million.289 The KOREAsat project included two stages of competitive 
bidding.  A consortium to manufacture the satellites was chosen from among four Korean 
industrial teams and domestic companies that submitted joint proposals with foreign partners: 
GE Astro (now Lockheed Martin), Space Systems/Loral and Hughes (Boeing) in the U.S., 
and British Aerospace (Astrium Satellites) in the U.K. In December, 1991, a consortium 
consisting of Goldstar information & Communications, Korean Air, and GE was selected for 
two AS-3000 series satellites. In bidding to select a consortium to launch the satellites, four 
companies (McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, Arianespace and Glavkosmos) together 
with domestic companies participated. KT signed a contract with a consortium made up of 
Halla Heavy Industry and McDonnell Douglas that would launch the satellite using the Delta 
II 7925 rocket in August 1992. The launch contract included technology transfer conditions, 
and engineers were involved in all processes ranging from designing to manufacturing the 
satellites and launch vehicles for three years from September 1992; 30 engineers were 
selected by KT, KARI, ETRI (Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute) and 
industries (Korean Air, Samsung Aerospace, Hyundai Electronics Industries, Hyundai, LG, 
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Korean Broadcasting System) for the satellites and 24 engineers were selected for the launch 
vehicles.290 
 
Recovering from Partial Failure 
On August 5, 1995, the KOREAsat-1 was launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida. 
The launch of the first Korean communication satellite was also planned as a national event 
for the 50th anniversary of independence on August 15. However, the launch of KOREAsat-1 
was a partial failure. One of the three air-started solid motors failed to jettison, resulting in 
KOREAsat-1 being placed in an orbit that was about 6,351 km short of its planned GTO 
apogee of 35,786km. The failure was attributed to an explosive transfer line (a type of 
detonation cord) possibly having been exposed to high temperatures due to a lack of 
insulation on the rocket's booster separation circuits.291 After 49 consecutive successes, it 
was the first Delta failure since 1986.292 The flawed launch required the satellite to use much 
of its maneuvering and attitude control propellant to reach its final geostationary orbit over 
the Solomon Islands 25 days after the launch. This resulted in a reduction of its expected 10-
year-and-seven-month lifespan by more than half.293  
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Although KT could have abandoned the spacecraft and received an insurance payout 
due to the accident in accordance with the contract, it took into consideration KOREAsat’s 
symbolic meaning and decided to maintain ownership, receiving 60% of its claim.294 
Fortunately, KOREAsat-2, which was manufactured as a backup for KOREAsat-1, was 
successfully put into orbit on January 14, 1996, so that KT did not suffer any setback in 
providing satellite services. Thus, the KT started its operation of the KOREAsat-2 from July 
1996 two years earlier than the original plan. Both KOREAsat-1 and 2 had a 12-channel 
capacity with three transponders for broadcasting, with each transponder delivering four 
digital channels. With this launch, South Korea became the 22nd country in the world with its 
own domestic satellite and the second with a digital direct broadcast satellite (DBS) 
system.295 
As KOREAsat-1’s lifetime was shortened, KT decided to advance the launch date of 
KOREAsat-3, which would carry 33 transponders, so accommodating the capacity of 
KOREAsat-1 and 2.296 The KOREAsat-3 program marks the continuation of a long-term 
relationship between KT and Lockheed Martin, which began with KOREAsat-1 and 2. In 
addition to providing the satellite, the program also involved upgrading existing ground 
systems. For a total of $ 216 million, KOREAsat-3 was manufactured with the participation 
of a Korean team that included: Daewoo Heavy Industries, Doowon, ETRI, Halla 
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Engineering and Heavy Industries, Hyundai Electronics Industries, KARI, and Korean Air.297 
Technical personnel of these companies were involved in the whole process of satellite 
design and manufacture in technical cooperation with Lockheed Martin. By participating in 
satellite production subcontracting of $1600 million, they contributed to boosting the level of 
domestic aerospace technology.298 
On 4 September, 1999, KOREAsat-3 was launched by an Ariane 42 rocket from 
French Guyana to replace the expired KOREAsat-1.299 The satellite, weighing 2,790kg at 
launch, was fitted with a steerable antenna to improve coverage capability on the Asian 
continent. While KOREAsat 1 and 2 were designed solely for domestic purposes, so could 
not relay any international signals, KOREAsat 3 had a wider footage area covering the North-
East region of Asia and a longer life time (15 years). In December 1999, KOREAsat-3 
completely replaced the services provided by the KOREAsat-1, and in May 2010, the satellite 
was sold to Asia Broadcast Satellite (ABS) and renamed ABS-7.300 
The KOREAsat project established the groundwork for South Korea to enter the 
worldwide business of space communications and to push the country into the rank of 
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technologically advanced nations in regards to the geosynchronous orbit. During the 
KOREAsat program period, KT and other involved industries accumulated satellite 
technology through on the job training and monitoring work with the cooperation of 
contractors. Their experience established the groundwork for the next generation of satellites.   
 
KARI- The Key Institute of the Korean Space Program 
KARI realized the South Korean space dream. On October 10, 1989, less than three 
months after the creation of SaTReC, the KARI was established as the key institute to 
“promote advanced aerospace research activities as well as to create a competitive air and 
space industry” in South Korea. It was a subsidiary of the Korea Institute of Machinery & 
Metals (KIMM) and it became an independent aerospace agency responsible for the long-
term development of the Korean space program in October 1996. KARI’s main objectives 
included advancing indigenous satellite technology in space applications, especially for Earth 
observations, and ensuring autonomous access to space with sounding rockets and satellite 
launch vehicles.301 While SaTReC developed Korea’s capability in the niche of experimental 
microsatellites (KITsat) using miniaturized components, and KT acquired operational 
technology of communication and broadcasting satellites (KOREAsat), KARI worked 
specifically on space applications with the Korean Multi-purpose Satellite (KOMPsat) 
program and on rocket propulsion with the Korean Sounding Rocket (KSR) program.  
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KOMPsat to Have “Multi-Purposes” 
Despite its ambitious plan to cover all areas of the aerospace sector,302 the KARI 
continually struggled to clearly define its mission and to secure funds in its early years. It was 
supposed to integrate the Aerospace Research Center of KIMM with the Space Engineering 
Section of ISSA with only 44 personnel. KARI started two main projects, a small aircraft 
project named Changong-91 and a Korean Sounding Rocket,303 which was already 
developed by the existing research personnel transferred from KIMM and ISSA. Nevertheless, 
repeated failures to take on new projects dulled its enthusiasm to be the main player in the 
national aerospace sector.304 KARI was thwarted by ADD in its attempt to participate in the 
Korean Fighter Program (KFP), which was to purchase the McDonnell Douglas FA-18 to 
improve the ability of the Republic of Korea to defend itself and support its own defense 
systems.305 Regarding the scientific satellite project, KARI promoted it as a joint project with 
SaTReC, but the government concluded that SaTReC should assume full charge of the 
project named KITsat. 
In this situation, KARI needed to plan a new large project for its survival. Indeed once 
it lost the leadership of the scientific satellite project, KARI was concerned that its KSR 
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project might be suspected as being for military purposes by other advanced countries.306 At 
about the same time the MND and the ADD were interested in independently developing a 
satellite that could monitor North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs.307 For 
these reasons, KARI hastily decided to embark on a remote sensing mission from space not 
only to meet the needs of South Korea in geo management and environmental control but 
also to conduct permanent observations of neighboring North Korea; they named the satellite 
project the Korean Multipurpose Satellite (KOMPsat). Technically this meant that the same 
bus could be utilized for many different applications—mainly for low Earth observations but 
also extended to geostationary earth orbit (GEO) applications. 
The new government that took office in 1993 announced the Five-Year Plan for the 
New Economy which included the goal of promoting the aerospace industry so as to enter the 
ranks of the top 10 countries in that domain.308 Along with the plan, Hong Jaehak, the 
director of KARI reported the Development Strategy for the Aerospace Industry to President 
Kim Young-sam during his presidential visit to the manufacturing factory of Samsung 
Aerospace at Changwon in Kyoungnam Province on March 12, 1993. The President endorsed 
the Strategy which included KARI’s plan for two big projects, one for developing a mid-size 
aircraft with 50 seats the other a LEO (low earth orbit) observation satellite, KOMPsat.309  
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The KOMPsat program was initiated in May 1994 as a major investment in space 
research in KARI as well as South Korea. It was developed from November 1994 to January 
2000 and its total budget was 224.2 billion won (about $ 0.2 billion).310 Its main objective 
was to develop and operate a national space segment for Earth observation as well as to 
indigenize the main components in the spacecraft and payload for use inKOMPsat-2. 
KOMPsat-1 was planned to carry a panchromatic camera of 6.6m resolution, a six-band 
ocean-scanning multispectral camera with 1km resolution and 800km swath, and physics 
sensors. In technical terms, they were called Electro-Optical Cameras (EOC), an Ocean 
Scanning Multispectral Imager (OSMI), and a Space Physics Sensor (SPS).  
EOC had a cartography mission to provide images for the production of scale maps, 
including digital elevation models, of the Korean peninsula from a remote earth location in 
the KOMPsat orbit. OSMI’s mission was worldwide ocean color monitoring for ocean 
ecological observation, ocean resource management, and ocean atmosphere environment 
analyses. SPS consisted of two observation sensors, a High Energy Particle Detector (HEPD) 
to study the effects of the radiation environment on microelectronics and an Ionosphere 
Measurement Sensor (IMS) to measure densities and temperatures of electrons in the 
ionosphere and to monitor ionospheric irregularities.311 The data from these instruments 
would provide valuable services to remote-sensing users in various fields of applications, 
including research on Earth resources and surveys of natural resources, conducting 
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surveillance of large-scale disasters and mitigation efforts, collecting high-resolution images 
for South Korea’s GIS (geographical information system) and contributing to the publication 
of printed and digitized maps. 312 
 
Strategy for the “Koreanization” of KOMPsat 
KARI relied on international cooperation to accelerate the KOMPsat program. In 
March 1995, it signed a contract with the U.S. Company, TRW to develop KOMPsat jointly, 
and in December 1996 it worked with Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) to launch the 
satellite using a Torus rocket. KOMPsat was KARI’s first joint satellite development project 
to acquire expertise in designing, building and using satellites as well as a key step forward 
for South Korea in its quest to become a self-sufficient, space-faring nation. Thus, KARI 
desperately negotiated with TRW to secure stable technology transfer and to acquire 
technology ownership. 
For example, the contract was to build two satellites, a flight model (FM) and a proto 
flight model (PFM), based on TRW’s modular, lightweight satellite bus technology. TRW 
would conduct assembly, integration and test (AIT) of the PFM in the U.S. in the presence of 
KARI and Korean industry engineers, while KARI would do the same for the flight model at 
the KARI facility drawing on the skills obtained from TRW. To ensure that TRW shared 
technology as it had promised, KARI required that TRW pay an indemnity if the user [KARI] 
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could not operate the FM normally after launch.313 Since the successful contract with KARI 
was very significant to TRW, which had a strong commitment to develop new Asian markets, 
the U.S. firm could not but agree with the offer. 
Under the contract with TRW, KARI mobilized its researchers; 25 technical staff 
members and some 50 researchers from KARI joined the 125-member TRW team in order to 
study satellite design data at TRW and learn about satellite systems and components. Seven 
Korean industrial enterprises also dispatched 30 engineers for the same program for the 
“Koreanization” of the satellite components.314 Through TRW’s ‘Train-the-Trainer’ program 
engineers shared office space, ensuring strong day-to-day collaboration on the project.  
Korean engineers developed 30 out of 48 major components including solar panel support, 
thermistor, flight software, piping system, and S-band antenna and transponder.315 The 
Korean industrial partners produced some hardware for the satellites’ electrical, thermal, 
structural, and propulsion subsystems in Korea.316 TRW provided on-site assistance to these 
Korean partners to ensure that the components were properly produced and prepared for 
integration into the satellite.  
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Thanks to the joint development with TRW, KARI could mobilize enough 
infrastructure, manpower, and technology to develop satellite systems for practical 
applications.317 On 21 December, 1999, KOMPsat-1, weighing 510kg, was launched by a 
solid-fuelled Taurus launcher provided by Orbital Sciences into an orbit at 685km. It was 
renamed Arirang-1, which is the name of a Korean folk song sometimes considered to be the 
unofficial national anthem of Korea. It represented South Korea’s first step toward an 
independent Earth-imaging capability suitable for civilian remote sensing and future military 
reconnaissance.318  
 
Competition for the Satellite Leadership between SaTReC and KARI 
By successfully supervising the organization of the KOMPsat program, the first fully 
government-led Korean space development project, KARI began to get the upper hand over 
SaTReC in planning and undertaking national satellite projects. Indeed, there were serious 
confrontations between SaTReC and KARI as regards taking the leadership of national space 
development.319 Until the mid-1990s, when SaTReC had successfully developed and 
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launched KITSAT-1 and KITSAT-2, KARI did not show marked achievements in the 
satellite research field, even though it was a national research institute. In 1993, SaTReC 
negotiated with the Chinese Research Institute of Space Technology to develop a joint 
satellite for its next project KITsat-3. However, the government objected that KITSAT-3 
duplicated KARI’s KOMPsat project and terminated funding for the KITsat-3 project. 
This resulted not only in the cancellation of a collaborative satellite development 
project between SaTReC and China, but also a crisis in the development of KITsat-3. The 
government began to insist that the representative of the Korean space effort should be the 
national research institute, KARI, and it pressured SaTReC towards downsizing or even 
shutting down to avoid overlapping investments. SaTReC managed to survive thanks to the 
timely inauguration of a Minister of Science and Technology, Jung Geunmo who was a 
strong supporter of SaTReC’s achievements,320 and very much favored the KITsat-3 project, 
which was reinstated and finally successfully completed in 1999.  
 SaTReC’s intention to remain as an autonomous organization while expanding the 
scope of its research soon came into conflict again with a government that wanted to fully 
control and manage the long-term planning of the nation’s space development directly under 
KARI’s leadership. Seo Jeonguk who was inaugurated as Science and Technology Minister 
succeeding Jung Geunmo in March 1999 proposed that SaTReC merge with KARI to reduce 
costs. Most SaTReC members reacted strongly against the government’s proposal and 
refused to move to KARI because they wanted to continue doing pure research in an 
autonomous organization rather than in what they saw as a bureaucratic one. 
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After going on a one-month strike, SaTReC’s founders decided to create a satellite 
company, SaTReC-i, to continue their work. Hardly even an affiliated research center of 
KAIST not KARI, the members left at SaTReC had to reduce the scope of their research and 
focus more on training satellite research experts. Instead of receiving funding directly from 
the government, SaTReC obtained funding from KARI. Its following project, KITSAT-4 was 
turned into KARI’s Science Technology Satellite-1 (STsat-1) project though SaTReC did 
actual development work for the satellite. As the end of the day the conflict between SaTReC 
and KARI resulted in a strengthened government-led system in which KARI was the 
representative research institute and SaTReC a research center focusing on the education and 
training of satellite engineers. 
 
KSR-1 and 2 Based on the Infra of Paekkom  
Before embarking on the acquisition of satellite technology through KOMPsat, KARI 
started to develop rocket systems for indigenous access to space in 1990, with the KSR 
program as the first step to a national satellite launch vehicle. The program included KSR-1, 
KSR-2, and KSR-3, with a total of five launches performed. Two flew in the KSR-1 series, 
two in KSR-2, and one in KSR-3. The main mission objective was “to provide an opportunity 
for scientists to research earth sciences and astrophysics and to improve Korean rocket 
development technologies, including payload instruments, flight systems, ground systems, 
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operational techniques and interfaces between sub-systems.”321 All of the KSR series craft 
were developed by KARI without technically significant support from foreign countries. 
South Korea acquired the solid-rocket technology through development of the K-1 
missile (Paekkom) by the ADD in 1970s. It had not conducted rocket research for scientific 
purpose apart from that done with a few experimental pencil rockets developed by the Korea 
Air Force Academy. There was also a study made of the basic disciplines necessary for the 
design of the sounding rocket in the early 1980s.322 South Korea’s first authentic research 
into sounding rockets for scientific purpose started with the Korea Space Science and 
Technology Development Program ISSA announced in 1987.323 According to the plan, the 
final purpose of Korean rocketry activities had to be to develop not a ballistic missile, but a 
small launcher that could place a multi-purpose satellite of several hundred kilograms in orbit 
in a decade. The Space Engineering Section of ISSA led by Dr. Ryu Jangsoo conducted some 
basic theoretical research for preliminary design of a 2-stage solid propellant sounding 
rocket.324 
Based on the research, Dr. Ryu’s team initiated a 3-year plan for a sounding rocket 
program with the budget of 47.3 million won (about 40,000 dollars) in February 1987. This 
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was the first sounding rocket project in South Korea funded by the government.325 In the first 
year, the specifications of the sounding rocket were fixed. At the design stage, the main 
rocket could reach about 100-150km with a 150kg payload. The diameter of the selected 
rocket motor was 0.42m, the overall length 7.18m, and weight 1240 kg.326 In the 2nd year, the 
ground test model was developed and tested by the team, which was transferred to KARI, 
newly established in December 1989.327 They succeeded in manufacturing and static firing 
testing of the booster motor on April 26, 1990. Through these researches, the essential 
technologies were developed for a sounding rocket that would be used in the KSR program, 
itself the first step to a national satellite launch vehicle. 
As the key institute to the promote national space plan, KARI decided to drop ISSA’s 
3 year plan, and officially started the KSR-1 project with a 2.85 million dollar budget in July 
1990.328 The aim of KSR-1, also named KSR-420s329, was to develop the technologies for a 
solid-propellant sounding rocket capable of reaching an altitude of 80-90km carrying a 
scientific payload of about 50-70kg weight. Dr. Ryu moved to KARI and continued to be the 
general manager for the KSR-1 project. For the development and manufacture of KSR-1, the 
rocket team used the infrastructure and human resources skilled in the ways of modern 
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industrial production created through the efforts to develop the K-1 missile in 1970s. For 
example, Hanwha played a key role in managing the development of propellants along with 
Samsung Aerospace and Daesung Precision. Doowon Heavy Industry manufactured flight 
body parts and a launch pad. The ADD provided the KARI’s rocket team with its ground test 
facilities for combustion tube and propellant tests.330  
An ozone sensor was the main scientific instrument on board. It would monitor the 
ozone layer and observe the ionosphere over the Korean peninsula. The sensor consisted of 
four radiometers for measuring the attenuation of solar ultraviolet radiation as a function of 
altitude during ascent. ISSA and the Korea Research Institute of Standards and Science 
(KRISS) developed the ozone sensor with universities such as the Seoul National, Yeonsei 
and Kyounghee Universities.331 The KSR program thus sought to provide the opportunity for 
Korean scientists and engineers to research Earth sciences and astrophysics as well as to 
improve Korean rocket development technologies, including payload instruments, flight 
systems, ground systems, operational techniques and interfaces between subsystems.   
On June 4, 1993, KARI launched the first KSR-1 from the Anheung launching site in 
the central of Chungcheong Province. This first Korean indigenous sounding rocket was 
unguided, single staged, 6.7m long, 42cm in diameter, and weighed 1.1 tons. It attained an 
altitude of 39km with the solid propellant. Two stratospheric ozone profiles successfully 
measured the ozone concentration between 15 and 30km over Korea using rocket-based solar 
absorption UV radiometry. The second KSR-1 which was launched on September 1, 1993, 
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and attained a 49.4km altitude, also successfully obtained the ozone profile.332 From the 
results from two KSR-1s, it was found that the maximum of the ozone distribution occurred 
near 25km, which was quite consistent with the mean value in the mid-latitude regions.333  
KARI developed the KSR-2 from December 1993 to June 1998 with a 5.22 million 
dollar budget.334 Its general manager was Dr. Moon Shinhaeng, who had been responsible 
for the development of the Hyonmu missile in ADD during the 1980s, who also helped with 
the KSR-1 project, and finally moved to KARI in 1992. KSR-2 was the upgraded version of 
the KSR-1, with a two-staged solid propellant. Dr. Moon decided to use the rocket motor 
used in KSR-1 as KSR-2’s second-stage rocket propulsion system. NKH-1’s first-stage solid 
propellant motor, developed by ADD in 1970s, was used for KSR-2’s first-stage rocket 
motor.335 The inertial navigation system and flight termination system were newly developed 
for this system. The 2-ton KSR-2, 11m long, 42cm diameter, had a payload of an X-ray 
observation system developed at the Korea Astronomy Observatory of KRISS336 between 
1995 and 1997. The instrument, which was composed of detector and signal processing parts, 
was designed for the observation of compact X-ray sources. 
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The first flight on July 9, 1997 was a failure. An abrupt cut-off of telemetry and radar 
communication occurred 20.85 seconds after lift-off. After the analysis of the anomalies, 
some improvements such as separation of power sources between telemetry transmitter and 
radar transponder were applied on the second flight hardware. On June 11, 1998, the second 
flight of KSR-2 was successful reaching an apogee of 137.2km before falling into the Yellow 
Sea, 123.9km from the launch pad.337    
 
Transition from Solid to Liquid  
Although the final purpose of the KSR program was to develop the technology for a 
small launcher able to place a multi-purpose satellite of several hundred kilograms in orbit in 
2000s, some wondered whether it might not violate the 1979 Memorandum of Understanding 
signed between the U.S. and South Korea that prohibited Seoul from developing ballistic 
missiles with ranges greater than 180 km.338 This risk of dual-use was a lively issue in the 
late 1990s. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, also 
called the Rumsfeld Commission, — an independent commission formed by the U.S. 
Congress at this time —,339 reported that South Korea appeared to “want to obtain some 
level of technical independence from the United States on the missile issue so that it can build 
missiles to strike targets throughout North Korea.” Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems also 
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stated that the “ROK could modify the KSR-1 to a ballistic missile to carry a 200 kg payload 
a range of 150 km.” If South Korea converted the KSR-2 into a ballistic missile, 
“unconfirmed reports suggest that a secondary use might be for a series of ballistic missiles 
with ranges from 100 to 900 km.”340 Even a Korean news outlet suggested that it may have a 
military purpose and that “KSR is likely to be military behind its name of science.”341 
The key goal of the final KSR program, KSR-3, was to develop technologies 
applicable to a space launch vehicle. KARI’s original concept for the first Korean space 
launch vehicle was to cluster indigenous KSR-3 rockets with a solid propellant to form a 
multistage launcher. However, in general since solid-fuel rockets can remain in storage for 
long periods and then reliably launch on short notice, they have been frequently used in 
military applications. A class of solid propellant rockets like KSR-3 can easily cause 
suspicion since they can be converted into a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) or an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Thus, to ensure the peaceful purpose of the KSR 
program, in December 1997, KARI embarked on its first liquid-fuel rocket project, KSR-3 
with a total investment of 78 billion won ($64 million). Its main objective was “to acquire 
technological expertise in liquid rocketry and incorporate core technologies for the satellite 
launch vehicle in areas such as propulsion, guidance/control, and mission design.”342 The 
KSR-3 would have a pressure-fed type of liquid rocket engine using gaseous helium as a 
pressurizer, with LoX and kerosene as propellants. 
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The Challenge of Developing an Indigenous Liquid-rocket System 
The manager of the KSR-3 was Dr. Chae Yonsuk who received his Ph.D. in 
aerospace engineering from Mississippi State University in 1987 and had been in charge of 
developing rocket engines for KSR-1 and 2. He noticed that the development of big solid 
propellant motors was considered unfavorable compared to the liquid propulsion system in 
view of economic and international non-proliferation policy environments in the early 1990s. 
This led him to start a small-scale research project on liquid propulsion systems in 1991.343 
Although the research was for the development of an apogee kick engine of liquid bi-
propellants for satellite orbit change,344 it was “an essential stage for us [KARI] to overcome 
the technology barrier of technologically advanced nations on space vehicles positively and 
to carry out serious space development effectively in the near future.”345 The apogee kick 
motor was designed to have a thrust of 1,790N (180kg) using hypergolic type of liquid 
bipropellants composed of a compound of triethylene amine and xylidine as fuel and nitric 
acid as oxidizer. The design performance was validated in the hot fire tests conducted in 
September 1995 and in October 1996.  
However, it was a huge challenge to move from a small kick motor to the liquid-fuel 
rocket for space launch purpose. Chae’s team faced significant technical challenges in 
developing a liquid-fuel rocket independently. It was virtually impossible for South Korea, 
not a member of international Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR), to purchase 
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essential parts from advanced countries for the more controllable liquid-fuel rockets that were 
optimal for civilian space-launch purposes. 346 As they would design and manufacture all the 
parts for the rocket domestically, they had to increase the weight of the system several times, 
which meant designing a bigger rocket. 
They initiated the project for a rocket with only 7 tons of thrust in December 1997. 
Two years later the thrust had almost doubled to 12.7 tons.347 The project was accomplished 
by going through many development stages, such as subscale model and full-scale engine 
combustion tests, propellant feeding system tests, integrated power plant tests, and eventually 
a flight test. Each development stage underwent various technical difficulties and challenges 
that had to be resolved and verified with reliable processes to minimize trials and errors. 
Throughout the program, three different versions of full-scale chambers were designed and 
manufactured for the optimization of performance and weight. A composite baffle 
successfully suppressed troublesome high frequency combustion instability, one the major 
bottlenecks in development.348  
Eventually, on 28 November 2002, the KSR-3 rocket 14m long, 1m in diameter, and 
weighing 6 tons was launched from the Anheung Proving Ground on the west coast of the 
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Korean Peninsula. It used a pressure-fed-type liquid rocket engine with gaseous helium as a 
pressurizer, with liquid oxygen and kerosene as propellants. The payload on board the rocket 
included an ozone detector and two magnetometers along with other various sensors installed 
to measure physical characteristics such as temperature, pressure, strain, and acceleration. As 
it reached an altitude of 42.7km and flew a distance of more than 84km, the payload data 
were transmitted to the ground station in real time by an onboard telemetry system. The 
scientific instruments like a UV radiometer and magnetometer acquired data about ozone 
concentrations and the earth’s magnetic fields during the flight.349 
KSR-3 was the first Korean sounding rocket propelled by a liquid propellant 
propulsion system and it had been developed over 5 years using purely domestic technologies 
except several wind tunnel tests.350 Even though KSR-3 had no complicated turbo-pump 
machinery, so that it had limited power and flexibility, KARI was able to achieve the basic 
technology required for building a liquid engine for a space launch vehicle.351 The acquired 
technologies would be applied to the development of higher performance liquid rocket 
engines necessary for following space development programs such as that of a Korean Space 
Launch Vehicles (KSLV). 
 
Conclusion 
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Although Korean rocket development for military use started in the 1970s, South 
Korea began to outline an economic rationale for moving the country into the field of space 
technology in the mid-1980s. Due to increasing international technology protectionism, 
Korean policy makers perceived the failure to escape from underdevelopment and to catch up 
with advanced industrial nations as one of the most serious risks to economic growth. In this 
atmosphere, they began to view space as a realm calling for cutting-edge technologies that 
South Korea had to master to join the ranks of the advanced countries. In the Long-term Plan 
for the Development of Science and Technology toward the 2000s, which first called for 
specific space-related projects, the Korean nation was imagined as a cohesive community of 
shared economic interests and developmental goals. Space development was a crucial 
constitutive element in this developmental national imagination, and the actors engaged in 
this plan were reminded that they had a responsibility to support and assist the state-led space 
policies. Based on the study, in December 1987, South Korean legislature finally approved 
the Aerospace Industry Development and Promotion Act, which included the first significant 
funding for space projects. 
As the first Korean research institute to specialize in space development, ISSA played 
a pivotal role in planning national space programs in late 1980s. However, with the 
establishment of the KARI in 1989, which would become the main actor in the civilian space 
program, SaTReC in KAIST and KT emerged as the central figures and replaced the role of 
ISSA. Initially relying on the import of technology from foreign countries, South Korea soon 
aspired to attaining an autonomous and indigenous satellite capability for space development. 
Satellite development was initiated by SaTReC with the KITsat-1, which was developed in a 
collaborative program with SSTL, UK. South Korean then launched a broadcasting and 
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telecommunication satellite KOREAsat-1 (1995) purchased from U.S. satellite company by 
KT, and a multipurpose observation satellite KOMPsat-1 (1999) jointly developed by KARI 
and the U.S. firm TRW. KARI also conducted several sounding rocket projects, KSR-1 
(1992), KSR-2 (1998), and KSR-3 (2002) without technically significant support from 
foreign countries. The first two were solid propellant rockets, but the latter was a liquid 
propellant rocket. 
The ADD and several government funded research institutes such as ETRI, KRISS, 
and KASI, and industrial firms such as KAI, Korean Air, Hanwha, Doowon Heavy Industirial, 
and SeTReC-I also strengthened their cooperation with these actors during the 1990s. In this 
process, the aerospace sectors have developed thanks to a strong commitment by a 
government intent on industrialization. For example, in October 1999, after many years of 
sensitive discussions, the government strongly suggested that Daewoo Heavy Industries, 
Samsung Aerospace and Hyundai Space Aircraft pool their aerospace operations into a new, 
independent company, Korean Aerospace Industries Ltd (KAI). The three firms hold equal 
shares in KAI for combined annual sales of approximately 700 million dollars, with a total 
employment of 3200 people. The goal was to build KAI into a total integrator for the 
development and production of aircraft and space systems by the merger of three leading 
aerospace companies.352 
 Bolstered by the progress in space technology for a decade since 1985, South Korea 
finally announced its first Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space Development on 
30 April, 1996. Korean space policy was shaped so that the government makes decisions on a 
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long-term and mid-term plan, and then related organizations and private experts join the 
project and work on specific details.353 The plan, which incorporates basic activities in space 
up to 2015, was the beginning of a comprehensive national space program. The long-term 
objectives of space development are to acquire the independent technological capabilities for 
space development and to join the top 10 countries in the space industry by competing in the 
global market. In order to accomplish these objectives, South Korea would develop 19 
satellites by the year 2015, and launch KSLV-1 with a satellite developed independently at a 
local launch site in 2010.354 Eventually, South Korea rushed into the 21st-century space race 
as an emerging power. 
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Seeking National Prestige in Space 1998-2013 
 
As of the mid-1980s, the South Korean government has taken advantage of the 
symbolism of space development as the national vision for science and technology, a vision 
which sees South Korea as being an advanced country in the 21st Century. The first dedicated 
Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space Development in 1996 included priority 
areas such as the development and launch of KSLV-1 (Korean Space Launch Vehicle) by 
2010. Using the slogan of “Launching Our Own Satellite with Our Own Rocket from Our 
Own Country,”355 the plan aimed to join the top ten countries in the global space industry 
market by acquiring independent technological capabilities for space development. KARI 
supported this ambitious plan including commercial, research and governmental space 
activities with an emphasis on economic benefits and public service, while ADD was 
separately engaged in the development of military aerospace applications under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. 
Despite the financial crisis of 1997 and the government’s decision to accept an 
International Monetary Fund bailout, the tendency to emphasize the economic benefits of 
space persisted. Pessimists in South Korea looked at the economic crisis as a sign that Korea 
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had insufficient resources to transform her economy into an advanced model.356 However, 
Kim Dae-jung, who won the presidential election in the winter of 1997, designed a National 
Basic Plan for Science and Technology to boost the ruined economy emphasizing the 
promotion of the so-called ‘6Ts’ – IT [information Technology], BT [Bio], NT [Nano], ET 
[Environmental], CT [Culture], and ST [Space].357 Space development was influenced by 
these changes, including a more government-led space program following governmental 
needs. 
National security concerns soon intervened to renew South Korea’s emphasis on the 
development of space capabilities. In August 1998, North Korea’s Taepodong-1 missile test 
and attempted satellite launch shocked South Korea, laying bare the country’s fundamental 
reliance upon the U.S. for space-derived intelligence on its neighbor. The South Korean 
government brought its independent launch of KSLV-1 forward by five years from 2010 to 
2015, and demanded that the U.S. revise the 1979 Missile Note and allow South Korea entry 
into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)358. To meet the deadline, South Korea 
dropped its commitment to ‘independence’ and decided to purchase technologies from Russia. 
The Russian side agreed to provide the standard URM booster from its Angara project to 
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serve as the first stage of the Korean launch vehicle, while South Korea would develop its 
own solid-fuel Kick Motor for the second stage. Nevertheless, the successful launch of 
KSLV-1 was delayed for eight years due to lengthy negotiations on technology transfer 
between the two countries, technical problems, and two failed attempts in 2009 and 2010. 
Finally, South Korea succeeded in joining the world’s elite ‘space club’ when KSLV-1 
blasted off smoothly and put a satellite into orbit in January, 2013. 
This chapter aims to offer an historical overview of the emergence of South Korea as 
a new space-faring nation by launching its first space launch vehicle, KSLV-1. It focuses 
particular attention on the how the KSLV-1 project evolved in the complicated contexts of 
national motivations and global pressures, which led South Korea to collaborate with Russia. 
To begin with a brief review of the history of the North Korean rocket program will be 
provided before I look into the North’s Taepodong-1’s influence on the South Korean space 
program in terms of inter-Korean relations. 
 
“Taepodong Shock” and a Ghost Satellite 
On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a medium-range ballistic missile from the 
north-eastern part of the country. Although the launch took place without any advance 
warning, the launch preparations for the missile had been detected by U.S., Japan, and South 
Korean intelligence with satellite observations and signal monitoring four days earlier.359 By 
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tracking the flight of the missile from the ground and in space, it was believed to be the 
maiden test flight of a new long-range missile, the Taepodong-1/Paektusan-1.360 The first 
stage fell into international waters 300 km east of Musudan-ri and the second stage flew over 
the Japanese island of Honshu and fell into the water 330 km away from the Japanese port of 
Hachinohe for a total distance of approximately 1,646 km.361 North Korea's missile program 
attracted particular concern because the Taepodong-1 design objectives were apparently for a 
system that could deliver a 1000-1500kg warhead at a range of 1500-2500km. If missile 
guidance was improved North Korea could have developed the ability to strike American military 
bases in Japan.362 North Korea was also widely thought to have been developing nuclear 
weapons, though it is not clear whether it had the ability to build a nuclear weapon small 
enough to be delivered by one of its missiles. North Korea offered no detailed explanation until 
the official announcement was made four days after the launch. 
Surprisingly, on 4 September, 1998, the North Korean Central News Agency broadcast a 
report claiming that what had been thought to have been a missile launch had actually been a first 
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satellite launch “for [the] peaceful use of outer space.”363 It went on to claim that it successfully 
launched the first North Korean artificial satellite, Kwangmyoungsong-1[Lode Star], transmitting 
the melody of the immortal revolutionary hymns ‘Song of General Kim Il Sung’ and ‘Song of 
General Kim Jong Il’ and the morse signals ‘Juche Korea’364 in 27MHz as it orbited the earth. 
The report stated that “the rocket and satellite which our scientists and technicians correctly 
put into orbit at one launch are 100% a fruition of our wisdom and technology,” and “the 
successful launch of the first artificial satellite by North Korea greatly encourages the Korean 
people in their efforts to build a powerful socialist state under the wise leadership of General 
Secretary Kim Jong Il.” Even though U.S. intelligence and the South Korean government had 
detected North Korea’s preparations of a new missile flight test in advance, nobody expected 
the missile to be configured as a space launch vehicle with a third stage.365 
On September 8, the North Korean Rodong Sinmun carried an interview with the 
scientists and technicians who had been involved with the satellite launch, Dr. Kwon Tong 
Hwa, Dr. Han Hae Chol, and Dr. Kim Haeng Gyong. They referred to the purpose of the 
launch of the satellite as following; 
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First, it is to perfect the structural engineering design of a multi-stage 
carrier rocket. Second, it is to perfect the structural engineering design of a 
multi-stage carrier rocket and its control technology. Third, it is to study the 
space environment and verify if its electronic devices correctly operate in space. 
Fourth, it is to complete the observation system of the carrier rocket and satellite. 
For this purpose, necessary observation devices were installed on the carrier 
rocket and satellite.366  
 
 
However, U.S. Space command announced that it had not detected any object orbiting 
the Earth that correlated with the orbital data the North Koreans had provided nor any radio 
transmissions at 27 MHz.367 While North Korea claimed that Kwangmyongsong-1 made 100 
rounds of the earth by September 13, the U.S. State Department officially announced that the 
North Korean launch had indeed been a satellite attempt, but that the launch had failed to 
place anything into orbit.368 Amid the hoax of the ‘Ghost Satellite,’ North Korea received 
worldwide criticism including from South Korea who charged that “their desire to reach 
space gave them an opportunity to hide the reality of ballistic rockets, which represented a 
major threat for the neighboring countries.”369 Responding to the criticism, a North Korean 
delegation participating in the UNISPACE III (Third United Nations Conference on the 
Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) conference held in Vienna from 19 to 30 July 
1999 commented that “the level of the technology in the U.S. to track spacecraft is 
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sophisticated but not efficient,” adding that if South Koreans “were true Koreans, they would 
be happy to see the first Korean satellite launched into orbit on our first attempt.”370  
North and South Korea have both developed rocket technology for military and 
civilian application, but their space programs differ in many important respects. The North 
and South Korean space launch vehicle programs are linked to ballistic missile development 
that began in the 1960s and early 1970s, respectively. However, their space launch 
capabilities are not merely intended to increase their missile’s range. Its mission depends on a 
number of variables including domestic politics, budget constraints, the overall strategic 
environment, as well as opportunities in the realm of international space cooperation. These 
differences mean that while North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile program with one 
attempted satellite launch, South Korea has a more extensive satellite program with an 
industrial policy to support its development. Before looking into the influence of Taepodong-
1 on the South Korean space program in terms of inter-Korean relations, it might be useful to 
briefly review the history of the North Korean rocket program.  
 
Origin and Evolution of the North Korean Missile Program 
Although there are significant uncertainties about the history and extent of North 
Korea’s space capabilities, it is widely believed that the history of the North Korean space 
launch vehicle program can be traced back to its ballistic missile development that began in 
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the 1960s. Despite North Korea’s security alliances with China and the Soviet Union since 
the Korean War (1950 to 1953), North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung was dissatisfied with his 
alliance partners. He believed that North Korea failed to unify Korea because of insufficient 
assistance against the U.S. military during the War. The asymmetry in the credibility of the 
alliance relationship led North Korea to perceive the utility of an indigenous ballistic missile 
program. It viewed ballistic missiles as weapons to deter or defeat foreign forces from 
intervening in another Korean conflict.371  
Beginning in the early 1960s, North Korea began to take a number of steps to 
decrease its dependence on its superpower patron the Soviet Union for weapons. It undertook 
to strengthen the military along the so-called ‘Four Great Military Lines’ doctrine; (1) 
improve political and technical discipline in the military; (2) modernize the military; (3) arm 
all the people with class consciousness and military technology; and (4) fortify the whole 
country.372 The military modernization program included expanded missile procurement and 
import substitution plans for arms production in general. According to the testimony of Ko 
Young Hwan, a former North Korean diplomat who served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
from 1978 to 1991, Kim Il Sung said to Kim Chang-bong, National Defense Minister, “it is 
imperative for us to develop rockets for war.” In 1965, the Premier established the Hamhung 
Military Academy to train personnel in rocket and missile development.373 He told Kim 
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Chang-bong that “if a war breaks out, the U.S. and Japan will also be involved. In order to 
prevent their involvement, we have to be able to produce rockets which fly as far as Japan. 
Therefore, it is the mandate for the Academy to nurture those personnel who are able to 
develop mid- and long-range missiles.”374 The young elites screened to enter the seven-year 
program studied designs of German V-1 and V-2 type missiles and of Soviet-made FROG 
(Free Rocket Over Ground) missiles. They played a pivotal role in attempts to reverse-
engineer the FROG in the mid-1970s and to build their own version of the Scud missile in 
1980s.   
  In 1968, North Korea obtained the FROG-5/7 short-range missile system with a 
range of up to 60km and a payload of 400kg from the Soviet Union.375 As North Korea–
Soviet relations began to sour in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union declined to provide 
additional missile systems or upgrades for those already delivered. Thus, North Korea turned 
to China to obtain access to more advanced missile technology. In September 1971, North 
Korea signed an agreement for missile technology transfer and the sale of missiles with 
China,376 and in April 1975, the two countries made a deal enabling North Korean 
participation in a Chinese missile project for developing the DF-61(Dong Feng-61). This was 
a liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of 600km and a payload of 1000kg based on 
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Soviet Scud technology.377 At the same time, North Korea began a program to reverse‐
engineer FROG‐7A rockets. The joint program with China was terminated when its main 
Chinese political supporter General Chen Xilian was expelled from power in 1978. The 
FROG reverse-engineering program was eventually canceled, though North Korean engineers 
probably gained knowledge that was later applied to their own version of the Scud.378  
North Korea continued to actively pursue Scud B technology to create a basis for its 
own in-house ballistic missile program, though the continuing difficulties in Pyongyang’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union and China disrupted the flow of missiles and missile 
technology to North Korea. Meanwhile South Korea successfully developed a guided missile, 
NHK-1 (Paekkom) in 1978.379 This strongly influenced the overall direction of North 
Korea’s ballistic missile program. It turned to Egypt, whom it had assisted during the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War, for assistance in continuing the development of its missile program. Egypt 
had wanted to produce long-range ballistic missiles since the war, but the Soviet Union 
refused to transfer the Scud missiles after the new president, Anwar Sadat, started re-
orienting the country toward the West.380 Both countries wanted to reverse-engineer the 
Soviet Scud-B with greater ranges and improved accuracies, and concluded a series of new 
agreements to cooperate in missile development. Egypt transferred a small number of R-17 
                                       
377 Hua Di, “One Superpower Worse that Two,” Asia‐Pacific Defense Reporter 18(2), (September 
1991): 14‐15. 
378 Christoph Bluth, Korea (Polity Press, 2008), p.160; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “Beijing's 
Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma,” International Security (Fall 1992): 5‐40. 
379 See Chapter 2 of this dissertation regarding South Korea’s efforts to develop its first guided rocket 
K-1 during 1970s. South Korea began the K-1 project partly because of North Korea’s deployment of 
FROG missile from Soviet Union in late 1960s. 
380 Lee Jonghun, “From the FROG to the Taepodong: North Korea’s Missile Game,” Shindonga 
(August 1999): 190-211. 
173 
 
missiles (the version of the Scud B exported by the Soviets to Egypt in the mid-1970s) to 
North Korea around 1981. By 1984 engineers of the Guided Missile Division of the Academy 
of Defense Sciences and the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau had successfully reverse 
engineered the device,381 producing the Hwasong-5.382 This was an indigenous version of 
the Scud-B, with a range of 320km and able to carry a payload of 1000kg.  
Just as North Korea began to manufacture the Hwasong-5 in 1985, it reached an 
agreement with Iran to obtain financial assistance for missile development and production in 
exchange for Iran’s option to purchase North Korean missiles for “the war of the cities” with 
Iraq.383 North Korea supplied Hwasong-5 to Iran during the war, and these sales provided it 
with millions of dollars of foreign exchange income as well as considerable technical data on 
the system’s performance through combat use.384 With this technical and financial assistance, 
North Korea’s missile development accelerated rapidly to produce Scud variants with 
extended ranges; By 1993, it successfully tested the Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) with a range of 
500km and a warhead of 770kg and Scud-D with a range of 1000km and warhead of 500kg. 
What is more, while producing a variety of short-range missiles, North Korea began to focus 
on research, development, and the eventual production of medium-range missiles. Work on 
an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, the Nodong with a range of 1300km and a warhead 
                                       
381 Cheol-wun Jang, “A Study on the Origins of SSM Development in North Korea,” North Korean 
Studies Review, Vol. 17 No. 3 (2014): 233-267. 
382 Hwasong means Mars in Korean. It seems that North Korea used the number from 1 to 4 for 
Hwasong series to its test version of reverse-engineered missiles. 
383 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional 
Paper No. 2, (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999), pp. 9-10. 
384 Daniel Pinkston, “The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program” (Strategic Studies Institute, 
February 2008), p. 16. 
174 
 
of 700kg, reportedly began in 1988.385 To accomplish the task, North Korea focused on 
using scaled-up versions of existing short-range missiles (mainly Scud-D), with more 
powerful engines and improved guidance systems. It reportedly clinched Nodong sales 
contracts with Libya, Iran, Syria, and Pakistan386 even before the Scud-D, the basis of 
Nodong, was successfully flight-tested on May 30, 1993.387 With the assistance of scientists 
and engineers from countries including Russia and the Ukraine after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, North Korea could deploy the first Nodong in February 1995 after a relatively 
short development period.388   
 North Korea’s desire to go into space is believed to begin with the Taepodong 
program, which was based on the technology of the Nodong. During the early 1990s, just 
after successfully testing the Nodong rockets, North Korea initiated the development of two 
multi-stage rockets that would become the Taepodong-1 and 2.389 Taepodong-1 appears to be 
designed as a two or three-stage missile with a Nodong as the first stage and a Hwasong-6 as 
the second stage. Taepodong-2 calls for complete new systems that would require extensive 
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design, development, and testing. The first stage may use four Nodong engines, while the 
second stage could be based on a Nodong design as well. Taepodong-1 is a preliminary step 
in the development plan of an ICBM, Taepodong-2. Reportedly, at a late-1993 or early-1994 
meeting of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee, Kim Il Sung first 
expressed his desire to place a satellite into orbit, and the Central Committee decided to use 
Taepodong as a space launch vehicle.390 By adding a solid upper stage, it would be able to 
put a 20-25kg payload into low Earth orbit. 
There is a high probability that Kim began to be interested in the symbolic value of 
space development over and above its obvious military applications.391 It is worth of noting 
that South Korea received international recognition through the successful launch of its first 
satellites KITsat-1(Uribyul-1) in 1992 and KITsat-2 1993 after it had announced its ambitious 
plan for space development in late 1980s.392 After Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, space 
technology assumed a very high symbolic value for Kim Jong Il. He has marketed himself as 
a progressive promoter of technological advancement, and has implemented two new state 
ideologies to coincide with the institutional changes of 1998 when the North decided to go 
into space.393 North Korea’s economy was in severe difficulties in the early 1990s; internal 
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insecurity was exacerbated by the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and by floods in 1995-1996 
that turned chronically poor harvests into disasters. As the official Kim Jong Il era was 
beginning in 1998, the concept of Kangsongdaeguk or building a “strong and powerful 
country” was introduced along with Songunjongchi (“military first politics”).  
Songunjongchi seems to mean that national security is an economic priority, though the 
slogans “put the army first” and “put the army in the center” are not limited to military 
affairs.394 After all, at the time of the launch of Taepodong-1 and Kwangmyoungsung-1, 
North Korea held major political celebrations on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
establishment of the communist state, and the increased political status of General Secretary 
Kim Jong Il. 
 
South Korean Reaction to the Taepodong Shock 
The so-called Taepodong Shock strongly influenced the Korean space program. The 
maiden launch of Taepodong-1 demonstrated the technological progress of North Korea in 
multi-stage rocketry and guidance systems, although South Korea concluded that the North 
Korean Kwangmyoungsong-1 satellite failed to achieve orbit. This surprise challenge to 
South Korea’s technological position represented a wake-up call, showing that South Korea 
was no longer alone in its space ambitions in the peninsula. Chae Yeonsuk, the manager 
developing the KSR-3 rocket in KARI, insisted that North Korean rocket launch technology 
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was 5 to 7 years ahead of South Korean technology.395 Furthermore, the South Korean 
people felt increasingly uncomfortable knowing that their government could not even keep up 
to date with developments without U.S. tracking information; Seoul had to wait to receive 
critical information from U.S. forces regarding the launch site’s preparation, as well as data 
about the flight itself.396 
The South Korean government reacted immediately. On September 23, 1998, the 
MOST announced the revised Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space 
Development, which brought its independent launch of SLV forward by five years, from 
2010 to 2005.397 Also, South Korea began to insist that the U.S. revise the 1979 Missile 
Guideline, which had stopped it developing missiles with ranges over 180km, or payloads 
over 500kg, in exchange for technological assistance. Although the two countries had already 
had five rounds of discussions about the revision of the agreement between November 1995 
and August 1998, no definitive conclusion had been reached. The U.S. proposed that South 
Korea join the MTCR,398 but still adhere to the 180km ceiling. This was unacceptable to 
South Korean negotiators. They believed the Missile Note was anachronistic and should be 
scrapped so that South Korea could increase the range of its ballistic missiles. After all, the 
MTCR allowed the development of missiles with a range of 300km for military purposes, and 
up to 500km for research objectives. South Korea wanted access to the technologies and 
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components needed for the development of their SLVs, needed to sign on to the MTCR to 
acquire them, but resented the lower range being imposed by the U.S. as a condition for 
assistance. .  
On 8 September 1998, Hong Sunyoung, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
visited the U.S. and told the National Press Club in Washington that “to extend the range of 
Korea’s missile development to 300km, is one of the countermeasures to North Korea’s 
threat.”399 President Kim Dae-jung affirmed the government’s position that “we should be 
allowed to develop and test-fire one for research and development in the 500 km range” 
during the July 1999 Kim-Clinton meeting at the White House. The U.S. agreed to the 
expansion of the range to 300km with a payload of 500kg and South Korea’s participation in 
the MTCR, but only under certain conditions; South Korea should share all information about 
its indigenous missile development and promise in writing not to divert scientific civilian 
rocket technology to military use. After several rounds of talks, the two countries finally 
reached a bilateral agreement on the new missile guidelines in January 2001, followed by 
South Korea’s entry into the MTCR in March 2001. South Korea would now be able to 
develop missiles of 300km range and 500kg payloads, and would also be allowed to develop 
peaceful SLVs with no limits on rocket ranges as in the MTCR guidelines. In return, South 
Korea conceded the following demands by the U.S.:400 
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1. The U.S. would have the right to inspect missile production facilities; 
2. The ROK would have to provide information at each step prior to research, 
development, production, and deployment; 
3. The ROK could not conduct research on missile systems with a range 
greater than 300km; and 
4. [The] ROK would have to disclose information on civilian rocket research. 
 
 
Reflecting this change, on December 19, 2000, the National Science and Technology 
Committee, which included President Kim, proposed the second revision to the 1996 Basic 
Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space Development. The main objective of the revised 
plan was to launch a KSLV-1 with a 100kg satellite by 2005, a KSLV-2 with a one-ton 
satellite by 2010, and a KSLV-3 with a 1.5 ton satellite by 2015. The committee suggested 
that a long-term vision for space development was needed, due to the South Korean publics’ 
growing interest in space. In the meeting, President Kim stressed that “to promote national 
prestige, we should succeed in launching our own satellite with our own rocket from our own 
country by 2005.”401  
 
The Change to International Cooperation for the KSLV Project 
Bringing its independent launch of KSLV-1 forward by five years resulted in a pivotal 
change in space policy for South Korea. In order to meet the due date, KARI suggested that it 
would have to intensify its research in critical technologies and strengthen international 
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cooperation to achieve South Korea’s space objectives after joining the MTCR.402 However, 
international cooperation had a significant implication because it meant that the KSR-3 
project, deemed to be a precursor to South Korea’s fully-fledged space launch programs, 
might be abandoned in favor of using foreign rocketry to accelerate KSLV-1 development. 
The initial objective of the KSR-3 project proposed by MOST and KARI in 1997, and 
revised in 1999 was to develop two types, the base form and the applied form; a 13-ton-thrust 
liquid single-stage propellant engine (base form), and a small three-stage launcher that 
combined the base forms with solid KSR boosters (applied form).403 The KSLV-1 concept 
would use the liquid engine developed for KSR-3 as the core vehicle, with a pair of strap-on 
boosters derived from the KSR-3, and with a solid KSR-1 as an upper stage.404 However, 
KARI experienced more difficulties than expected in SLV development, because it required 
much stronger propellant power than KSR-3 possessed to launch a satellite into orbit. The 
most critical problem was that KSR-3 used a pressure-fed-type liquid rocket engine with 
gaseous helium as a pressurizer. Its high pressure propellant tanks required thicker walls and 
stronger alloys which made the vehicle tanks heavier, thereby reducing performance and 
payload capacity. Finally, in May 2001 the government decided to develop a new liquid 
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rocket engine using a turbo-pump pressurizer for KSLV-1, and to downsize the KSR-3 
project to developing and testing only the single-stage engine (the basic form) in 2002.405 
It was a great challenge for KARI to develop a more complicated rocket engine for 
KSLV-1 in limited time. Accordingly it began to look into the possibility of international 
cooperation to purchase technologies from other countries for non-military rockets after 
joining the MTCR. Firstly, the South Korean government turned to the U.S. for possible 
assistance. However, contrary to South Korea’s expectations, in October 2010 the U.S. 
announced that it would probably refuse to help.406 Increased restriction imposed by the U.S. 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) after 1999 made U.S. companies unwilling, 
or unable, to complete a deal with South Korea for the delivery of a rocket stage.407  Thus 
KARI turned to other space faring countries including Russia, France, Japan, China, and 
India for help.  It only received a positive answer from Russia’s Khrunichev Design Bureau, 
a company hit hard by the Russian recession of the 1990s. Russia had signed a $350-million 
deal with India for a five-year joint project that included the transfer of three liquid-hydrogen 
cryogenic rocket engines and the technology for their construction in 1992. It sought to 
exploit commercial opportunities again.408  
The partnership for KSLV-1 development between the two countries did not work 
smoothly.  Negotiations for the joint development of KSLV-1 began in 2002, yet it took two 
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years to reach agreement. The Russian government ratified the cooperation of Khrunichev 
with KARI in July 2003, and the final contract for the joint development of the Korea Space 
Launch vehicle System (KSLS) was signed in 2004. The most critical issue was about 
responsibility and a re-flight option if the launch failed. KARI wanted Russia to take full 
technical responsibility for the entire launch system with the option of re-flight in case of 
failure.409 Russia would accept the re-flight option only if the failure could be traced to 
Russian components.  After long negotiations, the final contract for the joint development of 
the Korea Space Launch vehicle System (KSLS) was signed on October 26 2004. KSLV-1 
would be launched twice, and if one of them failed, Russia would provide a third launcher 
free of additional cost.  
The $200 million deal included terms for the joint development of a liquid-propellant 
rocket engine for the KSLV-1, as well as for cooperation in the construction of the launch 
facility at the Naro Space Center. KSLV-1 would be a two-stage launcher, 33m high with a 
maximum diameter of 2.9m, and a mass of 140 tons at lift-off. The first stage was derived 
from the Russian URM-1(Universal Rocket Module) developed by Khrunichev for the 
Angara family of modular launch vehicles, to be operated by the Russian Space Forces from 
the Northern Cosmodrome of Plesetsk. KARI was responsible for the design, development, 
test and production of the solid Kick Motor (KM) that formed the second stage and upper part 
of the rocket. The ‘made in Korea’ KM is an enlarged by-product of the solid KSR-1 booster. 
The second stage was made up of core parts entirely developed in Korea, which includes the 
Inertial Navigation System, the power, control and flight safety systems, plus the nose 
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fairing.410 Right up until the final agreement was signed, KARI continued to save an 
alternative plan to use an upgraded KSR-3 for the first stage of KSLV-1 in case the 
negotiations broke down. Although the alternative plan was appropriate for the slogan of 
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Figure 9 Changing Process of KSR-3 and KSLV-1 Design (Source: MOST, “The Revision of the 
Plan for Development of KSR-3,” National Archive of Korea, (DA0868457) (May 2001); Naro 




The KSLV-1 launch would be an important event for both Russia and South Korea. 
For Russia, it would be the maiden flight of the RD-191 engine as well as the URM-1/Angara 
model, which is the first new orbit-capable rocket to be developed by Russia since the fall of 
the Soviet Union.412 The Angara family of rockets is based on the Universal Rocket Module 
(URM) powered by a single RD-191 engine; the URM-1 forms the first stage of all Angara 
configurations. Although KSLV-1 would use the URM-1 with a reduced thrust RD-191, 
called the RD-151, as its first stage, it would be essentially the first member of the Angara 
family to fly. For South Korea, the cooperation with Russia was a magnificent opportunity to 
secure core technologies required to develop the fully ‘made in Korea’ KSLV-2 in the future.  
 
2005, the First Year of Space Korea 
KSLV-1 was the most prominent project of the whole Korean space development 
program. However, the maiden KSLV-1 flight which was originally planned for 2010 was 
brought forward to 2005 under the influence of the Taepodong Shock, which caused the 
Korean government to change its independent development plan into international 
cooperation with Russia. The date had to be postponed to 2007 due to delays in the 
negotiations defining the partnership between the two countries. To reflect the changes in the 
national and international environment as well as the possibility of implementing space 
technology development, the National Science and Technology Committee proposed a third 
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revision to The 1996 Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space Development on May 
17 2005.413  
The revised plan was divided over 20 years (1996-2015) and comprised a long-term 
plan, and a medium-term plan (2005-2010). The long-term objectives are to acquire the 
independent technological capabilities for space development and to join the top 10 countries 
in the space industry by competing in the global market by 2015. The mid-term objectives 
were more specific. By 2007, Korea would acquire the capability to launch micro-satellites 
by accomplishing the KSLV-1 project, and by the year 2010 it would develop 13 satellites 
(five satellites in the initial phase in 2005) including seven multi-purpose satellites 
(KOMPsat-series), four science and technology satellites (STsat-series) and two 
geostationary satellites (COMS-series).414 Earth observations and scientific measurements 
from space have been the priority of KARI with the KOMPsat and KITsat/STsat program 
since 1990s, yet the COMS (Communication, Ocean and Meteorological Satellite) program 
would create a multipurpose platform in geosynchronous orbit to accommodate the public 
and civilian demand for satellite utilization and maintain the continuity of satellite services. 
When the medium-term was completed, Korea would have acquired the technical basis to 
compete in the global space market.  
                                       
413 “The Third Revision of Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space Development,” National 
Science and Technology Committee, (May 17, 2005) (in Korean) 
414 The KOREAsat series, commercial turnkey satellites for telecommunications and broadcasts 
operated by Korea Telecom, have been excluded from the Basic Plan on National Space Development 
since 2005. Regarding its role to establish the groundwork for South Korea to enter the worldwide 
business of space communications in 1990s, see Chapter 3 in this dissertation.  
186 
 
Along with the progress in developing KSLV-1 with Russian technical assistance, 
South Korea also needed a basic space law for an orderly promotion of space development 
and effective international cooperation. Although the 1987 Aerospace Industry Promotion 
Act had contributed toward the development of aerospace technology and industry, it did not 
designate an aerospace authority nor did it provide guidelines for engaging with international 
treaties, conventions and principles. To this end the government passed the Korean Space 
Development Promotion Act on May 31, 2005. The purpose of this Act was to “facilitate the 
peaceful use and scientific exploration of outer space, to contribute to national security, and 
to the sound development of the national economy and the improvement of people’s living, 
by promoting space development in a systematic way, ensuring the efficient use and 
administration of space objects.”415 The Act covered a number of issues such as government 
responsibilities, the establishment of a basic plan for promoting space development, the 
designation of a development institute for space exploration, the domestic and international 
registration of space objects, licensing of space launch vehicles and cancellation of licenses, 
and compensation for damages as a result of space accidents.416 By establishing a legal basis 
for carrying out its fundamental space development and promotion plan which is in 
accordance with international obligations under the various UN Space treaties and 
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conventions,417 South Korea declared its strong will as a space developing country to carry 
out the duty of supervision by the states regulated by international treaty.  
The Act stipulated that the government must draft a Middle and Long Term Space 
Development Plan (Space Development Plan for brevity) every five years. It would replace 
the old Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space Development by a new plan based 
on the newly-enacted Space Act. The plan had to be reviewed by the supreme government 
body for deciding space policy, namely the Korea National Space Committee (KNSC) which 
is placed under the control of the President and chaired by the Minster of Science and 
Technology. The KNSC, which would consist of around 15 committee members including 
nine ministers of related ministries, also assesses the use and management of space 
development projects, and reviews the availability of the financial resources necessary for 
space development as well as investment plans.  
The first Space Development Plan was drafted on June 20, 2007.418 It announced a 
plan to launch a lunar orbiter by 2020 and to send a probe to the moon five years after that. 
Compared to the Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space Development when it was 
established first in 1996, the new version of 2007 increased the budget for the national space 
program by a factor of five. Along with rearranging the legal basis for space development, 
the government started numerous publicity campaigns to justify its ambitious space projects. 
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It declared the year 2005 as the new beginning of the space development project, and started 
a space culture movement with the slogan “Space Korea.” It held various events, including 
World Space Week, loading a human chip in a KOMPsat, and the selection of an honorary 
ambassador for space development on the internet.419  
In December 2007, Professor Huh Hwanil of Choongnam University started a 
research project to restore Singijeon [ghost-like machine arrow], one of the world’s first 
successful multi-launch rocket systems developed in fifteenth-century South Korea, with 
funding from KARI and MOST. Historical documents show that the large Singijeon, with a 
powder container made out of paper, was the world’s largest rocket at that time, while 
Sanhwa Singijeon was the world’s first two-stage rocket. The research team restored the large 
Singijeon by traditional methods based on the original blueprint, and launched it successfully 
in September 2008.420 Based on this historical background, a commercial film 'Singijeon' was 
released in early September 2008. The synopsis relies on patriotism. During the reign of King 
Sejong, the Choseon dynasty presented an obstacle to the territorial expansion of Ming China, 
the aspiring imperial power. Ming China demanded submission and interfered with the 
internal affairs of Choseon. Disgusted by the Chinese interference, King Sejong secretly 
develops the Singijeon, and uses it to take back Choseon’s land and supremacy. The film 
production team restored the original Singijeon with the help of Professor Huh’s team.  
Director Kim Yu-jin said “it was very challenging to run the restored rocket system, and my 
impression is that our forefathers had better technology in dealing with the timed detonation 
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for the Singijeon.”421 The film was quite successful, topping box office receipts on its 
opening weekend. It also won the award for Best Film at the 2009 Grand Bell Awards, which 
have been called the Korean equivalent of the American Academy Awards. Given that Korea 
had one of the world’s most advanced explosive weapons, it implied that the science and 
technology of that time were among the world finest, and that the root of KSLV-1 can be 
found in Singijeon.422 
 
The First Korean Astronaut Program 
The real exposure of space development to the general public occurred with a 
landmark event; the first Korean Astronaut Program (KAP). The KAP was made possible by 
the Russia-South Korea space agreement of 2004 for the selection of a South Korean 
astronaut to ride a Soyuz spacecraft to the International Space Station (ISS). In November 
2005, KARI and MOST started the program with a $20.7 million contract with the Russian 
Space Agency (RSA) for the purpose of developing manned space technologies and the 
public outreach of space exploration.423 This program includes all phases of human 
spaceflight, such as the astronaut selection process, basic/advanced training, boarding a 
Russian spacecraft (Soyuz), staying in the International Space Station, carrying out eighteen 
space experiments as a governmental mission for the astronaut, and the return to Earth.  
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KARI justified the KAP using rhetoric intended to stir up emotions of national pride. 
South Korea would be the thirty-sixth astronaut-producing country in the world, and the 
eleventh country to carry out a manned space experiment. However, this figure did not satisfy 
South Korea’s national pride as some less developed countries, such as Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Mongolia, and Afghanistan, already had astronauts. Thus, it was somewhat late for South 
Korea, as the eleventh-ranked economic country, to have its own astronaut. Furthermore, 
KARI provided an optimistic vision that established South Korea as one of the top ten space 
powers in the world. Even though “a late comer in human space flight”, South Korea could 
eventually catch up with other developed countries as it experienced rapid economic growth 
in a very short time. The Astronauts Program was classified as a national project after the 
Mid-to-Long-Term plan, so by steadily following the plan South Korea could be a space 
power, launching a 100% Korean SLV, with a Korean astronaut in the near future.  
The KARI drew the public directly into the KAP by allowing “any Korean male or 
female over nineteen who is intellectually, morally, and physically fit” to apply. The 
statement, “Anyone can be an astronaut”, was a rhetorical strategy to try and win over as 
many people as possible to secure a democratic foundation for the KAP. The selection notice 
was posted in 2006 for 3 months, from April 21 to July 14. In all 29,280 males and 6,926 
females (36,206 people) applied for the astronaut contest.424 From the beginning of the 
program to the selection of the final candidates, the whole process was broadcast by Seoul 
Broadcasting System (SBS) in its program entitled, “2008 Space Korea.” KARI and SBS 
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conducted the selection of astronauts in the format of ‘a reality show’ such as ‘Survivor’ and 
‘American Idol.’ 
On December 24, 2006, the high-publicity competition eventually yielded two 
finalists; Ko San, a thirty-year-old male artificial-intelligence scientist in the Samsung 
Advanced Institute of Technology, and Yi Soyeon, a twenty-nine-year-old female graduate 
student majoring in biotechnology in KAIST. They started their training in Moscow for the 
Soyuz TMA spaceship and in Houston for conditions on the ISS (International Space Station). 
On September 5, 2007, the MOST announced Ko as primary astronaut and Yi as backup, 
following their performance in tests during training in Russia. Ko indicated the important 
symbolic value of the flight to South Korea by stating that he would “bring soil from each 
side of the divided Korean peninsula and mix them together in space during his flight.”425 
However, on March 10, 2008, less than one month before the flight, this decision was 
reversed, after the Federal Space Agency asked for a replacement. Ko twice violated the 
regulations of the training protocol in Russia by reading, without authorization, some 
sensitive documents and by mailing one to Korea. It was the first time a candidate for 
spaceflight had to be replaced for a breach of training regulations. Baek Hong-ryeol, head of 
the KARI explained that “the Russian side judged that Ko’s self-driven behavior could cause 
serious results to other spacemen in the real situation and requested the replacement.”426 Ko 
also reiterated that the KARI had nothing to do with the case, and said he hoped to use the 
know-how he had learned about manned space flight. Conspiracy theorists argued that Ko 
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was a spy for the Korean government, and given that he had shown a solid and disciplined 
personality, was unlikely to disobey rules twice of his own volition.427  
Yi moved into Ko’s slot and became a member of the Soyuz TMA-12 crew with 
Russian Sergei Volkov, commander, and Oleg Kononenko, flight engineer. On April 8, 2008, 
the Soyuz rocket carrying them was launched from Baikonur in Kazakhstan. They spent two 
days in the Soyuz spacecraft until docking with the ISS, arriving there on April 10. Yi spent 
about nine days aboard the ISS and conducted 13 scientific experiments in biology, life 
science, material science, earth science and system engineering, five educational space 
experiments, and three kinds of international collaboration experiments.428 She succeeded in 
all of these experiments during the nine days and successfully sent all of the results to 
scientists on the ground.429 
One experiment was nearly cancelled because of political interference. The 
experiment entitled “Small-Organism-Culture-Medium that Can Be Used in Space” involved 
creating equipment that could culture animal and plant cells in a low-gravity environment. 
This equipment was developed nationally for two years and was able to culture adult stem 
cells of Donghaeana dokdonensis, a new kind of micro-organism discovered in Korean 
waters in 2004. It was named after Dokdo, a Korean island in the East Sea (Sea of Japan), 
where the Japanese government has challenged Korea’s territorial sovereignty. The KARI 
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tried to advertise the experiment widely but ran into obstacles: months before the launch, the 
Japanese government requested its withdrawal as a condition for Yi being able to visit the 
ISS. (Japan has the authority, as a nation within the ISS, to restrict the activities of astronauts 
from nations who are not members of the ISS.) The KARI considered the political situation 
between Japan and Korea, and sought permission to continue the experiments on condition 
that the results would not be publicized. Japan accepted this proposal, making it possible to 
proceed with the experiment.430 
In addition to scientific experiments, Yi conducted many performances and activities 
in the ISS, such as giving space lectures, performances with various flags including the 
Korean national flag, doing ham radio communication with Korean students, participating in 
live TV broadcasts, and so on. She remarked that “Korea, as seen from space, is one country”, 
and she wanted people in North Korea to be “happy” with her mission and share in her 
“triumph.” She voiced the hope that one day the two halves of her divided peninsula would 
reunite.431 The highlights of the mission for Yi, and the entire South Korean nation, was a 
traditional Korean kimchi dinner Yi hosted on 12 April in the space station, in honor of the 
first Russian in space, Yuri Gagarin. Kimchi is a signature national dish of fermented cabbage, 
marinated in red pepper and garlic. Korean culinary scientists recently perfected a way to 
make kimchi and other Korean dishes such as soybean soup, hot pepper paste, sticky rice and 
Korean ginseng suitable for space travel. 
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Immediately after Yi returned on April 24, 2008, her flight was covered extensively 
by the South Korean media, making Yi a national hero. Despite the controversy over whether 
Yi was an astronaut or a space traveler432, the effort made by the Korean government to 
promote space development to the general public was successful, as measured by the level of 
public attention. According to a survey of 500 adults by Hankook Research in 2008, 99% of 
the respondents knew that the first Korean astronaut had accomplished a space flight, and 
82.2% of those who answered said that their interest in space had increased. South Korea 
does not have further plans for human space flight. 
 
The “Success of the Troika”  
In an attempt to continue the success of the astronaut program, KARI pushed on with 
the launch of KSLV-1, notwithstanding disputes with the Russians over technology transfer. 
The detailed design of the first stage of KSLV-1 was completed by December 2005, yet 
Russia refused to deliver the design and production technology until the Russian parliament 
had ratified the technology cooperation pact that protected its sensitive rocket technology and 
parts. Without this design data, South Korea was unable to complete the interface between 
the first and second stages or the construction of the launch facility. In October 17, 2006, 
South Korea signed the Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) that Russia would supply 
components and materials needed for the development “without transferring technology” so 
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as to have the maiden KSLV-1 flight by late 2007 as planned.433 The date for the flight 
slipped to August 2009. Russia called for postponements six times due to technical problems 
in developing the first-stage rocket.434 
Meanwhile, ‘made in Korea’ parts were successfully completed one by one under the 
catchphrase “Korean satellite is launched by Korean launch vehicle at Korean space center.” 
The Korean engineers called this success the “Success of the Troika.”435 For the payload of 
KSLV-1, SaTReC developed STsat-2 (Science and Technology Satellite-2) in October 2002 
as a sequel mission to KITsat-4, also known as STsat-1, in orbit since September 2003.436 
The 100-kilogram satellite STsat-2 would carry two main payloads; DREAM (Dual-channel 
Radiometer for Earth and Atmosphere Monitoring) which can measure the moisture level of 
the earth’s atmosphere and cloud, and, secondly, LRA (Laser Reflector Array) which 
provides precise orbit information of the STsat-2. During the two years spent on its 
ellipsoidal orbit of 300-1500km LRA was expected to optimize the performance of the 
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technologies proven in the small satellite projects previously developed by the SaTReC, and 
to test advanced bus technologies for small satellites.437  
The first space launching base, the Naro Space Center, was built on a remote island 
named Oenarodo [outer Naro island], in the South Jeolla Province on the southern coast of 
the Korean peninsula. South Korea had a rocket launching site at the Anheung Test Center of 
the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) on the west coast of the Korean Peninsula, 
where it launched the Korean Sounding Rockets (KSR-1, 2, 3). However, the space center 
was built far from any military base as South Korea was not supposed to develop space 
programs supported by, or interconnected with, the military. Also the KSLV-1 would be 
launched in a southern direction to place satellites into polar orbits so avoiding strong protests 
from China on westbound flights and from Japan on eastbound launches.438 Beginning work 
on the center in 2000, Hyundai Heavy Industries completed the construction of the facilities 
in 2007 with a blueprint provided by the Khrunichev Space Center, except for the launch pad 
and erector, which could be done after delivery of the first-stage from Russia. The second 
stage of the KSLV-1 was already completed by April 2008. The final comprehensive 
operational tests took place to check the overall operation and function at each stage of the 
flight sequence after the launch, including fairing separation, ignition of the Kick Motor of 
the upper stage, satellite separation and flight completion. In June 2009, the Russian first 
stage of KSLV-1 was delivered from Khrunichev Space center by aircraft to Pusan 
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International Airport, and moved by ship to Naro space center to be integrated with second 
stage of the satellite and the fairing.439  
Finally, on August 25, 2009, South Korea’s first space rocket, Naro-1 renamed 
through an online bidding process in May 2009,440 blasted off with STsat-2A at the Naro 
Space Center, the country’s first spaceport. The launch seemed successful. Min Kyung-Ju, 
head of the Naro Space Center, said “If the launch is successful, South Korea will become a 
member of the ‘space club’ whose members have developed their own rockets and satellites 
and sent this into space from a launch facility on their own soil.” However, the satellite failed 
to achieve the desired orbit; one of the two payload fairings that covered the satellite failed to 
separate, and the second stage did not have enough fuel to overcome the additional weight. 
The spacecraft was then 342km above waters near Australia instead of the 306km altitude it 
was supposed to reach. In a Cabinet meeting shortly after the official announcement of the 
failure, President Lee Myung-Bak called for renewed and redoubled efforts to advance the 
country’s space technology: “We must realize our dream of becoming a leading country in 
space technology, even if it takes an eighth attempt after seven failures or a ninth attempt 
after eight failures.”  
The second launch of a Naro-1 with a payload of STsat-2B that was identical to 
STsat-2A took place on June 10, 2010; yet it also ended in failure. According to the KARI, it 
exploded 137 seconds after liftoff, when it was believed to be at an altitude of around 70km. 
South Korea and Russia failed to agree on the cause of the aborted launch of the Naro. A 
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joint committee of Russian and South Korean experts consisting of thirty engineers from each 
country began an investigation into the cause of the failure in August 2010, but had not 
reached agreement by June 2011.441 While Russians claimed that the malfunction in the 
flight termination system in the Korean upper stage rocket might have caused an explosion, 
KARI claimed that a malfunction in the oxidation and compression systems in the Russian 
first-stage rocket might have led to the failure. The investigation team found it very difficult 
and time-consuming to verify the exact causes of the failure. Finally it could only recommend 
that the two countries do what they could to avoid another failure. 
Although the definitive cause of the second failed launch had not been determined, 
the two countries agreed to push for a third attempt as outlined in a bilateral agreement. A 
third launch of Naro-1 was scheduled to take place by the end of 2012. The government said 
that if this third launch also ended in failure, the Naro project would be terminated, although 
it had already given approval for a new generation of space vehicles. The first attempt on 26 
October was delayed only hours before its scheduled lift off due to a leak detected in a 
connection between the first-stage rocket and the launch pad. A second attempt on 29 
November, 2012 was also suspended due to problems in the upper second-stage of the rocket. 
Finally, on January 30, 2013, after a decade of development and two failed attempts, the 
Naro blasted off smoothly and placed the STsat-2C into orbit. The Korean government 
announced that “in spite of its short history of 25 years in space development, Korea has 
secured outstanding space development abilities, becoming the 11th member of the ‘Space 
                                       








Initially focusing on purchasing foreign technology, South Korea has made major 
efforts in the last decade to develop independent capabilities for the production and orbiting 
of satellites using its own launcher. During the 1990s, South Korea began a space program 
with KITsat-1 and 2 with the assistance of Surrey University in the U.K., and KOMPsat-1 
(1999) cooperating with American and French manufacturers of space systems. In this 
century, it has increased its technological capabilities with the success of fourteen national 
satellites projects including KITsat-3 and KOREAsat-3 (1999), KITsat-4/STsat-1(2003), 
MBsat (2004), KOMPsat-2 and KOREAsat-5 (2006), KOREAsat-6 and COMS-1 (2010), 
KOMPsat-3 (2012), STsat-2c, KOMPsat-5, and STsat-3 (2013), and KOMPsat-3A (2015). 
KOMPsat enables Korea to monitor the ground, ocean, and general environment with high 
accuracy as well as to strengthen the nation’s security and international competitiveness in 
space technology. STsat is devoted to preliminary research and space experiments, and 
COMS serves the needs of meteorological observation, monitoring, and the development of 
next-generation geostationary satellite communications.443 
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Although the scale of the space industry in Korea is still very limited (o.45% share in 
the global space market based on sales in 2013444), the government continuously creates a 
demand for the space industry by supporting the export of aerospace products. In 2008, the 
Korean Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) signed contracts totaling 
$22 million with three overseas institutions, including the European Space Agency (ESA), to 
supply KOMPsat-2 satellite images over the next three years.445 For private use and other 
uses, KAI (Korea Aerospace Industries), acting as the sales agent for KMPsat-2 images in 
Korea, distributes them at a commercial price. The SaTReC-I, a private spin-off firm 
established by former KAIST engineers, became the first Korean company to enter the 
foreign satellite market winning many contracts for the complete or partial development of 
satellites for medium-resolution Earth observations from more than 20 global customers in 
Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.446 
However, launch technology is much more difficult to acquire through technology 
transfer than satellite technology because it is dual-use. Like other space-faring countries, 
South Korea has been subject to bilateral control regimes such as the 1979 Missile Note that 
prevented technology being diverted to missile development. This affected the indigenous 
NHK-1 that was built by modifying the U.S. Nike Hercules ballistic missile. Using the 
industrial and technical infrastructure put in place for the NHK-1 project, South Korea 
initiated its sounding rocket project for scientific purpose, KSR in the 1990s. KARI 
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successfully launched the solid-fuelled sounding rockets KSR-1 in 1993, KSR-2 in 1998, and 
liquid-fuelled KSR-3 in 2002. The indigenous propulsion, control and guidance technologies 
used in the KSR series would also be utilized for the first Korean space launcher. Thus, the 
KSLV-1 project has been crucial to South Korea as a new entrant to the space community to 
build its prestige and boost the national image abroad. Along with the nationalistic slogan of 
“Launching Our Own Satellite with Our Own Rocket from Our Own Country,” KARI 
conducted landmark events for the exposure of space development to the public, for example, 
the project to restore Singijeon, a 15th-century South Korean rocket system, and the first 
Korean Astronaut Program. 
North Korea’s attempt to orbit its first satellite in 1998, so-called Taepodong Shock, 
directly affected the basic direction of independent development of KSLV-1. South Korea 
brought its independent launch of KSLV-1 forward by five years, and urged the U.S. to revise 
the 1979 Missile Note and allow its entrance into the MTCR. Indeed, this political drive led 
South Korea to turn to international cooperation with Russia rather than overcome technical 
difficulties in developing an indigenous liquid-fueled rocket for KSLV-1. As it turned out 
international cooperation in building a rocket came at the cost of an eight-year delay and a 40% 
budget increase. South Korea initially planned to have a launcher capable of lifting a 100kg 
payload into low earth orbit by 2005, but only achieved this goal in 2013 due to prolonged 
negotiations over the partnership with the Russians and significant problems with rocket 
engine development. In that time the initial budget of 359.4 billion won (about $370 million) 
grew to 509.8 billion won (about $524 million).447 
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Thomas Hughes suggests that it is extremely rare for the large technological systems 
to be countered. He elaborates with an analogy that places large technological systems 
alongside dinosaurs; “To counter large technological systems, forces analogous to those that 
killed off the dinosaurs are needed.”448 When a big science project such as space exploration 
gets underway, it is difficult to stop the project even with institutional means such as 
evaluation and audit. In terms of project management, the delay of the KSLV-1 project can 
attributed to an over-optimistic plan based on the best-case scenario, undefined objectives 
and performance specifications, and cursory evaluation.449 Indeed, as in 2007, the long 
negotiations over technology transfer agreed that Russia would supply components and 
materials needed for the development “without transferring technology,” Critics suggested 
that the Russians were using Korean money to get precious expertise for their own rockets, 
without transferring rocket technology to South Korea.450 A joint committee investigating the 
cause of the second failure of KSLV-1 in 2010 even suggested reducing interactions between 
the Russian first stage and Korean second stage for higher credibility of the system.451 
Despite of delays due to problems with the “made in Russia” first stage, KARI postponed its 
schedule for launch many times rather than abandon the project which had already been set 
up in 2005.  
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As James Moltz points out, the Korean space program has been “motivated by the 
joint but sometimes contradictory goals of building its prestige and promoting international 
cooperation.”452 KSLV-1 has been, indeed, at the intersection of such complicated national 
and global contradictions. The motivations for the project were the aspiration to develop a 
space industry on a par with the advanced countries, unsettled historical and geopolitical 
rivalries with North Korea, and a desire to emerge from a long dependency on foreign 
technology. And its success has been closely intertwined with the global environment in 
which South Korea collaborated with Russia under the MTCR. Park Jeong-joo, head of 
KSLV Propulsion Div., estimated that “[KSLV-1] was a collaborative effort, one that was 
necessary for a giant leap. We did obtain invaluable knowledge from them, and worked our 
way up to emulating their technologies. It was rather lucky to fail at two attempts in 2009 and 
2010, because we had a maximum chance to learn from Russia through those failures.”453 
2013 marks another significant year in the history of the Korean space program. On 
November 2013, the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning announced the second 
Middle and Long Term space Development Plan.454 The next step for South Korea is 
developing its own indigenous rocket, the KSLV-2, a three-stage rocket with a liquid-fuel 
engine carrying an application satellite by 2020. South Korea aims to develop an indigenous 
10-ton thrust liquid fueled rocket engine by 2016, a 75-ton thrust engine by 2018, and a 300-
ton thrust engine that can carry a 1.5-ton satellite into outer space by 2020. In the meantime, 
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North Korea launched a three-stage rocket Unha-3 with the Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite into 
orbit on 12 December 2012, and U.S. defense officials confirmed the object in orbit.455 On 7 
October, 2012, South Korea and U.S. reached an agreement allowing South Korea to extend 
the range of its ballistic missiles to 800 kilometers with a 500 kilogram payload.456 It 
remains to be seen how South Korea’s space program will evolve over time in this 
complicated local and global context.  
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has detailed the story of the origin and development of the Korean 
space program from its early years to the present (1958-2013). My primary approach to this 
narrative has been a close examination of how different imagineries of space development 
have evolved with the Korean state’s efforts at nation-building. The Korean state mobilized 
these imaginaries at successive crossroads in the nation-building process. I have highlighted 
the centrality of the goals of modernity, self-defense, economic security, and national prestige 
as drivers of space development, taking it to a new level each time. My critical argument has 
been that, while these imaginaries were deployed for nationalistic reasons, there was always a 
hidden transnational context.  
The Sputnik Shock of 1957 directly motivated the political leaders to develop guided 
weapons for national security. Furthermore it inspired the Korean people who became 
fascinated with rocket development under the slogan of an “aspiration for a Western 
modernity.”  This aspiration would help them emerge from the “backwardness” of Korea’s 
long colonization followed by civil war and subsequent division. The development team in 
the NDSRI launched their first modern rocket successfully in 1958 under President Rhee’s 
strong support. The social response to several amateur rocketeers’ efforts to launch their self-
produced rudimentary rockets was very enthusiastic, and some amateur rocket clubs and 
scholarly associations, such as KAS and KSSSS championed a boom in popular space 
science. However, the military government that seized power through a coup in 1961 
dismissed NDSRI in order to secure the U.S.’s approval and continued assistance. The 
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military government echoed Kennedy’s changed foreign policy which denied cutting edge 
equipment in exchange for consumable military supplies.  Stunted, the rocket boom did not 
advance into a national space policy in the 1960s. 
It was only in the early 1970s that South Korea began to again pursue the 
development of a new generation of guided missiles. This time the rationale was based on the 
principle of “self-defense” because of serious concerns over the increasing threat from North 
Korea - and U.S. forces’ withdrawal from South Korea after the implementation of the Nixon 
doctrine. South Korea established the ADD in 1970 to pursue modernization programs for the 
armed forces, and initiated both nuclear weapons and surface-to-surface missile programs. 
Although the ADD, under pressure from the United States, suspended the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons in the mid-1970s, it did successfully develop the surface-to-surface guided missile 
K-1, a modification of the U.S.-produced Nike Hercules missile, in 1978. Recognizing U.S. 
fears of proliferation and regional tensions, South Korea signed the Missile Note in 1979 
which allowed only for the development of missiles with a short range of 180km.  
In the 1980s, South Korea began to outline a new economic rationale for moving the 
country into the field of space technology, this time based on high-tech infrastructure and 
skilled workers trained through the growing defense industry in the 1970s. As the majority of 
South Korean industry based on low-cost labor was only able to compete in world markets 
thanks to global technology protectionism in the 1980s, the country emphasized space 
development as a way to reinforce South Korean’s “economic security.” Space development 
would give South Korea a chance to catch up with advanced industrial nations and withstand 
the fierce international competition in new technology. Although initially relying on the 
import of technology from foreign countries, South Korea soon aspired to attaining an 
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indigenous capability for space development. In 1996, the government announced its first 
Basic Plan on Mid-to-Long-Term National Space Development, of which the main objective 
was to join the top 10 countries in the space industry and to launch KSLV-1 from a local 
launch site with a satellite developed independently in 2010.    
When North Korea attempted to launch the Taepodong-1 space launch vehicle with a 
satellite in 1998, South Korea brought its launch of KSLV-1 forward by five years from 2010 
to 2005. Also South Korea revised the 1979 Missile Guideline and joined the MCTR to 
extend the range of Korea’s rocket development. The dominant imagination for Korean space 
development was now “national prestige.” Even though South Korea turned to international 
cooperation with Russia rather than indigenous development of the rocket engine for KSLV-1 
to meet its new deadline, the imaginary of national prestige endured with public events - such 
as the restoration project of Singijeon and the first Korean Astronaut Program. Despite of 
delays due to a long period of negotiation on technology transfer with Russia, some technical 
problems, and two failed attempts in 2009 and 2010, in 2013 South Korea succeeded in 
launching KSLV-1 and delivering a satellite into orbit. 
I have argued here that the fifty-five years of South Korea’s aspiration for space is 
divisible into four periods according to changing dominant national imaginations in political 
and social contexts; “modernization” during the 1950s~1960s, “self-defense” during 
1970~1984, “economic security” during 1985~1997, and “national prestige” during 
1998~2013. These nationalistic imaginations were invoked and re-presented at key turning 
points in policy formation. The characteristics and transitions of Korean space development, 
as examined through four phases in terms of five categories, are summarized in Table 5.  
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Here one can observe some of the turning points in deploying the imaginations of South 
Korean space development.  
 
 
Table 5: The Change in Korean Space Development 
 
 1958~1969 1970~1984 1985~1997 1998~2013 
Imaginaries Modernity Self-defense Economic Security National Prestige 
Turning point  Established ADD (1970) 
Establishing the first 
national long-term plan 




The Sputnik Shock 
(1957) 
Established a rocket 
team in NDSRI (1958) 
Dismissed NDSRI 
(1961) 
Increasing threats from 
North Korea (1969) 







The Seoul Olympic 
Games(1988) 
Revision of Missile 
Agreement  and entry 
into the MTCR(2001) 
Space-related 
Act and Policy 
 
The Promotional Plan 
for the Aerospace 
Industry (1972) 
Long-term plan for the 
development of science 
and technology toward 
the 2000s (1985),  
Basic plan on mid-to-
long-term national space 
development(1996) 
Basic plan on mid-to-








Paekkom missile (1978) 
 
Satellites (KoreaSat, 
KITsat, KOMPsat series),  







The First Korean 




My case study of the Korean space program suggests that these national imaginations 
tended to be adapted, maintained, and transformed at the national level as powerful 
instruments of “meaning-making and goal-selecting in the process of nation-building.”457 
Asif Sidiqqi has argued that the link between nationalism and competence in space activities 
has been articulated by four elements ubiquitous in the public conceptions of any national 
space program: the iconography of a founding father, the claim of indignity, the link with 
national identity, and the necessity of justifications.458 These elements obviously include the 
perception of a powerful relationship between science and technology and nationalism, and 
they have constructed a master narrative of the history of space exploration and informed 
major decisions regarding national space policy. The history of the Korean space program 
shows that the nation retains a very strong position as the primary enabler of space 
development in spite of increased international cooperation coming out of the fifty years of 
spaceflight.459 Also, the national imaginations enabling a country’s space program have been 
changing because they are deeply connected to collective visions of desired futures.  
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Paradoxically speaking, however, this path of nation-building to enable a country’s 
space program cannot be fully captured within “the walls of national containers,” because a 
nationalistic narrative sometimes “occlude[s] the multiple borrowings and transnational 
interactions that are sustained by interpersonal, inter-institutional and inter-firm relations.” 460 
The dominant imaginations in each period of the history of the Korean space program 
commonly view the science and technology related to the space industry as primarily a form 
of national power and as instruments to serve state-led development. Also, the stability and 
instability of an imagination cannot help being heavily dependent on the multifaceted 
processes of co-producing space technology and nationhood. As John Krige recently stressed, 
however, scientific and technological practices in space exploration (as well as nuclear 
science) in reality have been “embedded in global networks through which knowledge in all 
its forms circulated.”461 For this reason, he proposed that one “study the history of space 
through a lens that describes the tissue of global linkages that make ‘national’ space programs 
possible and that sustain them.”  
The many cases in the history of Korean space program, as described in this 
dissertation, show that Korean space technology has been at the intersection of multiple flows 
of knowledge, materials, and human resources from a variety of sources across borders. For 
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example, the K-1 missile described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation is characterized by such 
cross-border flows. The K-1 is still widely known as the first “Korean” missile developed by 
Korean engineers’ dedicated efforts despite the pressure from U.S. fears of proliferation in 
the 1970s. The news media have rarely covered the dependence of its production programs 
on foreign countries. Yet, as I have shown, the ADD  at the time actively sought to purchase 
the necessary propellant and guidance technologies, parts and components on the 
international market including both the U.S. and France. Foreign policy scholar Janne Nolan 
criticized a film shown to him when he visited the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis in 
March 1982: “the film was an enthusiastic interpretation of the arms production capabilities 
of South Korean industries. It managed completely to avoid reference to U.S. assistance and 
components.”462 It is not surprising that the government and the news media demonstrate the 
independence and nationalistic pride of the weapon more than foreign assistance for it. As 
Nolan points out, the importance of the missile has “far more to do with political symbolism 
than with any objective calculation of military utility.”  
The motives for South Korea commencing independent arms production in the early 
1970s can be analyzed in terms of three main factors: the increasing threats from North Korea, 
the insecurity of its alliance with the U.S., and Park’s urge towards self-reliance. The 
involvement of these factors in key aspects of South Korea’s development of the missile 
created a sense of urgency that led the country to make efforts to acquire the components for 
the most advanced weapons from those available in the international market. The 
development of K-1 was feasible with the circulation of flows of people, ideas and objects 
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across national boundaries, with the structures that support these flows and with the different 
scales across which structures and flows operate. Thus, in John Krige’s notion, the K-1 
missile was a “global hybrid,” embedded in a network of interconnections that overflowed 
territorial boundaries, rather than a national product.463 The first “Korean” satellite KITsat-1 
developed by a contract between two universities in Korea and the U.K. and the first “Korean” 
space launch vehicle KSLV-1 which has a Russian-built first stage also provide fertile 
examples of the global hybrid, despite their nationalistic significance. 
The contradiction between the nationalistic core of the imaginations of the Korean 
space program, and the reality of the transnational character built into the technical hardware, 
demanded that a good deal of social work be done to align the conquest of space by Korea 
with a nationalistic rhetoric. Even though South Korea furthered its capabilities and expertise 
towards a space-launch in developing its own surface-to-surface guided rocket K-1 in 1970s, 
popular enthusiasm for space exploration that was created by the Korean people themselves 
did not directly affect the top-level decision to go to space later. It is simply because before 
the 1980s the only external force that affected military rocket projects was the Korean 
Government itself. However, the public has emerged as one of the most important external 
forces since the government first began to express an interest in a civilian space program in 
the mid-1980s. As exposure to the public became a very important feature of Korean space 
development, such development is never far removed from the public consciousness.  
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For example, the KITsat-1 in 1992 given the nickname Uribyeol (Our Star in Korean), 
was stigmatized as a “foreign star,” 464 and Korea’s first astronaut, Dr. Yi So-Yeon, who 
took part in space activities in the ISS in 2008, was also criticized for being a “space tourist” 
not an astronaut, because she travelled aboard a Russian spacecraft.465  MEST and KARI 
made the communication strategy for KSLV-1 using the slogan of “Our Own Rocket” despite 
its first stage being made in Russia.  This communication strategy for KSLV-1 led to a deep 
distrust of MEST and KARI by the public, who also began to doubt their technical capability. 
The successive delays of the launch led people to suspect that that the Russians were using 
Korean money to get precious expertise for their own rockets without transferring rocket 
technology to South Korea. Finally after the first failure, the distrust of the public partly 
resulted in the request for a change of organization in KARI. In 2011, the leadership of KARI 
was handed over to external specialists in order to strengthen local cooperation among 
industry, university, and government institutes for the success of the future of Korean space 
exploration.466  
In this way, changing imaginations were embedded in the political culture of a nation. 
The history of the Korean space program, which has been “motivated by the joint, but 
sometimes contradictory, goals of building its prestige and promoting international 
cooperation,” can be understood to be closely intertwined with the global environment in 
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which Korean space policy has evolved in the process of the construction of national 
imaginations.  The nation helps to reconfigure actors’ sense of the possible space of action 
by mobilizing resources, but it also sometimes triggers resistance when it calls for movement 
across borders. The nation-state in transnational history is like a “porous membrane 
permitting a two-way flow of the stuff of knowledge.”467 
 A major difficulty in the transnational perspective is that de-centering the nation-
state can lead to abandoning the national as a category of analysis altogether.468 However, 
writing a transnational history of space exploration does not mean only rupturing the national 
frame. Rather, transnational history requires placing the nation-state in its proper global 
context. As John Krige has stressed one seeks “to embed the national into the transnational 
narrative-not as a bounded container but as one node in an interconnected global network. 
We must position our national actors on a global stage of competing and collaborating, actual 
and aspirant space powers, and follow them as they choose, or refuse, to establish links with 
institutions and individuals in other countries. A global space history must retain the national 
as key analytic category-not as an autonomous but as an interdependent actor, whose 
practices are inspired by national interest and framed by foreign policy.”469  
                                       
467 John Krige’s remark at Francis Bacon Conference at California Institute of Technology, 7-9 May 
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of Science Society Vol. 39, No.3, (July 2010). 
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The new era for space exploration will be international and participatory; thus, the 
influence of cultural values and national aspirations of various countries must be considered 
in long-term cooperative exploration activities. The Korean space program will be also 
deeply connected to the coproduction of science, technology, and national identity that will 
be driven by a collective imagination of a desired future, one which entails complex 
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